Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261200Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS: GLOC SEVERANCE IMMINENT. C2 HARDENING IMPERATIVE AMIDST WIDESPREAD POWER OUTAGES. RF IO EXPLOITS ABU DHABI DIPLOMACY.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF forces maintain the high-tempo ground assault on the Pokrovsk Axis. The kinetic effort is directly linked to deep infrastructure strikes designed to paralyze UAF response.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): RF forces continue attempts to seize the T-05-15 GLOC (Rodynske sector). UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) activity is confirmed near Pokrovsk (FRIENDLY FACT), indicating ongoing close-quarters defense and counter-penetration operations.
• Southern Fixation (Zaporizhzhia): Confirmed kinetic activity around Huliaipole and Stepnohirsk. UAF forces successfully defended against RF assault groups near Stepnohirsk (FRIENDLY FACT), while RF UAV units (14th Guards Brigade) successfully struck UAF vehicles in the sector (ENEMY FACT). Civilian casualties are reported in Zaporizhzhia (FRIENDLY FACT).
• Northern Operations (Sumy): RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed using Orlan-10 and Lancet loitering munitions to destroy AFU hardware in the Sumy region (ENEMY FACT), reinforcing the observation that RF is dedicating precision ISR/Strike assets to eliminate UAF mobile reconnaissance in the border regions.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

Conditions remain permissive for large-scale mechanized maneuver on the Pokrovsk axis (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The risk profile has intensified due to simultaneous infrastructure collapse and confirmed C2 disruption in rear areas.

• ENERGY CRISIS (CRITICAL FACT): Emergency power outages (graphically regulated) are confirmed in both Poltava and Kharkiv Oblasts (FRIENDLY FACT, RBC-Ukraine). This confirms the success of the RF deep strike campaign in degrading grid redundancy and severely complicating logistics and backup C2 functioning (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• AD Status: The confirmed energy disruption in the area of the C2 backup nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) renders the MDCOA more probable and potentially more effective.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent: Achieve operational collapse on the Pokrovsk axis (T-05-15) while executing command paralysis via deep strikes and cognitive disruption via highly specific diplomatic IO.

• Capability: Kinetic/Cognitive Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF utilized state media (TASS) to confirm US-RF-UA contacts in Abu Dhabi immediately following the confirmed energy strikes on Poltava/Kharkiv. This ensures that ground success, kinetic strikes, and IO promoting a US-imposed "peace plan" achieve maximum disruptive effect on UAF resolve and international support stability.
• Logistics/Personnel Sustainment: RF recruitment efforts continue, specifically advertising favorable contract service terms via regional channels (Makhachkala, Dagestan - ENEMY FACT), suggesting a deliberate strategy to recruit motivated contract personnel from specific regions to sustain the war effort (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to employ sophisticated, dedicated UAV reconnaissance-strike packages (Orlan-10/Lancet) to suppress UAF mobile and special operations forces operating outside of main axis friction points (Sumy, Zaporizhzhia).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain adequate for high-tempo assaults. Internal security challenges related to recovering wounded personnel are suggested by the reported extortion case in Moscow, but this is assessed to have a low impact on overall combat readiness (LOW CONFIDENCE).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, centralized, and highly synchronized between the military and diplomatic-informational domains.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: CRITICAL/DEFENSIVE. The confirmed energy outages in Poltava and Kharkiv severely stress the operational sustainment and redundancy of UAF C2 structures supporting the Eastern Front. UAF operational readiness depends critically on the immediate authorization and deployment of Reserve Bravo.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) confirmed operation near Pokrovsk (TACTICAL SUCCESS).
• UAF forces repelled Russian assault near Stepnohirsk, Zaporizhzhia (TACTICAL SUCCESS).
• UAF launched a high-profile recruitment drive for the Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS) (STRATEGIC ADAPTATION).
• Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) announced internal cleansing measures against corruption (STRATEGIC RESILIENCE), countering RF narratives of systemic corruption. Setbacks (CRITICAL):
• Confirmed emergency power outages in Poltava and Kharkiv (OPERATIONAL SETBACK), significantly increasing vulnerability to follow-up strikes.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Immediate AD hardening for C2 nodes and immediate deployment of field generator capacity to key logistics hubs in Poltava/Kharkiv region.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO focus has shifted from internal defeatism to leveraging diplomatic signals to create maximum uncertainty regarding US support continuity and peace terms.

• Diplomatic Ambiguity (CRITICAL): Russian official Ushakov confirmed (TASS, ENEMY FACT) discrete contact channels with the US and UA in Abu Dhabi and confirmed receiving an unofficial US "peace plan." He stated Russia views some points positively but denies that the plan was discussed in UAE.
  • Analysis: This narrative is highly effective: it simultaneously legitimizes the idea of secret negotiations, frames the US as dictating terms ("Plan Trump," Rybar message), and implies that the RF is close to accepting a negotiated settlement favorable to Russia, thus undermining UAF morale and political will (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Aid Disruption: US Republican Congressman Fitzpatrick's reaction to the "Witkoff Tapes" indicates that the RF IO targeting Tomahawk aid is successfully creating political friction within the US (FRIENDLY FACT).
• Hybrid Framing: The reported seizure of a "Geran" (Shahed) drone at the Moldova-Romania border is designed to heighten fears in NATO states regarding materiel accountability and weapons proliferation originating from the conflict zone (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is severely impacted by the confirmed power outages in key regions (Poltava/Kharkiv). The diplomatic ambiguity surrounding the US peace plan and the Abu Dhabi meetings risks creating widespread public confusion and pressure on the NCA to negotiate from a position of weakness.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The explicit targeting of US domestic political cohesion via the "Witkoff" narrative and the manipulation of the Abu Dhabi contacts confirm RF assesses that the Western political environment is highly sensitive and exploitable. US diplomatic engagement, even if focused on prisoner exchange, is being weaponized against Ukraine.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces will achieve definitive control or functional severance of the T-05-15 GLOC (Rodynske sector) NLT 261300Z. This kinetic success will be immediately supported by amplified state media reporting detailing the "progress" made on the informal US peace plan, demanding that Kyiv halt offensive actions and accept the new reality imposed by Washington/Moscow.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF executes a precision ballistic strike targeting the Poltava and Vinnytsia C2 backup nodes NLT 261800Z. The confirmed, widespread energy outages in Poltava/Kharkiv have created optimal conditions for C2 decapitation, as power redundancy and AD coverage are currently degraded.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE MANAGEMENT & GLOC DEFENSE (J3/NCA)

1. IMMEDIATE RESERVE DEPLOYMENT: The NCA must confirm authorization and physical movement of Reserve Force Bravo NLT 261230Z to conduct immediate counter-attack and stabilization operations around the T-05-15 corridor.
2. RECON/FIRE SUPPORT TARGETING: Prioritize HIMARS/ATACMS targeting missions against confirmed RF heavy fire support systems (TOS-1A, heavy artillery) supporting the imminent Rodynske assault. Use SSO-derived intelligence for specific target coordination.

R-2: CRITICAL ASSET HARDENING & GRID STABILIZATION (AD Command/J4 Energy)

1. MDCOA MITIGATION (AD): Immediately execute the pre-planned movement of PAC-3/SAMP-T or equivalent long-range AD systems to establish a dense protective bubble over Poltava and Vinnytsia C2 nodes NLT 261400Z.
2. POWER RESTORATION: J4 (Logistics/Energy) must prioritize the immediate deployment of mobile high-capacity generators to critical command and communication nodes within the Poltava/Kharkiv oblasts to mitigate C2 failure risk arising from the confirmed outages.
3. UAS COUNTER-MEASURES (NORTH): Shift SHORAD units deployed to the North to active, mobile patrol roles focused on countering dedicated RF ISR/Lancet teams confirmed operating in Sumy, utilizing Electronic Warfare (EW) countermeasures to preempt high-value precision strikes.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-IO (NCA/J2 IO)

1. NEUTRALIZE DIPLOMATIC AMBIGUITY: The NCA must immediately issue a joint public statement with the US (White House or State Department) to explicitly clarify the purpose of the Abu Dhabi meeting (e.g., prisoner exchange, humanitarian issues) and deny that any US "peace plan" favorable to RF interests is currently under active discussion or negotiation.
2. AMPLIFY RESILIENCE: Immediately amplify confirmed UAF tactical successes (SSO in Pokrovsk, defensive success in Stepnohirsk) and internal institutional cleansing actions (PGO corruption case) to demonstrate combat effectiveness and governance resilience in the face of kinetic and informational assaults.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS