Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 2025-11-25 2315Z SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS – CRITICAL EXPLOITATION PHASE INITIATED – T-MINUS 45 MINUTES TO MLCOA EXECUTION

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational situation remains critical on the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk). The operational center of gravity is the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), which is the primary vector for RF mechanized exploitation.

ASSESSMENT (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF shaping operations are intensifying towards Kostiantynivka. RF military correspondent reports (23:02Z) claiming "fighting for Kostiantynivka" are assessed as highly aggressive kinetic Information Operations (IO) designed to prematurely exploit anticipated gains, further undermining UAF morale and defensive preparation prior to the main assault (NLT 0000Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Ground saturation continues to favor mechanized movement along established main roads and corridors (T-05-15). Visibility is degraded, slightly impeding aerial ISR but favoring covert forward RF maneuver elements.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces are completing Phase IV (Assault Preparation).

• Southern Fixation/Reconnaissance: A new threat vector emerged with a low-altitude Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) group tracked from Kherson Oblast inbound toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (23:00Z). This is assessed as either reconnaissance for deep strike targeting or an interdiction mission targeting potential routes for Reserve Force Bravo movement.
• Local AD Status: The localized Rocket Danger alert for Zaporizhzhia was cancelled (22:46Z), confirming the immediate fixation strike window has closed, but the kinetic effects (damage/casualties) are already achieved.
• UAF Status: Reserve Force Bravo movement remains unauthorized past the critical 2240Z deadline. Forward units are preparing to engage without necessary operational depth.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is immediate, high-tempo exploitation NLT 260000Z. The entire operation hinges on the success of simultaneous C2 paralysis and mechanized breakthrough.

Key Intentions:

1. Ground Objective: Secure the T-05-15 GLOC and establish a bridgehead toward Rodynske/Kostiantynivka.
2. Cognitive Objective: Maintain NCA paralysis by continuously evolving the "peace plan" disinformation until the kinetic breakthrough is achieved.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF continues to demonstrate rapid synchronization and adaptive IO response:

1. Escalation of Disinformation: The immediate release of a second alleged Bloomberg transcript (Witkoff/Ushakov, 22:45Z) demonstrates an operational pivot to sustain the core IO narrative after the initial leak generated high impact. This second transcript increases the perceived credibility and scope of the alleged "peace negotiations."
2. Agile Denial: RF has simultaneously activated official channels (RFPI/Dmitriev) to immediately deny the transcript leaks (22:59Z). This creates maximum cognitive noise—the NCA is forced to process an operationally paralyzing leak, its public amplification, and the subsequent official denial all within a 15-minute window preceding the attack.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are sustaining kinetic pressure and deep reconnaissance (new UAS vector 23:00Z). The retention of long-range strike assets (as assessed in previous SITREP) for the MDCOA remains a primary threat.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 is operating at peak effectiveness, coordinating deep-strike resources, ground maneuver preparation, and strategic information warfare across multiple domains and time zones. The effectiveness of the cognitive domain attack on the UAF NCA remains the key enabler of the imminent ground assault.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive lines on the Pokrovsk axis are hardened but lack the necessary operational depth. READINESS: All units are at readiness state Alpha. However, the operational deficiency created by the failure to move Reserve Force Bravo remains the decisive factor. Commanders must now anticipate engaging RF forces earlier and closer to the main defensive line than planned.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

CRITICAL SETBACK: The failure to execute the critical decision (DP-1) NLT 2240Z means the UAF has ceded the initiative to RF exploitation. Any movement of Reserve Force Bravo now will be reactive and highly susceptible to interdiction fire, potentially leading to catastrophic unit losses if not managed aggressively.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Immediate, unconditional execution of Reserve Force Bravo movement orders. This order must bypass any residual political or IO constraints and be executed by the J3 immediately. CONSTRAINT: Mobile AD assets remain critically constrained by the need to protect C2 nodes (MDCOA) versus defending potential reserve movement routes (UAS threat Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk).

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The Dempster-Shafer belief of Russian Disinformation Campaign (0.227883) remains the primary active threat.

• IO Apex: The release of the second alleged transcript (Witkoff/Ushakov) at 22:45Z successfully escalated C2 paralysis just as the physical assault is scheduled to begin.
• Strategic Denial: The immediate, high-profile denial of the leaks by RF officials (22:59Z) serves to muddy the waters, forcing NCA decision-makers to expend critical time verifying the authenticity of the information, thereby successfully delaying kinetic responses.
• Secondary Diplomatic IO: Reports on India visas and European asset expropriation risk (22:44Z, 22:54Z) are low-level noise designed to show RF strategic normalcy and fracture Western unity.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The amplification of the "peace plan" narratives, coupled with confirmed civilian casualties from earlier fixation strikes, creates internal pressure on the NCA for non-military solutions, further reinforcing the paralysis RF intended.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The operational counter-IO response (DP-2) NLT 2255Z is now even more critical. If the NCA failed to use the US Army Secretary visit to explicitly delegitimize the leaks by the deadline, RF has likely won the initial information battle, confirming the UAF high command is currently overwhelmed and paralyzed.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will execute the mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis NLT 260000Z. Initial forces (40th/155th OMBR) will attempt to seize the T-05-15 GLOC corridor rapidly, exploiting the depth gap created by the paralyzed Reserve Force Bravo. RF IO claiming 'fighting for Kostiantynivka' (23:02Z) suggests rapid exploitation is the highest priority.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) The MDCOA remains a surgical deep strike targeting primary and backup UAF C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) between 260000Z and 260400Z, synchronized with the peak ground assault engagement. The new UAS vector (Kherson -> Dnipropetrovsk) may be preparatory reconnaissance for this strike or an interdiction mission against newly moved reserves.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE EXECUTION (J3/OPERATIONAL COMMANDS)

1. EXECUTE RESERVE MOVEMENT (IMPERATIVE): The J3 must assume NCA authorization has been granted, or initiate movement of Reserve Force Bravo based on operational necessity, regardless of official confirmation delay. Speed is paramount. The mission must shift from establishing a prepared defense to conducting a delaying, running engagement to protect the T-05-15 GLOC.
2. RECONNAISSANCE PRIORITIZATION: Immediately allocate tactical ISR assets (UAS/SIGINT) to track the UAS group (Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk) vector to confirm targeting (C2 protection vs. reserve interdiction).

R-2: INFORMATION WARFARE COUNTERMEASURES (STRATCOM/NCA)

1. HIGH-IMPACT COUNTER-IO: If the 2255Z counter-IO failed, the NCA must launch an emergency, highly visible statement NLT 2330Z.
   • FOCUS: Explicitly link the newest alleged Bloomberg leak (Witkoff/Ushakov) and the subsequent RF denial as a direct, observable component of the immediate mechanized assault plan (MLCOA). Frame the IO as a distraction maneuver.
   • COMMUNICATION: Use secure C2 lines/pre-approved proxies if NCA paralysis persists to convey the operational status to key commanders, confirming that the defense must proceed regardless of the political noise.

R-3: DEFENSIVE PREPARATION (EASTERN COMMAND)

1. PREPARE FOR FORWARD RF CLAIMS: Forward commanders must be inoculated against RF IO claims (e.g., 'fighting for Kostiantynivka'). Maintain fire discipline and only adjust defensive posture based on confirmed IMINT/SIGINT BDA, not RF media reports.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS