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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-25 15:00:25Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-25 14:43:58Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 251500Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / POKROVSK AXIS DEFENSE (OPERATION IRON SHIELD)


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The RF Main Effort (ME) remains focused on operational depth penetration along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis. RF forces are currently exploiting tactical gains near Pokrovske and Novopavlivka. The immediate operational objective is the interdiction and seizure of the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), which is critical for defending Kostiantynivka's western flank and facilitating UAF reserve movement.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Current clear and dry weather conditions persist, favoring maximized RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, particularly tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Glide Bomb (KAB) targeting.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF continues a highly synchronized multi-domain approach: leveraging decisive Information Operations (IO) to achieve strategic paralysis in Kyiv, while accelerating ground exploitation in Donetsk Oblast.

  • Kinetic Indicator (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE): A new group of RF reconnaissance/strike UAS was detected moving south over Northern Chernihiv region (251450Z). This activity correlates directly with predictive models indicating preparatory strikes against UAF operational depth (AD/Logistics) prior to the NLT 260000Z main ground assault.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CRITICAL): RF intends to force a decisive operational breakthrough at Pokrovsk NLT 260000Z by leveraging the cognitive damage caused by the alleged peace agreement and troop limit (800k) claims. The goal is to undermine UAF mobilization effectiveness and prevent the committed deployment of strategic reserves. CAPABILITY (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates robust capability to rapidly fuse diplomatic signaling with tactical kinetic operations. RF maintains local air superiority and effective precision strike assets (KAB/UAVs) for interdicting UAF reserves.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF Telegram channels are actively propagating claims of UAF operational retreat along the Pokrovske/Novopavlivka vectors (251411Z). This narrative is strategically timed to reinforce the diplomatic IO—suggesting Kyiv's alleged agreement to unfavorable terms stems from terminal tactical weakness. This is a critical psychological maneuver designed to preempt UAF reserve deployment.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adequate to sustain the current high-tempo offensive operations in the Donetsk direction. The expected surge in KAB strikes indicates sustained PGM availability.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The immediate, global amplification of the peace agreement disinformation following NCA movements demonstrates centralized control over tactical, operational, and strategic domains.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is critically stable but suffers high cognitive pressure. Continued IO attacks directly target the legitimacy of the National Command Authority (NCA) and threaten domestic support for mobilization (Dempster-Shafer Belief: 0.056785 on troop limit disinformation).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (OPERATIONAL/COGNITIVE): The primary setback is the success of the RF political-military deception campaign (false peace agreement). Failure to immediately and convincingly refute this narrative compromises the command environment.
  • Status of Reserves (CRITICAL GAP): The status of the crucial relief force "Plan 7-B MOD" remains a critical vulnerability. As of 241530Z, the force was communications-dark and exposed to KAB interdiction along its movement corridor toward Rodynske. This force must be assumed compromised or delayed.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT: The primary constraint is the diminishing window to commit reserves NLT 252000Z before the RF main assault (260000Z). REQUIREMENT: Immediate prioritization of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Counter-UAS assets to protect the revised reserve deployment routes from KAB cuing (GAP 1D/17).


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF is executing a high-stakes deception phase: "Kyiv has agreed to surrender terms and resource limitations."

  • Primary Vector: Exploiting screenshots from credible Western news organizations (CBS News) to legitimize the fabricated claim of Ukrainian agreement to unfavorable US-brokered peace terms, including an 800,000 troop ceiling.
  • Secondary Vector: Domestic UAF communication efforts (NGU, MVS) are focused on high-morale events (Dignity Day, Holodomor Remembrance) to reinforce historical resilience and link current aggression to past genocide. While necessary for morale, these messages do not provide kinetic relief or a direct counter to the immediate peace-plan narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The lack of immediate and decisive NCA rebuttal risks rapid domestic erosion of support for renewed mobilization efforts, potentially leading to widespread political instability or civil disobedience. The highly publicized but localized internal security incident in Lviv (241614Z) offers RF supplementary IO fodder for narratives of domestic collapse.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO successfully leverages the diplomatic process to delay Western aid. Partners pushing a peace framework are now pressured to force Ukraine's compliance based on the fabricated narrative of initial agreement. This poses an immediate threat to the J-4 materiel pipeline (Predicted 72-hour delay).


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): Execution of Coordinated Penetration and IO Lockdown. RF will intensify kinetic operations on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis NLT 260000Z, focusing on rapid shallow penetration and securing the T-05-15 GLOC. This kinetic push will be synchronized with a 12-hour period of maximal IO pressure (251600Z – 260400Z) targeting Western parliaments and media, seeking to achieve a definitive, irreversible delay in UAF reserve commitment.

  • Anticipated Fixation: RF air assets (UAS/KAB) will exploit the UAV reconnaissance detected in Chernihiv (251450Z) to launch targeted strikes against Northern/Central logistics or AD nodes NLT 260600Z to prevent diversion of SHORAD assets to the main axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Operational Defeat via Political Paralysis. If the NCA fails to deliver a convincing, joint refutation of the IO NLT 251600Z, the resulting domestic and external political uncertainty prevents the commitment of reserves (or forces the commitment of the previously compromised Plan 7-B MOD without required security). RF 40th/155th OMBRs, capitalizing on the resulting tactical vacuum, achieve an operational breakthrough, seizing Rodynske and effectively placing Kostiantynivka under direct fire control NLT 280000Z. This forces a catastrophic operational withdrawal.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (REVISED - CRITICAL)

EventEstimated Timeline (Z)Decision Point / Action Required
CRITICAL IO Counter-AttackURGENT (NLT 251600Z)NCA must execute joint televised rejection of peace framework claims and troop limits.
Commitment of New ReservesNLT 252000ZJ3 must authorize the movement of an alternative reserve force (assuming Plan 7-B is compromised) to block the T-05-15 axis.
RF Main Assault (Kinetic)NLT 260000ZAnticipate highest density of RF ground assault (40th/155th OMBR) reinforced by intensive tactical air support.
Fixation Strike WindowNLT 260600ZJ2 predicts concentrated RF KAB/UAV strike activity (Kharkiv/Poltava/Sumy) based on 251450Z drone detection.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: NCA / J7 (STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS)

  1. EXECUTE IMMEDIATE, JOINT COUNTER-IO (CRITICAL PRIORITY): The NCA must issue a joint Presidential/MoD statement NLT 251600Z. The message must explicitly reject the 'agreement' and the 800k troop limit. Crucially, it must frame the disinformation as a deliberate precursor to the anticipated RF ground assault NLT 260000Z, thus linking the diplomatic lie directly to Russian military aggression. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  2. Public Transparency: Utilize UAF combat footage (e.g., Azov 12th Brigade FPV near Kostiantynivka) to demonstrate active resistance on the ground, directly contradicting RF claims of mass retreat.

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / GROUND FORCES COMMAND

  1. REVISE RESERVE DEPLOYMENT (CRITICAL PRIORITY): Assume "Plan 7-B MOD" is non-viable for immediate counter-attack due to confirmed interdiction risk (Previous Report) and critical C2 gap. Identify and deploy a new ready reserve element to the T-05-15 GLOC corridor NLT 252000Z.
  2. EW/C-UAS Shielding: Prioritize immediate deployment of tactical EW assets (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to secure the movement corridors of the newly committed reserve force against RF ISR cuing and KAB strikes.

TO: J2 (INTELLIGENCE) / AIR FORCE COMMAND

  1. Track Northern UAV (HIGH PRIORITY): Dedicated SIGINT/ELINT must track the detected UAV group (251450Z Chernihiv) to determine its exact targeting matrix (AD sites, logistics depots, or forward C2). Use this data to relocate high-value AD assets (Patriot/SAMP-T) if necessary. (COLLECTION PRIORITY: HIGH)
  2. Confirm Ballistic Strike Status (GAP Mitigation): Conduct retrospective analysis to confirm if the predicted NLT 240000Z ballistic strike occurred, and if C2 redundancies (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia) were successfully utilized.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

GAP IDGAP DESCRIPTIONPRIORITYCOLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
GAP 1 (CRITICAL)Current location, attrition rate, and combat effectiveness of "Plan 7-B MOD" reserve force.CRITICALJ3 internal reporting review and high-resolution GEOINT/IMINT (UAS) targeting the expected interdiction corridor near Rodynske. NLT 251700Z.
GAP 1D (CRITICAL)Specific RF fire support capacity (artillery/rocket) supporting the T-05-15 GLOC assault.CRITICALDedicated SIGINT collection focused on RF artillery unit locations and observed rate of fire density near Pokrovske/Novopavlivka. NLT 251800Z.
GAP 17 (HIGH)Precise targeting data derived from the UAV group detected in Chernihiv (251450Z).HIGHELINT/SIGINT sweep along the Southern axis of flight for command frequency intercepts and sensor data download attempts. NLT 260100Z.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-11-25 14:43:58Z)

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