Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261100Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS: KINETIC EXPLOITATION IMMINENT. C2 AD VULNERABILITY UNMITIGATED. RF IO SHIFTS TO HIGH-VALUE AID DISRUPTION.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF forces continue synchronized kinetic and shaping operations across three axes to support the main effort on the Pokrovsk Axis.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): RF high-tempo ground assault persists. Immediate threat remains the severance of the T-05-15 GLOC (Rodynske sector), isolating forward UAF units.
• Infrastructure Attacks: RF forces have executed new strikes against Energy Infrastructure in both Donetsk and Kharkiv Oblasts (confirmed by MinEnergy), resulting in emergency power outages. This action supports the main ground effort by further degrading rear-area C2 and logistics ahead of the predicted breakthrough. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Southern Fixation (Zaporizhzhia): UAS activity detected targeting Zaporizhzhia (from the South) has been cleared. Defensive action remains highly effective in this sector, confirmed by the destruction of 2x Tanks and 60+ pieces of enemy materiel in the last 24 hours. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Northern Operations (Sumy): RF forces confirmed the successful use of ISR/loitering munitions to strike a UAF light tactical vehicle (buggy) in the Malaya Rybitsa area (Sumy Oblast). This confirms RF intent to aggressively counter UAF mobile infiltration/reconnaissance units outside the main operational zones. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Weather conditions remain permissive for mechanized movement on the Pokrovsk axis.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The threat profile is dominated by the simultaneous kinetic degradation of infrastructure (Energy/C2) and cognitive degradation of strategic partnerships (IO).

• UAF Deep Strike Efficacy: RF sources confirmed damage to civilian infrastructure (20 apartments, 15 homes) in Novorossiysk resulting from the earlier UAF strike. This validates the UAF capability to strike strategic Russian infrastructure, though the enemy is actively leveraging collateral damage for IO gain. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• AD Status: The C2 AD vulnerability (Poltava/Vinnytsia nodes) remains unmitigated by available confirmed reporting, making the MDCOA (ballistic decapitation strike) the defining risk for the next 12 hours. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent: Achieve operational collapse on the Pokrovsk axis by severing logistics (GLOC T-05-15), degrading C2 redundancy (Energy strikes/MDCOA), and actively fracturing US-UAF confidence.

• Capability: Synchronized Kinetic/Information: The RF seamlessly integrates new energy strikes with the simultaneous launch of the "Witkoff derailed Tomahawk transfer" IO narrative. This confirms an advanced ability to time cognitive strikes to moments of physical crisis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Tactical Adaptation: Counter-Infiltration: The drone strike in Sumy confirms RF is successfully utilizing ISR assets to target small, highly mobile UAF units used for deep reconnaissance or cross-border harassment. This requires immediate review of UAF mobile unit TTPs in these sectors. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Hybrid Threat: RF sources are actively linking a seized arms smuggling operation (ATGMs, MANPADS in Romania) back to alleged Ukrainian origins. This is an attempt to erode trust among NATO donors regarding materiel accountability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmation of subsequent infrastructure strikes (Donetsk/Kharkiv Energy) shows RF is not halting its deep kinetic effort despite the previous massed strike. This indicates a sustained operational commitment to pre-emptively paralyze UAF C2 and logistics supporting the Eastern front.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adequately supporting the current operational tempo, characterized by high expenditure of ground fire support systems (TOS-1A, previous SITREP) and consistent availability of glide bombs and ballistic assets for deep strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective and highly centralized, ensuring tight synchronization between kinetic (energy strikes) and informational (Tomahawk delay IO) effects.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: CRITICAL/DEFENSIVE. While UAF defensive forces in the South are achieving tactical success, the lack of confirmed Reserve Bravo deployment and the ongoing C2 AD vulnerability leaves the overall operational posture precariously balanced against the main RF effort.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed successful defense and attrition in the Southern Operational Zone (2x Tanks, 60+ OVT destroyed).
• OP Advisor Bevz issued a clear, public rejection of false surrender terms ("No recognition of occupied territories," "No constitutional changes"). This directly addresses and mitigates the previous IO threat of "cognitive paralysis." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Confirmation of pending $5B PURL weapons package by NATO SG provides a critical strategic counter-narrative to defeatism. Setbacks (CRITICAL):
• The continued delay in authorizing/deploying Reserve Force Bravo against the imminent loss of the T-05-15 GLOC remains the primary operational risk.
• High-value US aid (Tomahawk missiles) is now explicitly targeted by RF IO, increasing friction in the military-diplomatic domain.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Immediate AD hardening for C2 nodes. CONSTRAINT: The NCA must ensure that diplomatic assurances (e.g., $5B PURL package) translate into accelerated operational delivery timelines to address immediate kinetic needs.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO strategy has pivoted to attacking the reliability and depth of Western military support, timed precisely with infrastructure strikes.

• Aid Disruption Narrative: The narrative claiming the "Witkoff Tapes" derailed the transfer of Tomahawk missiles is a highly dangerous, targeted cognitive strike designed to convince frontline troops and the civilian population that US support is unreliable and politically fractured. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Legitimacy Counter-Narrative (UAF): The firm, public statement by OP Advisor Bevz, rejecting territorial and constitutional concessions, serves as a decisive counter-measure against the RF's surrender/negotiation IO. This message must be amplified rapidly. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Hybrid/Crime Framing: The emphasis on arms smuggling (Moldova/Romania) and domestic financial fraud (PGO/RF reports) highlights the persistent threat of RF hybrid operations attempting to paint Ukraine as a source of instability and criminality.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale remains under extreme duress due to ongoing kinetic attacks (energy outages confirmed) and persistent IO pressure. The NCA's successful countering of the "surrender terms" helps stabilize domestic political sentiment, but the perceived loss of high-value US weapons (Tomahawks) risks offsetting this gain.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmation of the $5B PURL weapons package from NATO provides a necessary counter-signal to the RF defeatism narrative. The continued targeting of aid mechanisms (Tomahawks) suggests RF assessment that international support remains a critical vulnerability.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces will achieve definitive control or functional severance of the T-05-15 GLOC (Rodynske sector) NLT 261300Z. This success will be immediately followed by the intensification of energy strikes in central/eastern Ukraine and synchronized IO promoting tactical success as a strategic collapse, renewing pressure on the NCA to negotiate.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF executes the follow-up ballistic strike targeting the Poltava/Vinnytsia C2 backup nodes NLT 261800Z. Given the confirmed AD vulnerability and the new confirmed wave of infrastructure attacks (clearing AD attention), the conditions for this decapitation strike are optimized.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE MANAGEMENT & GLOC DEFENSE (J3/NCA)

1. IMMEDIATE RESERVE DEPLOYMENT: The National Command Authority (NCA) must authorize and confirm the physical deployment of Reserve Force Bravo NLT 261130Z. Every minute of delay increases the risk of irreversible encirclement and materiel loss on the Pokrovsk axis. (HIGH PRIORITY)
2. RECON/FIRE SUPPORT PRIORITY: Re-task all available long-range ISR assets (MALE UAVs, SIGINT) and dedicated deep-strike munitions (HIMARS, ATACMS) to target confirmed RF reserve movement or heavy artillery massing within 20km of the T-05-15 corridor, specifically Rodynske, to delay RF advance.

R-2: CRITICAL ASSET HARDENING (AD Command)

1. MDCOA PREEMPTION: Immediately initiate the movement of PAC-3/SAMP-T or specialized long-range AD systems to create a protective envelope over the Poltava and Vinnytsia C2 backup nodes NLT 261400Z. The vulnerability is acute and exploitable by the enemy. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
2. UAS COUNTER-MEASURES (NORTH): Shift SHORAD (Gepard, Avenger) focus in Sumy/Chernihiv from static defense to high-mobility counter-UAS patrol groups utilizing anti-drone EW systems, specifically targeting RF ISR and loitering munitions, countering the confirmed RF adaptation against mobile UAF units.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ALLIANCE PROTECTION (NCA/J2 IO)

1. NEUTRALIZE TOMAHAKW IO: NCA must issue a joint statement with US counterparts immediately to deny the "Tomahawk delay" narrative, confirming the continuity of high-value aid programs. Frame the RF claim as a desperate attempt to fracture trust during a moment of kinetic weakness. (HIGH PRIORITY)
2. AMPLIFY RESISTANCE: Sustain high-volume amplification of OP Advisor Bevz's statement, linking the rejection of concessions directly to the confirmed combat success in the South (60+ OVT destroyed), using factual military results to inoculate the public against the defeatism narrative.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS