Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 260315Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK EXPLOITATION ACCELERATION: CONFIRMED RF UMPK DEPLOYMENT AND HYBRID DIPLOMATIC-IO SYNCHRONIZATION.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF forces maintain the exploitation phase on the Pokrovsk Axis. The advance toward Rodynske and the T-05-15 GLOC is assessed as critically imminent (NLT 260330Z).

• MAIN AXIS (Pokrovsk): Kinetic pressure is mounting. The operational window for confirming the status of Reserve Force Bravo (RFB) has expired (NLT 260315Z), forcing UAF J3 to operate under the assumption of RFB non-viability or fixation.
• FIXATION AXIS (Kharkiv/Kupiansk): CONFIRMED KINETIC FIXATION. Three (3) FAB-500 glide bombs equipped with Universal Planning and Correction Modules (UMPK) were employed against a UAF Forward Deployment Point (PVD) of the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade (OMB) near Podoly, Kharkiv Oblast (260311Z). This demonstrates RF capacity for high-volume, precise standoff strikes in the northern sector, effectively fixing UAF reserves.
• REAR AREA PENETRATION: The RF UAS group tracked deep in Northern Chernihiv (260236Z) continues to follow a southerly course, maintaining the threat to Poltava/Vinnytsia C2 nodes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Low visibility continues to facilitate RF mechanized movement and deep UAS/UMPK targeting operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The status of Reserve Force Bravo (RFB) remains a CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE GAP (Priority 1). The failure to confirm its dispersal or commitment severely degrades the UAF ability to mount a timely operational counter-attack or establish hardened secondary defenses along the T-05-15 GLOC. RF is leveraging this systemic paralysis.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to achieve operational depth on the Pokrovsk axis while paralyzing the UAF command structure and fixing potential reserves through multi-domain synchronization.

• UMPK Standoff Capability (CRITICAL NEW FACTOR): The confirmed operational use of 3x UMPK-equipped FABs in Kharkiv (Podoly) validates RF claims (260307Z TASS report) regarding widespread glide bomb usage. This significantly increases the threat posed to UAF forward assembly areas, logistics nodes, and C2 centers that rely on mobility or dispersion rather than hardened structures.
  • Analytical Judgment: RF is prioritizing the neutralization of northern UAF reserves (Kharkiv/Kupiansk) through high-precision kinetic fixation to ensure the Pokrovsk exploitation is unopposed by maneuver forces.
• C2 Targeting Capability: The loss of the M577 CSV (previous SITREP) combined with the persistent rear-area UAS track confirms the RF shift toward high-value, mobile C2 decapitation.
• Sustainment Narrative: RF IO highlighting 96% casualty survival (TASS) suggests a deliberate effort to project high medical/logistical resilience, intended for both domestic morale and strategic deterrence.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed deployment of UMPK in the Kharkiv sector is the most significant tactical adaptation. It enables RF aircraft to deliver heavy munitions with precision from greater stand-off distances, mitigating risks from UAF mobile air defense (AD) units. This necessitates a change in how UAF positions organize and camouflage in the northern operational area.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 is executing highly synchronized kinetic and cognitive operations. The timely orchestration of the Pokrovsk breach, the M577 strike, the Kharkiv UMPK fixation, and the high-level diplomatic IO push demonstrates robust, multi-domain integration.

2.4. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UMPK deployment implies adequate stocks of planning modules and airframes capable of deployment, supporting the high kinetic tempo (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Critical-Degraded. The primary concern is the vulnerability of mobile C2 and the inability to confirm the status of critical reserve forces (RFB). READINESS: UAF operational response capacity is hindered by the confirmed RF ability to strike mobile C2 (M577) and the introduction of precise standoff fixation fire (UMPK).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

OPERATIONAL SETBACK: The confirmed UMPK strike on the 14th OMbR PVD in Podoly constitutes a severe setback for forward reserve staging and protection in the northern sector. This directly impacts the ability to utilize those forces for counter-mobility operations or reinforcement further south.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Immediate commitment of secondary reserves (Plan D/E equivalent) is required to establish a blocking position against the Rodynske advance, as RFB must be assumed non-viable until proven otherwise. CONSTRAINT: C2 network security is critically constrained by RF ISR/strike speed.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF IO is now synchronizing ground gains with high-level international political friction:

1. Diplomatic Weaponization: RF media is amplifying claims regarding leaks, Trump's reactions, and the planned Witkoff/Putin meeting (260244Z), aiming to sow distrust among international partners and portray Kyiv's position as diplomatically isolated and subject to external pressure for compromise. This directly feeds into the existing "800k troop cap" narrative.
2. Technological Projection: Heavy promotion of UMPK capabilities and successful military medicine (96% survival) reinforces the narrative of RF military superiority and long-term endurance, intended to demoralize UAF mobilization efforts.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale continues to erode under the combined weight of territorial losses (Pokrovsk), kinetic targeting of forces, and the failure of the NCA to definitively address the "800k troop cap" disinformation campaign (DP-4 failure).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The latest IO push attempts to fracture international coalition resolve by focusing on specific, high-profile Western political figures and alleged back-channel negotiations.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF mechanized forces will exploit the operational gap caused by the uncertainty of RFB and the successful fixation of northern reserves (via UMPK strikes). The main advance will focus on seizing the T-05-15 GLOC near Rodynske NLT 260330Z. This ground maneuver will be supported by continued UMPK strikes (Kharkiv/Kupiansk) and sustained ISR targeting of rear-area C2.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) CRITICAL C2 STRIKE EXECUTION. Utilizing the deep-penetrating UAS (Chernihiv track), RF launches precision (likely Iskander/Shahed) strikes against C2/ISR infrastructure in the Poltava/Vinnytsia corridor NLT 260400Z. This attack is designed to finalize the operational decapitation while UAF forces are tactically committed to defending Rodynske and politically paralyzed by the IO campaign.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE PROTECTION & C2 SURVIVABILITY (J3/C2 Command)

1. RFB STATUS (ASSUME NON-VIABLE): J3 must officially downgrade Reserve Force Bravo (RFB) status to Combat Ineffective / Non-Viable for planning purposes until physical confirmation of dispersal is received. Immediately activate secondary reserve forces (Plan D/E) and accelerate their deployment window NLT 260400Z.
2. C2 HARDENING & EMCON (CRITICAL): All mobile tactical and operational C2 nodes (M577 replacements, staff vehicles) must maintain high-speed relocation protocols and maximum Electronic Emission Control (EMCON). Mobile C2 is confirmed as the primary kinetic target.
3. UMPK MITIGATION: Units in the Kharkiv/Kupiansk sector (14th OMbR area) must immediately move forward assembly areas (PVDS) out of confirmed UMPK range (estimated 40-70km standoff) or utilize deep cover/urban concealment. AD assets must prioritize protection of known PVDs/reserves against standoff guided weapons.

R-2: GROUND OPERATIONS (Eastern Command)

1. GLOC DEFENSE (Rodynske): Prioritize the immediate deployment of anti-tank obstacle teams and indirect fire assets to establish a short-duration delay/blocking position along the final approach to the T-05-15 GLOC. Focus on delaying RF penetration until secondary reserves arrive.
2. AD REALLOCATION (MDCOA Mitigation): AD Command must confirm SHORAD reallocation (NASAMS/Gepard) to protect the designated Poltava/Vinnytsia backup C2 nodes. This is the only effective countermeasure against the immediate MDCOA.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL (NCA/J2 IO)

1. EXECUTE DP-4 (IMMEDIATE AND EXPANDED): The National Command Authority must immediately execute the Counter-IO statement (DP-4). The statement must explicitly link the "800k troop cap" disinformation and the RF diplomatic influence claims (Trump/Witkoff) directly to the ongoing Pokrovsk breach, portraying them as synchronized attacks on Ukrainian will and sovereignty. The strategic window for inoculation is closed, but damage control is critical.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS