Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 260115Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS ASSAULT – SYNCHRONIZATION EXECUTION PHASE – DEEP STRIKE AND COGNITIVE PARALYSIS CONTINUED

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Russian Federation (RF) operation continues its fully synchronized assault phase. The main effort remains the Pokrovsk Axis, targeting the T-05-15 GLOC toward Rodynske.

KEY KINETIC UPDATE (HIGH CONFIDENCE): UAF Air Force confirms multiple KAB launches directed at the Donetsk region (260100Z). This confirms RF air shaping operations are now providing direct kinetic cover for the mechanized ground assault, validating the MLCOA timeframe (NLT 260100Z).

FIXATION UPDATE (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Persistent multi-domain pressure is sustained on the North-Eastern flank, with confirmed repeat explosions in Kharkiv (260050Z, 260108Z). This kinetic activity prevents lateral movement of UAF reinforcements and Air Defense (AD) assets.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Low visibility continues to favor RF nighttime mechanized maneuver and deep strike operations, particularly UAS targeting.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces are assessed to be initiating or sustaining breakthrough operations on the Pokrovsk Axis, supported by real-time KAB deployment.

• Pokrovsk Axis: Forces are in direct confrontation. The UAF must assume the initial defensive line is severely compromised or breached.
• Deep Interdiction: The fixation effort now covers three primary vectors: Pokrovsk (Ground Assault), Kryvyi Rih (RFB targeting), and Sumy/Kharkiv (Northern Reserve fixation).
• Counter-Strike Development: Reports of a significant fire/attack on the AO «ВНИИР-Прогресс» defense facility in Cheboksary, Russia (260056Z) indicate a potential successful UAF deep kinetic response, although target impact and attribution require immediate confirmation (Intelligence Gap 5).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent remains the immediate operational synchronization of tactical breakthrough and strategic paralysis. The current operation confirms high C2 fidelity and resource allocation.

• Primary Intent: Achieve a decisive breach and exploit the Pokrovsk Axis while ensuring all UAF counter-response mechanisms (specifically RFB) are neutralized via interdiction and cognitive paralysis (IO).
• Adaptation (IO/Psychological): RF has pivoted immediately from the diplomatic deception (peace talks) to technological and morale-based IO, coinciding precisely with the kinetic push. TASS reports Rostec claims of new "100% kill" loitering munitions (260108Z) designed to demoralize UAF artillery units currently providing support fire.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed KAB launches on the Donetsk axis (01:00Z) signal that RF fixed-wing CAS/interdiction assets are actively supporting the ground assault, indicating a lack of effective UAF AD opposition in the immediate operational area.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The alleged attack on the Cheboksary defense facility (AO «ВНИИР-Прогресс») is a potential long-term strategic disruption to RF logistics and materiel production. However, immediate RF munition expenditure for the current assault remains robust (KABs, sustained Kharkiv fire).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 is performing optimally, demonstrating the ability to rapidly shift the Information Environment narrative (from political deception to military-technological superiority) precisely at the moment of operational execution.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Forward forces on the Pokrovsk Axis are facing heavy kinetic pressure (KABs). The lack of confirmed EW coverage over Kryvyi Rih means Reserve Force Bravo (RFB) remains at extreme risk of MDCOA precision strike. READINESS: Command attention is critically fragmented between defending the front (KABs confirmed), mitigating the MDCOA (RFB protection), and addressing the still-uncontested RF IO narrative.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

CRITICAL SETBACK (Cognitive): The delay in executing DP-4 (Counter-IO Statement) is confirmed by UAF media (RBC-Ukraine 260046Z) still reporting elements of the RF peace talk deception narrative, effectively sustaining the cognitive cover for the RF ground assault well past the critical decision point (260045Z). POTENTIAL STRATEGIC SUCCESS (Kinetic): The reported deep strike on the Cheboksary defense facility (00:56Z) is a potentially significant operational success if confirmed, providing strategic cost imposition on the RF.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: EW Denial over Kryvyi Rih remains the immediate kinetic priority. AD assets must be maintained on high alert for the MDCOA precision strike window (NLT 260200Z). CONSTRAINT: UAF AD is confirmed to be overwhelmed/diluted across multiple fixation zones (Donetsk, Kryvyi Rih, Sumy, Kharkiv).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The RF IO campaign is now operating in two tiers:

1. Strategic Deception Cover: Sustaining the 'peace talks/surrender' narrative (via continued media reporting, 00:46Z) to paralyze strategic command.
2. Tactical Demoralization: Deploying claims of new, unstoppable weapons systems (Rostec 01:08Z) and POW mistreatment (Colonelcassad 01:06Z) to reduce the combat morale of forward units facing the assault.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The lack of a forceful, official counter-statement (DP-4) reinforces the perception that the political leadership may be capitulating, directly undermining the fighting will of RFB and frontline forces in the decisive hours of the assault.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The weaponization of the international diplomatic schedule (US-RF meeting rumors) continues to successfully delay and distract the NCA during the critical execution phase.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR) will confirm breach of the initial UAF defensive line on the Pokrovsk axis NLT 260130Z and begin exploitation maneuvers, supported by continuous KAB/Fixed-Wing CAS strikes focused on paralyzing forward reserve staging areas.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will execute precision deep strikes (Iskander/Kinzhals) NLT 260130Z – 260230Z utilizing persistent targeting data (Kryvyi Rih UAS group) to destroy Reserve Force Bravo (RFB) assets. The ongoing KAB use and sustained Kharkiv strikes indicate RF has committed significant kinetic resources and will likely synchronize the deep strike immediately following the ground breach confirmation.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE (AD Command/J3)

1. IMPERATIVE EW ACTIVATION: Re-issue the order for EW activation over the RFB movement corridor (Kryvyi Rih) NLT 260120Z. Success or failure must be confirmed immediately via SIGINT monitoring of RF UAS data links. If EW fails, RFB must immediately disperse (Fail-Safe Procedure 1).
2. ACPD STATUS CONFIRMATION: Confirm that Mobile AD Convoy Protection Detachments (ACPDs) are actively providing kinetic coverage for RFB. If confirmation fails, assume RFB is vulnerable and accelerate dispersal.
3. FORWARD AD RELOCATION: Given confirmed KAB activity on the Donetsk Axis (01:00Z), prioritize the immediate relocation of any available SHORAD systems (e.g., MANPAD teams) to cover high-value forward C2 nodes and critical choke points immediately behind the defensive line.

R-2: COMMAND RESPONSE (NCA/J2 IO)

1. IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF DP-4: The NCA must issue the public statement NLT 260120Z. The statement must directly address the specific IO details (Trump/Witkoff, troop limits) and link the narrative to the immediate ground assault, framing the RF IO as a cynical operational MASKIROVKA.
2. EXPLOIT CHEBOKSARY (IO/J2): If the Cheboksary attack on the defense plant (00:56Z) can be plausibly attributed to Ukrainian action or proxies, the J2 must immediately initiate an IO campaign exploiting this strategic counter-strike to boost domestic morale and signal deep strike capability, countering the RF Rostec technology claims.

R-3: FRONTLINE OPERATIONS (EASTERN COMMAND)

1. FIGHTING WITHDRAWAL PREPARATION: Prepare to execute a controlled, staggered fighting withdrawal to the pre-planned second line of defense if mechanized exploitation is confirmed NLT 260130Z. Holding reserves must not be squandered; their purpose is to stabilize the line until RFB, if successfully protected, can be committed.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS