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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-25 15:44:03Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-25 15:13:59Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 251545Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / POKROVSK AXIS DEFENSE (OPERATION IRON SHIELD)


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

FACT (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The Russian Federation (RF) Main Effort (ME) remains fixed on operational penetration toward the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) on the Pokrovsk axis. NEW KINETIC SHAPING (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF has expanded its kinetic shaping operations with confirmed KAB launches targeting Dnipropetrovsk (25150346Z) and Zaporizhzhia (25151043Z) regions. This extends the depth of RF fire preparation, targeting potential UAF reserve and logistical corridors that feed the Pokrovsk defense. LOCAL DEFENSIVE SUCCESS (FACT/MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): UAF 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade (65-ї ОМБр) successfully repelled an RF assault in the Zaporizhzhia direction (25150631Z). This demonstrates local tactical resilience despite overwhelming operational pressure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, dry conditions persist, continuing to facilitate maximized RF ISR and precision strike capabilities (KAB and loitering munitions). No immediate environmental constraints inhibit RF mechanized movement NLT 260000Z.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF continues a highly synchronized, multi-domain offensive phase. Kinetic shaping fires are now confirmed deep into the operational rear (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia), preceding the main mechanized assault. UAF forces are currently engaged in critical AD reallocation and counter-IO efforts, per previous instruction.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CRITICAL/HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF intent is to exploit the operational paralysis caused by the "800k troop limit" Information Operation (IO) long enough to ensure the decisive ground assault (NLT 260000Z) faces no organized, large-scale UAF reserve. CAPABILITY (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF is demonstrating the ability to sustain intense, deep-reaching kinetic operations using KABs and heavy tactical fires (TOS-1A confirmed in Zaporizhzhia, 25150247Z), confirming adequate PGM inventory for the pre-assault phase.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The expansion of KAB targeting to Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia represents a tactical refinement designed to pre-isolate the Pokrovsk battle space from reinforcement vectors originating from the south and west. This significantly increases the risk to Reserve Force Bravo's projected movement corridor.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The deployment of TOS-1A systems and the high rate of KAB usage suggest forward logistical hubs are successfully supporting localized high-intensity combat operations. No new counter-indicators of systemic RF logistical failure have been detected in the recent message traffic.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The near-simultaneous amplification of the "Abu Dhabi talks" and "800k limit" narratives across multiple platforms, coordinated with the expansion of kinetic pressure, demonstrates tight, centralized multi-domain control aimed at achieving cognitive shock before kinetic breakthrough.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF defensive lines maintain integrity in critical secondary sectors (Zaporizhzhia success confirmed). Strategic response remains at a critical decision point, dependent upon the immediate commitment of an alternative reserve force. READINESS ASSESSMENT: The threat of flank interdiction and deep AD asset strain is mounting due to the expanded KAB footprint.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS (CRITICAL): UAF successfully executed a deep strike against a high-value RF A-60 specialized aircraft in Taganrog (25154211Z). This confirms long-range strike capability and resource allocation to high-impact target sets. CRITICAL SETBACK: The failure to launch the necessary strategic counter-IO NLT 251530Z means the NCA is now operating with T-15 minutes until the absolute critical deadline (251600Z) to neutralize the strategic paralysis threat.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT (AD): The confirmed KAB activity targeting Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia compounds the urgency for SHORAD reallocation (per previous instruction) to protect backup C2 nodes and now necessitates greater EW/AD coverage for the movement of Reserve Force Bravo. REQUIREMENT: Immediate utilization of the newly confirmed long-range strike capability (Taganrog precedent) to maximize disruption of RF pre-assault preparation (e.g., forward airbases, logistics choke points).


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

CRITICAL THREAT (ABU DHABI/800K LIMIT): RF and pro-RF channels are now highly synchronized, promoting the false narrative that "direct unplanned negotiations" (25151827Z) are occurring and that the US is involved in finalizing a settlement (25154032Z). This disinformation is explicitly designed to freeze UAF operational movement NLT 252000Z. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WEAPONIZATION: Western statements (White House, UK PM) emphasizing US-led frameworks are being leveraged by RF sources to suggest Kyiv is being forced into compliance, reinforcing the internal paralysis narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF Morale: Diplomatic developments are highly volatile. While the Taganrog strike provides a temporary boost, the prevailing narrative of secret peace talks risks inducing passive acceptance among the public and delays in mobilization efforts. International Support (FACT/MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Confirmation of European Parliament support for the EU defense industry program (25150758Z) provides an immediate, verifiable counter-narrative to RF claims of collapsing Western support.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is successfully placing pressure on the NCA by creating a false diplomatic crisis centered on the 800k limit. This is directly aimed at ensuring kinetic success by freezing UAF strategic decision-making.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): Execution of Penetration and Reserve Interdiction. RF will maximize IO pressure NLT 252000Z while intensifying KAB/Artillery fires to isolate the Pokrovsk battle space.

  • 251600Z - 252000Z: RF ISR will prioritize tracking all major road/rail movements originating from Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to identify and target Reserve Force Bravo movement prior to its commitment.
  • 260000Z: Main mechanized assault on the T-05-15 GLOC commences, exploiting the expected strategic delay/disruption of UAF reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Operational Defeat via Decapitation Strike and Flanking Maneuver. If the C2 AD protection is not in place by 251700Z:

  • Immediate Threat: RF executes the predicted second precision strike targeting Poltava/Vinnytsia backup C2 nodes NLT 251800Z, with expanded targeting intelligence likely derived from the KAB strikes now hitting the Dnipro axis.
  • Operational Outcome: Total loss of operational C2 stability during the most critical 4-hour window (252000Z – 260000Z) allows for rapid RF breakthrough and envelopment of Kostiantynivka.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL UPDATE)

EventEstimated Timeline (Z)Decision Point / Action Required
CRITICAL IO Counter-AttackURGENT (NLT 251600Z)T-15 Minutes. NCA must execute joint televised rejection of peace framework claims and troop limits, specifically addressing the false US negotiation narrative.
C2 Protection / SHORAD ReallocationNLT 251700ZAD Command must shift SHORAD assets to Poltava/Vinnytsia backup C2 nodes. (High-risk window)
Flank Threat Confirmation (Otradnoye)NLT 251700ZJ2 must confirm/deny RF presence via ISR.
Commitment of New ReservesNLT 252000ZJ3 must authorize the movement of an alternative reserve force (Reserve Force Bravo) to the T-05-15 corridor with maximized EW screening.
RF Main Assault (Kinetic)NLT 260000ZAnticipate highest density of RF ground assault.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: NCA / J7 (STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS) – 15 MINUTE WINDOW

  1. EXECUTE IMMEDIATE, FORCEFUL COUNTER-IO: The NCA must issue the joint rejection statement NLT 251600Z. The message must explicitly reject the 'agreement,' the 800k troop limit, and the narratives surrounding the "Abu Dhabi talks," framing them as calculated RF deception designed to create strategic paralysis immediately preceding the 260000Z ground assault. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / GROUND FORCES COMMAND

  1. RESERVE MOVEMENT REDUNDANCY (CRITICAL): Reroute Reserve Force Bravo to utilize multiple, decentralized low-signature movement corridors toward the T-05-15 GLOC, integrating rail assets if feasible, to mitigate the increased risk from expanded KAB targeting in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia. Movement must begin NLT 252000Z.
  2. FIRE SUPPORT AUGMENTATION: Immediately redeploy specialized counter-battery radar and MLRS assets to the Zaporizhzhia axis to maximize counter-fire against detected TOS-1A and heavy artillery, alleviating pressure on the southern flank of the main Pokrovsk defense.

TO: J2 (INTELLIGENCE) / AIR FORCE COMMAND

  1. C2 AD Reallocation STATUS CHECK (HIGH PRIORITY): J2 must confirm the physical relocation of SHORAD assets to Poltava/Vinnytsia NLT 251700Z. Failure to do so requires J2 to identify and task substitute mobile air defense capability.
  2. EXPLOIT DEEP STRIKE SUCCESS: Task J3/J4 to develop rapid follow-up strike packages targeting strategic RF fixed assets (e.g., fuel/ammunition dumps, high-value specialized radar/C2 aircraft parking) utilizing the long-range capability demonstrated in the Taganrog strike (A-60). This diverts RF resources from the immediate ME.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-11-25 15:13:59Z)

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