Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 2025-11-25 22:00Z SUBJECT: Post-Kinetic Exploitation and Imminent RF Ground Assault (Pokrovsk Axis)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF efforts remain focused on achieving a decisive operational breakthrough on the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast). The main effort targets the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), essential for reinforcement and resupply of forward Ukrainian units. RF units (specifically 40th/155th OMBR) are postured to seize Rodynske NLT 2025-11-26 0000Z, which would threaten the isolation of Kostiantynivka.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

• STATUS: Unchanged from previous reporting. Ground saturation (MUD/GO) likely impeding off-road maneuverability for heavy mechanized RF units, forcing reliance on established GLOCs (such as T-05-15).
• IMPACT: Limits RF tactical flexibility but makes their primary axis of advance (Pokrovsk) predictable.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Confirmed in the "Post-Kinetic Exploitation" phase following massed strikes. RF is conducting simultaneous fixation and shaping fires across multiple regions.
  • UAS detected in Chuhuiv Raion (Kharkiv) (21:40Z), moving southwest, confirming fixation intent in the north.
  • Confirmed drone strikes on civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia (21:14Z onwards), causing 7+ casualties and damaging 4+ multi-story buildings, aimed at fixing UAF resources in the south.
• UAF: AD assets are dispersed and magazines depleted (63% interception rate). Key operational reserve (Plan 7-B MOD) is assessed as non-viable.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The primary RF intent is the mechanized seizure of the Pokrovsk axis NLT 260000Z.

• CAPABILITY: RF has demonstrated the ability to synchronize multi-domain operations (Precision strike/UAS fixation/Critical IO) to create favorable windows for ground maneuver.
• NEW DEVELOPMENT (KINETIC SHAPING): The simultaneous UAS fixation strikes (Chernihiv, Chuhuiv, Zaporizhzhia) are actively maximizing UAF AD dispersion immediately prior to the ground assault, increasing the probability of a decisive breakthrough.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No significant change in overarching tactics; RF is executing the predicted MLCOA. The high volume of UAS activity post-strike is a confirmation of the kinetic exploitation strategy. RF Information Operations remain highly specific and tailored to disrupt NCA decision-making.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Analysis suggests forward-deployment of long-range precision missiles (Iskander/KN-23) to support the MDCOA (Strike on C2 nodes). Sustained UAS operations indicate acceptable short-term drone inventory levels.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF strategic C2 remains effective and coordinated. The approval of the RF National Policy Strategy up to 2036 (21:32Z) demonstrates continuity and focus on long-term goals, unaffected by minor internal political signaling (e.g., Ivanov asset transfer).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• DEFENSIVE STATUS: Strained. UAF units on the Pokrovsk axis are prepared for contact, but the lack of an immediate, confirmed, and dedicated operational reserve force creates a critical defensive gap.
• AD STATUS: Low readiness for a secondary precision strike due to magazine depletion and asset dispersal. Mobile SHORAD assets are necessary to cover backup C2 nodes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK: Confirmed loss of reserve viability (Plan 7-B MOD).
• SUCCESS (CONTEXTUAL): Past performance data (WU Samurai messages) confirms UAF proficiency in counter-UAS operations utilizing specialized interceptor drones and mobile fire teams, suggesting local capability to handle smaller, dispersed UAS threats (Chuhuiv/Zaporizhzhia).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and deployment of a viable, uncompromised reserve (e.g., Reserve Force Bravo) to the Pokrovsk axis (T-05-15 corridor). AD CONSTRAINT: Requirement to balance protection of critical population centers (Zaporizhzhia) and strategic C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) with limited mobile SHORAD assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF IO focus remains on paralyzing NCA by weaponizing diplomatic narratives and sowing internal distrust.

• TROOP LIMIT PARALYSIS: The false narrative of the "800,000 troop cap agreement" (0.056 belief score) remains the highest priority IO threat.
• GEO-POLITICAL LIES: RF is actively disseminating targeted disinformation (Witkoff/Trump/Ushakov reports, 21:17Z, 21:32Z) via prominent channels to fracture US political trust and potentially preempt or undermine upcoming security cooperation.
• INTERNAL DECAY NARRATIVE: RF channels are pushing fabricated claims of UAF fratricide and C2 chaos (21:18Z) to lower UAF morale and justify imminent ground success.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed civilian strikes in Zaporizhzhia (4+ apartment buildings damaged, 7 casualties) will escalate public anxiety and pressure the NCA for defensive action and security guarantees. This increases the window of vulnerability to RF IO regarding peace negotiations.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

(FACT) US Army Secretary Driscoll is scheduled to visit Kyiv this week (21:34Z). This is a high-level demonstrative signal of continued commitment that can be leveraged as a direct counter-IO measure.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces (40th/155th OMBR) will launch the main mechanized assault along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis NLT 2025-11-26 0000Z. This assault will be preceded by intense shaping fires and continued fixing strikes (UAS/KAB) in the Kharkiv (Chuhuiv) and Zaporizhzhia sectors to delay the movement of UAF reinforcements.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF launches a secondary, surgical precision strike (Iskander/KN-23) targeting backup Poltava/Vinnytsia C2 nodes. This strike is timed to coincide with the peak hours of the Pokrovsk ground assault (between 2025-11-26 0000Z and 0400Z), aiming for C2 decapitation while UAF AD resources are geographically fixed or exhausted.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE FORCE MANAGEMENT (J3)

1. EXECUTE RESERVE RELEASE: Officially declare Plan 7-B MOD COMPROMISED/NON-VIABLE. Immediately authorize and expedite the movement of Reserve Force Bravo (or equivalent ready unit) to reinforce the Pokrovsk defense sector, specifically securing the T-05-15 GLOC, NLT 2025-11-25 2330Z.

R-2: INFORMATION WARFARE COUNTERMEASURES (NCA/STRATCOM)

1. COUNTER-IO: Issue an immediate, high-profile joint statement utilizing the confirmed US Army Secretary Driscoll visit announcement (21:34Z) to EXPLICITLY REJECT the "800,000 troop limit" and "surrender terms." Frame the RF disinformation as a desperate psychological preparation for their imminent (260000Z) ground assault.

R-3: INTELLIGENCE GAP CLOSURE (J2)

1. PRIORITY ISR: Immediately task maximum available tactical ISR assets (UAS/SIGINT) to the Otradnoye sector (Dnipropetrovsk) to confirm or deny RF presence, required for accurate southern flank defense planning. NLT 2025-11-25 2300Z.

R-4: AIR DEFENSE REALLOCATION (AD Command)

1. C2 PRIORITY: Maintain reallocation of mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/NASAMS) to primary and backup C2 nodes in Poltava/Vinnytsia to mitigate the MDCOA of a decapitation strike coinciding with the ground assault.
2. UAS RESPONSE: Deploy mobile fire teams and dedicated counter-UAS groups (leveraging lessons learned by units like "Samurai") to intercept detected UAS groups in Chuhuiv and Zaporizhzhia to protect critical logistics infrastructure and prevent further fixation efforts.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS