Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 2025-11-25 2210Z SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT WARNING – IMMINENT RF MECHANIZED ASSAULT (POKROVSK AXIS)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk). RF forces are positioned to exploit the post-kinetic exploitation phase. The T-05-15 GLOC corridor remains the most critical objective. Seizure of Rodynske (NLT 260000Z) is assessed as highly probable without immediate reserve commitment, directly threatening the isolation of Kostiantynivka and potentially collapsing the regional defensive line.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Ground saturation (GO/MUD) favors mechanized movement along established roads (T-05-15), making the RF main effort highly predictable but difficult to interdict en masse due to reduced off-road UAF maneuverability.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF is in the final preparations for Phase IV (Ground Assault).

• RF: Confirmed synchronization of fixing operations with maneuver preparations:
  • Zaporizhzhia: UAS air raid warning lifted (21:53Z). Confirmed post-strike BDA shows civilian infrastructure damage (21:53Z), successfully fixing local UAF resources and generating immediate civilian anxiety.
  • Bryansk Oblast (RF): RF systems issuing a missile danger alert (21:54Z). This is assessed as a potential RF IO/false flag action designed to elicit an immediate, unnecessary UAF defensive reaction or increase domestic support for the imminent offensive.
• UAF: Units on the Pokrovsk axis are in high readiness for contact. Key command decision-making remains critically delayed by the RF IO campaign targeting the NCA.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF intention is the mechanized seizure of the T-05-15 GLOC and consolidation of a major operational breakthrough NLT 2025-11-26 0000Z.

• CAPABILITY: Demonstrated ability to sustain multi-domain pressure (IO, UAS fixation, precision shaping fires) right up to the point of ground assault, maximizing UAF C2 paralysis and defensive resource dispersal.
• LOGIC: The entire operational sequence (Mass Strike -> IO Paralysis -> UAS Fixation -> Ground Assault) is designed to hit the UAF at its lowest point of readiness and highest point of C2 confusion.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF tactics are focused on maximizing the current window of opportunity (UAF AD depletion/C2 paralysis). The rapid dissemination of targeted disinformation (e.g., weaponizing the alleged Bloomberg leak at 22:09Z) precisely coordinates with the ground assault timeline, confirming sophisticated, centralized C2 control over Information Warfare assets.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Sustained UAS operations (evidenced by recent Zaporizhzhia strike) confirms acceptable forward inventory of disposable platforms. The confirmed low missile interception rate (63% previously reported) suggests RF forward missile inventory (Iskander/KN-23) is high, supporting the MDCOA (Decapitation Strike).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 remains cohesive and effective. The rapid, synchronized execution of kinetic exploitation and IO confirms a low level of friction between strategic and operational commands. The strategic guidance (National Policy Strategy up to 2036) confirms long-term political commitment to the military objectives.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

CRITICAL STATUS (Pokrovsk): Units are holding defensive positions but are critically exposed due to the confirmed non-viability of Plan 7-B MOD. The defense relies entirely on the immediate authorization and deployment of an alternative reserve. AD STATUS: Dispersed and vulnerable to the predicted second precision strike (MDCOA). Prioritization of mobile assets (SHORAD) to C2 nodes is essential.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK (C2): The RF IO campaign continues to degrade NCA decision-making regarding force mobilization and reserve authorization, creating an operational-level vulnerability.
• SETBACK (Logistics): Confirmed continued damage to critical infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia necessitates immediate diversion of recovery/security resources.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Authorization and execution of Reserve Force Bravo movement to the T-05-15 GLOC corridor within the next 30 minutes (NLT 2240Z) to establish defensive depth prior to 260000Z. CONSTRAINT: Limited mobile SHORAD assets must cover both C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) and critical logistical hubs, demanding difficult prioritization against the MDCOA.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF IO is now focusing on undermining international resolve and justifying the imminent ground assault.

1. Paralysis IO: The "800,000 troop cap" narrative continues to serve its primary function: freezing NCA reserve commitment.
2. International Fracture Narrative: RF state media is actively weaponizing diplomatic reports (alleged Bloomberg leak, 22:09Z), framing US political figures as advising Russia and characterizing Kyiv's supporters as the "War Party" attempting to sabotage peace.
3. Logistics Undermining: The TASS report claiming closure of the closest Polish airfield until July 2026 (21:53Z) is designed to broadcast perceived limitations on NATO/US resupply efforts.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed strikes and resulting casualties in population centers (Zaporizhzhia) create pressure on the government to divert military assets for immediate civilian protection, supporting the RF fixation objective.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed US Army Secretary visit provides a strong, high-level counter-narrative, but this asset must be leveraged immediately to combat the IO wave.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) will launch the main mechanized assault along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis NLT 2025-11-26 0000Z. This will be the culmination of the post-kinetic exploitation phase, exploiting the UAF reserve gap and C2 paralysis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF executes a simultaneous, surgical precision strike (Iskander/KN-23) targeting primary and backup UAF C2 nodes (specifically Poltava/Vinnytsia) timed to coincide with the peak hours of the Pokrovsk ground assault (between 2025-11-26 0000Z and 0400Z). This is aimed at complete command decapitation.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical decision window is closing rapidly (T-minus 50 minutes to estimated assault start).

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: CRITICAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (J3/NCA)

1. IMMEDIATE RESERVE DEPLOYMENT: Officially declare Plan 7-B MOD COMPROMISED. The window for effective defense is closing. IMMEDIATELY AUTHORIZE AND EXECUTE the movement of Reserve Force Bravo to reinforce the Pokrovsk defense sector, specifically securing the T-05-15 GLOC.
   • TIMELINE: Movement initiation NLT 2025-11-25 2240Z.

R-2: INFORMATION WARFARE COUNTERMEASURES (STRATCOM/NCA)

1. COUNTER-IO EXECUTION: The NCA must issue a high-level, definitive public statement NLT 2025-11-25 2230Z.
   • KEY MESSAGE: Explicitly reject all "troop cap" and "surrender term" narratives, linking the Russian disinformation campaign directly to the imminent, failing ground assault on Pokrovsk to inoculate domestic and international audiences.
   • ASSET LEVERAGE: Utilize the confirmed US Army Secretary Driscoll visit announcement as proof of continued, unwavering strategic support, directly contradicting RF IO regarding logistic limitations (Polish airfield closure).

R-3: AIR DEFENSE ALLOCATION (AD Command)

1. HARDEN C2 NODES: Maintain and reinforce the reallocation of mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/NASAMS) to primary and backup C2 nodes in Poltava/Vinnytsia to mitigate the MDCOA of a decapitation strike during the ground assault. This asset protection is higher priority than immediate energy infrastructure defense.
2. COUNTER-UAS: Maximize deployment of mobile counter-UAS fire teams to peripheral fixation zones (Chuhuiv, Zaporizhzhia) to prevent re-fixation, releasing AD resources to cover critical logistics and C2.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS