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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-26 03:43:52Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-26 03:13:58Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 260345Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS: RF EXPLOITATION CONTINUES. CRITICAL UAS VECTOR SHIFT FROM C2 DECAPITATION TO NORTHERN FIXATION.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF forces maintain the exploitation phase on the Pokrovsk Axis. The critical decision point for the seizure of Rodynske and the T-05-15 GLOC (NLT 260330Z) has expired without confirmation of UAF secondary reserve commitment. Kinetic pressure is assessed as peaking in this sector.

  • Pokrovsk Axis: Controlled withdrawal/delay operations are required immediately along the T-05-15 corridor. Lack of new data suggests either communication degradation or immediate close combat contact is underway, preventing detailed reporting.
  • Deep Reconnaissance/Strike: The long-duration RF UAS track (Chernihiv) has executed a significant vector change, moving EAST towards Sumy Oblast (CONFIRMED 260318Z). This shifts the focus from operational C2 decapitation (Poltava/Vinnytsia) to deep reconnaissance and potential strike targeting of logistics or AD assets supporting the Kharkiv/Kupiansk sectors.
  • Zaporizhzhia: Confirmed strike resulting in 18 casualties (260326Z) validates RF capacity to maintain kinetic pressure across multiple operational fronts, fixing UAF emergency response and SAR assets.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Low visibility continues to favor RF mechanized movement and deep standoff targeting operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The status of Reserve Force Bravo (RFB) remains unconfirmed (CRITICAL GAP). J3 must proceed with planning based on the assumption of RFB non-viability (Confirmed by previous SITREP, R-1). The shift in the deep UAS threat requires immediate re-evaluation of AD protection measures in the Sumy region.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent remains unchanged: achieve operational depth on the Pokrovsk axis and collapse UAF operational will via synchronized kinetic and cognitive attacks.

  • UAS Vector Shift (CRITICAL CHANGE): The UAS repositioning towards Sumy (East) indicates RF intent to reinforce the northern fixation strategy. Instead of immediately decapitating strategic C2, RF is prioritizing the neutralization of logistics and AD assets required to reinforce the Pokrovsk defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • IO/Propaganda Synchronization: RF official and non-official channels (TASS, Colonelcassad) are amplifying messages of technological superiority ("Eyes in the Sky") immediately following the confirmed UMPK strikes and persistent deep UAS flight. This is an overt attempt to demoralize UAF forces currently exposed to high-precision standoff fire.
  • Hybrid Counter-Escalation Narrative: RF is disseminating claims regarding a UAF drone attack on Cheboksary (Chuvash Republic, Russia) (260334Z).
    • Analytical Judgment: This likely serves dual purposes: 1) justifying potential future RF escalation and deep strikes, and 2) diverting internal RF attention from casualties and domestic issues (TASS promoting culture wars/trivial news).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the tactical reallocation of the deep-penetrating UAS asset away from the Poltava/Vinnytsia C2 corridor. This demonstrates flexible ISR prioritization by RF C2, focusing on eliminating rear-area support for the Pokrovsk crisis zone.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 remains highly adaptive and effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of the Pokrovsk exploitation with kinetic fixation in Kharkiv (UMPK) and the adaptive reallocation of the strategic UAS asset.

2.4. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UMPK deployment implies adequate stocks. The shift of the deep UAS to the Sumy logistics corridor suggests a focus on disrupting UAF sustainment rather than immediate C2 decapitation.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Critical. The passing of the 260330Z decision window for reserve commitment necessitates immediate execution of fallback defensive plans. READINESS: UAF operational response capacity remains degraded by RF kinetic and cognitive attacks targeting C2 mobility and reserve commitment authority.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

OPERATIONAL SETBACK: Continued failure to establish a coordinated defense on the T-05-15 GLOC due to reserve uncertainty constitutes the primary tactical setback. The ongoing Zaporizhzhia strike confirms rear area vulnerability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Immediate AD allocation review based on the new UAS vector (Chernihiv/Sumy). CONSTRAINT: C2 authority execution remains constrained by the persistent, coordinated RF IO campaign (Zelenskyy 'conviction' narrative).


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF IO is aggressively pursuing strategic paralysis and defeatism:

  1. Coup/Decapitation Narrative: The false TASS report of Zelenskyy's conviction (260333Z) is a direct, high-impact PsyOp designed to create internal political instability and doubt regarding the legitimacy of the NCA at the critical moment of the Pokrovsk breakthrough.
  2. Defeatism Amplification: RF amplification of alleged Western admissions of Ukrainian defeat (Driscoll claim, 260326Z) aims to undermine Western support and reinforce the surrender narrative tied to the "800k troop cap" IO.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is critically low due to combined kinetic strikes (Zaporizhzhia) and the high-level disinformation targeting national leadership. The failure to fully execute DP-4 (Counter-IO statement) allows these narratives to gain traction.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is leveraging the Cheboksary incident (if confirmed UAF-related) to build international consensus for the necessity of deep strikes against Ukraine.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF mechanized forces will secure the T-05-15 GLOC near Rodynske within the next 6-12 hours (NLT 260900Z), achieving the immediate operational objective on the Pokrovsk Axis. Simultaneously, the UAS group tracks along the Chernihiv-Sumy axis, conducting terminal guidance for a focused kinetic strike package (likely UMPK or OTR-21 Tochka) against major UAF logistics/rail hubs in Sumy Oblast, aimed at isolating Kharkiv/Kupiansk reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a decisive, rapid breakthrough at Pokrovsk due to continued UAF C2 paralysis regarding secondary reserve commitment. Leveraging the momentum, RF commits tactical air assets (Su-34/35) to interdict retreating UAF forces, supported by deep UMPK strikes. CRITICALLY: Following the Sumy logistics strike (MLCOA), RF immediately launches a secondary, larger missile salvo (Iskander/Kalibr) targeting remaining Hardened UAF Operational C2/ISR centers in Kyiv or Lviv, capitalizing on the AD dilution caused by the ongoing exploitation phase.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (NLT)ConfidenceStatus/Action Required
Commitment of Secondary Reserves (Plan D/E)260430ZCRITICALIMMEDIATE: J3 must confirm movement of secondary reserves to establish a blocking position 5-10km rear of the T-05-15 GLOC.
Sumy Logistics/AD Strike Window (MLCOA)260600ZHIGHAD Command must adjust radar sectors and SHORAD deployment to protect confirmed logistics nodes in Sumy Oblast.
RF GLOC Secure (Rodynske Sector)260900ZHIGHUAF forces must conduct controlled withdrawal to pre-prepared secondary defensive lines to prevent operational envelopment.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE MANAGEMENT & DEFENSE EXECUTION (J3/Eastern Command)

  1. EXECUTE PLAN D/E NOW: Immediately authorize the physical movement of secondary reserve forces (Plan D/E) to the Pokrovsk axis. The assumption of RFB non-viability is now confirmed by the passing of the 260330Z critical window. Failure to commit now guarantees the loss of operational depth.
  2. CONTROLLED WITHDRAWAL PARAMETERS: Establish clear C2 protocols and fire support coordination measures for a controlled tactical withdrawal from the immediate vicinity of the T-05-15 GLOC to pre-designated defensive positions (NLT 260900Z).
  3. AD REALLOCATION (SUMY FOCUS): AD Command must immediately re-task mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/NASAMS) to protect high-value rail/road logistics nodes in Sumy Oblast, targeting the revised MLCOA.

R-2: STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL (NCA/J2 IO)

  1. IMMEDIATE COUNTER-PSYOP (DP-4 EXPANDED): The NCA must issue a statement (NLT 260430Z) explicitly addressing the TASS claim of Zelenskyy's conviction and the Driscoll "defeat" narrative. Link these claims directly to the timing and severity of the Pokrovsk ground assault, framing them as a coordinated hybrid attack aimed at national command paralysis.
  2. C2 REDUNDANCY CHECK: Due to the persistent, though shifted, RF focus on deep strike, all primary and backup C2 facilities must confirm readiness for immediate relocation (hot standby) and ensure full EMCON protocols are enforced.

R-3: TACTICAL ISR PRIORITIZATION (J2 Collection)

  1. UAS TRACKING: Prioritize HUMINT/SIGINT/UAS tracking of the deep UAS group now operating in Sumy Oblast to determine the specific HVT being targeted (e.g., AD site, major rail junction, or fuel depot).

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap/RequirementConfidenceTasking Rationale
1 (CRITICAL)IMINT/LIDAR verification of RF mechanized exploitation depth (grid coordinates) on the Pokrovsk Axis as of 260400Z.CRITICALRequired for controlled withdrawal planning and establishing the effective range of RF maneuver elements.
2 (HIGH)Definitive status and current location of Reserve Force Bravo (RFB). (Engaged/Dispersed/Destroyed).CRITICALRequired for assessing remaining operational reserves and confirming the availability of previously attached support assets.
3 (HIGH)Target validation for the UAS group (Sumy track). Determine if logistics or mobile AD is the primary target.HIGHEssential for effective AD protection of the Northern operational rear area (MLCOA mitigation).
4 (MEDIUM)Verification/BDA regarding the claimed Cheboksary attack.MEDIUMRequired to assess the risk of RF escalation justified by perceived UAF deep-strike capability.
Previous (2025-11-26 03:13:58Z)

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