Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 260930Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS: DEFENSE ATTRITION REACHING BREAKPOINT. BALLISTIC DEFENSE FAILURE CONFIRMED. RF COGNITIVE STRIKE SUSTAINED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is marked by sustained high-intensity combat on the Pokrovsk Axis (52 engagements reported in the last 24 hours), confirming RF intent to achieve operational depth and kinetic exploitation.

• Pokrovsk Axis: RF kinetic pressure is concentrated on the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) near Rodynske. The window for successful tactical withdrawal (CTW) or reinforcement is assessed as having closed or being critically degraded. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Secondary Axis (Zaporizhzhia): Pro-RF sources claim advances toward Huliaipole (Vostok Grouping), indicating continued fixation operations designed to prevent the rotation of UAF reserves northwards. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike: The RF successfully executed a synchronized strike package utilizing 90 total Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and two Iskander-M Ballistic Missiles launched from Rostov Oblast. This confirms the multi-domain kinetic exploitation strategy.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

The Kharkiv Regional Administration reports worsening weather conditions. This may constrain high-tempo drone and unguided glide bomb (KAB) operations in the northeast theater, though the primary Pokrovsk axis remains conducive to mechanized movement. Solar weather fluctuations (magnetic storm alert) are noted but are not assessed to significantly impact RF/UAF encrypted communications. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces on the Pokrovsk axis are engaged in critical defensive attrition warfare.

• Air Defense (AD) Status: UAF AD successfully suppressed/intercepted 72/90 RF UAS. However, UAF official reporting confirms 0/2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles were intercepted/suppressed. This constitutes a critical failure in terminal defense capabilities against the specified threat vector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• C2 Protection: Local AD successes were reported over Dnipropetrovsk (3 UAVs downed), indicating dispersed SHORAD assets are reacting regionally, but the failure to intercept the high-value ballistic threat suggests strategic AD assets were either mispositioned or overwhelmed.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent remains the kinetic seizure of operational depth on the Pokrovsk Axis synchronized with C2 decapitation/attrition and cognitive paralysis of the NCA.

• Ballistic Lethality: The confirmed penetration by both Iskander-M missiles demonstrates RF capability to strike hardened targets with high precision and destructive power, bypassing current layered defenses. This immediately escalates the threat to all UAF C2, logistics, and strategic assembly areas. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Fixation Operations: Confirmed use of KABs against Sumy and continued KAB/Artillery strikes on Kharkiv validates the use of airpower to fix UAF northern reserves and prevent their deployment to the Pokrovsk Main Effort. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Subversion and Terror: RF is utilizing subversion/intelligence methods, confirmed by the apprehension of a minor involved in a coordinated terrorist attack in Dnipro, supporting the operational objective of generating internal chaos and diverting internal security resources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift toward relying on Iskander-M for high-value deep strikes, following UAS saturation, is the most critical tactical adaptation. This requires a immediate re-evaluation of AD asset allocation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are sustaining high-tempo ground operations and synchronized deep strike capability. UAF forces successfully executed minor railway sabotage actions against RF logistics, indicating partisan activity continues, but this is unlikely to slow the Pokrovsk offensive significantly. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains synchronized, achieving multi-domain effects. UAF C2 is actively managing kinetic responses but remains operationally constrained by the NCA's political paralysis resulting from the "Witkoff Tapes" IO campaign.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: CRITICAL/DANGEROUS. Units forward of the assumed Phase Line Alpha on the Pokrovsk axis are facing encirclement risk. Readiness is high at the tactical AD level (UAS suppression) but critically low at the strategic defense level (Iskander-M penetration).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• High UAS interception rate (72 total).
• Successful low-level AD engagement in regional centers (Dnipropetrovsk).
• Confirmed tactical success of railway sabotage operations (rear-area resistance). Setbacks (CRITICAL):
• Confirmed 0% intercept rate for Iskander-M ballistic missiles.
• NCA remains unable to authorize Reserve Force Bravo due to ongoing IO/political pressure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Immediate deployment of high-tier terminal AD systems (PAC-3, SAMP-T) to protect backup C2/Logistics Nodes (Poltava, Vinnytsia) as these are now the MLCOA/MDCOA targets for the RF ballistic capability. CONSTRAINT: The intelligence gap regarding the precise BDA of the Iskander-M targets (R-2) currently prevents optimized logistics rerouting and C2 hardening.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign has transitioned into an "exploitation phase," leveraging previous successes.

• Cognitive Decapitation: RF media actively discusses the "Witkoff Tapes," linking the leak's content (negotiation framework, US involvement) to internal UAF political infighting. The goal is to maximize distrust in the NCA at the height of the Pokrovsk kinetic assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Diplomatic Normalization: Extensive coverage of Putin's state visit to Kyrgyzstan (TASS, Colonelcassad) serves to project diplomatic confidence and competence, contrasting sharply with the internal political turmoil projected onto Kyiv.
• External Support Erosion: RF sources are actively reporting on EU discussions regarding "Plan B" for using frozen Russian assets, attempting to portray Western support as desperate, complicated, and potentially illegal.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The simultaneous pressure of the Pokrovsk ground assault and the confirmed ballistic strikes, coupled with the political shockwave from the IO campaign, places civilian and military morale under extreme stress. The RF goal is to induce a public demand for immediate cessation of hostilities based on the belief that NCA political infighting is undermining the war effort.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Incoming NATO SG Rutte's statement suggesting the war "may end by the end of 2025" creates an ambiguous temporal framework that RF IO can exploit to encourage a sense of inevitability regarding a negotiated, unfavorable settlement.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces will achieve definitive control of the T-05-15 GLOC (Rodynske sector) NLT 261200Z, formally completing the severance of the main logistics route into Kostiantynivka. Simultaneously, RF will utilize the confirmed 0/2 AD performance to launch follow-up ballistic strikes against the primary Dnipro/Odesa logistics nodes (if the previous strike failed to achieve decisive BDA) or against exposed UAF reserve staging areas immediately behind the contested GLOC.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF, recognizing the failure of UAF AD against Iskander-M, launches a synchronized ballistic strike targeting the secondary Poltava/Vinnytsia C2 backup nodes NLT 261800Z. This would be coupled with the immediate kinetic exploitation of the Pokrovsk front, capitalizing on complete C2 disruption to force an operational collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE MANAGEMENT & CONTINGENCY EXECUTION (J3/Eastern Command)

1. EXPEDITE RESERVE RELEASE (NCA): The National Command Authority must be notified that the kinetic window for deploying Reserve Force Bravo effectively to defend the T-05-15 corridor is hours, not days. Authorization NLT 261100Z is mandatory.
2. IMMEDIATE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN: Eastern Command must allocate maximum deep-strike artillery and drone resources to interdict RF consolidation of control around Rodynske/T-05-15, buying critical time for surviving forward units to execute a controlled withdrawal (CTW). Prioritize high-value counter-battery fire against RF artillery supporting the assault. (HIGH PRIORITY)

R-2: BALLISTIC DEFENSE REDEPLOYMENT (AD Command)

1. C2 HARDENING PRIORITY: Immediately assume the 0/2 intercept rate will be replicated. AD Command must prioritize the emergency movement of all available high-tier terminal phase defense systems (PAC-3/SAMP-T) to defend the Poltava and Vinnytsia C2 backup nodes against the MDCOA.
2. BDA VALIDATION TASKING: Allocate dedicated high-altitude ISR assets (e.g., RQ-4 or equivalent IMINT) to acquire BDA of the confirmed Iskander-M impact points NLT 261500Z to assess the necessity of C2/logistics relocation.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTER-IO (NCA/J2 IO)

1. NCA COUNTER-STRIKE: NCA must deliver an immediate, decisive public response NLT 261100Z that links the confirmed kinetic brutality (Iskander-M strikes, 52 engagements) directly to the confirmed IO campaign ("Witkoff Tapes"). Frame the RF diplomatic maneuvers (Kyrgyzstan) and leaks as coordinated acts of terror and political blackmail.
2. FOCUS ON UNITY: Counter the Dnipro terrorist incident (R-2) by emphasizing internal security resilience and framing the perpetrator as an RF agent, linking subversion efforts to the failed diplomatic agenda.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS