Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 2025-11-25 2245Z SUBJECT: CRITICAL C2 PARALYSIS AND IMMINENT GROUND ASSAULT (POKROVSK AXIS) – DP-1 WINDOW EXPIRED

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk), with RF forces postured for a breakthrough targeting the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC). The predicted main assault is less than T-minus 75 minutes from initiation (NLT 260000Z). Loss of the GLOC remains highly probable due to the expired reserve deployment window.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Ground saturation favors RF mechanized movement along main roads.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces are successfully completing Phase III (Fixation and C2 Degradation) preparations.

• RF Fixation: A renewed Rocket Danger alert was issued for Zaporizhzhia Oblast (22:32Z), confirming RF capacity for follow-on strikes or continued active fixation. Confirmed damage and casualties (12 hospitalized, 7 high-rises) in Zaporizhzhia (22:19Z) successfully divert UAF resources.
• RF Deception: The Bryansk (RF) missile danger alert was quickly lifted (22:32Z), confirming its low kinetic value and high IO/deception value (False Flag action).
• UAF Status: Units on the Pokrovsk axis are in defensive positions, but the lack of depth due to the non-viability of Plan 7-B MOD and the delay in authorizing Reserve Force Bravo movement place the line at extreme risk of operational collapse NLT 0000Z.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF intent is immediate mechanized exploitation NLT 260000Z, capitalizing on successful Information Operations (IO) targeting National Command Authority (NCA) decision-making. The current IO campaign is the most sophisticated and critical component of the RF operational plan.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to demonstrate highly agile synchronization of kinetic effects and IO.

1. Exploitation of BDA: Casualty figures and confirmed structural damage in Zaporizhzhia (22:19Z) are immediately fed into the information space to generate domestic pressure and justify RF operations.
2. Weaponizing Leaks: The rapid amplification (22:33Z) of the alleged Bloomberg transcript leak (regarding a "peace plan" and "troop cap") is a decisive move to solidify C2 paralysis and undermine international solidarity precisely when UAF reserves must move.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The renewed rocket alert (22:32Z) confirms sufficient forward strike inventory (Iskander/KN-23) to execute the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) targeting C2 nodes. RF operational logistics are sustaining the high tempo required for the coordinated multi-domain assault.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 remains highly cohesive, demonstrated by the real-time synchronization of kinetic fixation (Zaporizhzhia) and strategic IO (Bloomberg leak amplification) across multiple theaters and domains.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

CRITICAL STATUS (Pokrovsk): The UAF defensive line faces imminent assault without operational depth. The critical decision point (DP-1: 2240Z) for the movement of Reserve Force Bravo has expired, meaning any movement now will likely result in a running engagement rather than a prepared defense, substantially increasing risk. AD STATUS: Localized protection remains vulnerable, particularly in peripheral areas subjected to ongoing fixation strikes (Zaporizhzhia rocket alert).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• CRITICAL SETBACK (C2): Failure to authorize Reserve Force Bravo movement by the critical 2240Z deadline confirms the high effectiveness of the RF IO campaign in paralyzing NCA decision-making.
• HUMANITARIAN SETBACK: Confirmed civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in Zaporizhzhia (12 hospitalized, 7 buildings) necessitates immediate resource allocation for security and recovery, drawing assets away from frontline reinforcement.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, unconditional execution of Reserve Force Bravo movement. The timeline must be accelerated to achieve the closest possible disposition to the T-05-15 GLOC prior to 260000Z. CONSTRAINT: Limited mobile AD resources must remain focused on C2 protection (MDCOA mitigation) despite ongoing fixation strikes in regional centers.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The RF IO campaign has reached its operational apex, successfully integrating high-level, credible-sounding leaks with the kinetic timeline.

• C2 Paralysis Amplified: The alleged Bloomberg transcript leak (22:33Z) lends false legitimacy to the "800,000 troop cap" and "surrender framework" narratives, ensuring maximum confusion and delay within the UAF high command during the decisive operational window.
• International Fracture: RF state media continues to broadcast narratives critical of Ukrainian refugees in Germany (TASS 22:17Z), aimed at eroding political will among key NATO partners.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Confirmed civilian casualties (Zaporizhzhia) compound existing fear, increasing public demand for immediate retaliatory measures or greater protection, which contradicts the strategic necessity of preserving mobile AD assets for C2 defense.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The operational urgency demands that NCA immediately use the US Army Secretary visit as a high-visibility counter-IO measure to delegitimize the "peace leak" narrative. Failure to do so risks RF successfully framing the US visit as a 'damage control' effort instead of a show of support.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will launch the main mechanized assault along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis NLT 2025-11-26 0000Z. This assault will be initiated in the knowledge that UAF reserves were paralyzed and failed to deploy by the critical 2240Z window. Initial RF objectives will likely focus on securing the T-05-15 GLOC corridor and exploiting the depth gap toward Rodynske.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF executes a simultaneous, surgical precision strike (Iskander/KN-23) targeting primary and backup UAF C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) timed to coincide with the peak hours of the Pokrovsk ground assault (between 260000Z and 260400Z). The renewed rocket alert in Zaporizhzhia demonstrates active strike capability is retained for this purpose.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical decision window has closed and must be treated as an immediate, high-risk execution scenario.

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: CRITICAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (J3/NCA)

1. IMMEDIATE RESERVE DEPLOYMENT (OVERDUE): Acknowledge the failure to meet the 2240Z deployment timeline. IMMEDIATELY AUTHORIZE AND EXECUTE the movement of Reserve Force Bravo. Deployment must prioritize speed over security and anticipate immediate RF interdiction fires.
   • MISSION: Establish blocking positions and delay the RF advance on the T-05-15 GLOC, regardless of preparatory fires.

R-2: INFORMATION WARFARE COUNTERMEASURES (STRATCOM/NCA)

1. COUNTER-IO EXECUTION (URGENT): The NCA must issue a high-level, definitive public statement NLT 2025-11-25 2255Z.
   • PRIORITY: Directly address and explicitly reject the alleged Bloomberg transcript leak and all associated "peace framework" or "troop cap" narratives as a desperate Russian maneuver to delay necessary defensive movements (Reserve Bravo).
   • ASSET LEVERAGE: The announcement should be timed to overlap with high-visibility coverage of the US Army Secretary visit to directly undermine the RF narrative of dissolving international support.

R-3: AIR DEFENSE ALLOCATION (AD Command)

1. MAINTAIN MDCOA MITIGATION: Maintain the current prioritization of mobile SHORAD assets to primary and backup C2 nodes in Poltava/Vinnytsia to mitigate the high risk of a decapitation strike during the Pokrovsk assault. Do not divert these strategic assets to local defense of Zaporizhzhia, despite renewed alerts.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS