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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-25 14:43:58Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-25 14:13:59Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 251445Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / COGNITIVE COUNTER-PARALYSIS & POKROVSK AXIS DEFENSE


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF kinetic focus remains the exploitation of the Pokrovsk axis toward Kostiantynivka. RF sources (Дневник Десантника, 251411Z) claim localized tactical successes along the Pokrovske and Novopavlivka axes, reinforcing the assessment that RF is attempting to interdict the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) and secure the western flank approach to Kostiantynivka.

  • Focus of Effort (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE): The primary kinetic threat is the continued expansion of the salient from the Pokrovsk area, aimed at fracturing UAF defensive lines and isolating Kostiantynivka.
  • Fixation Strikes (FACT/MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF continues tactical air interdiction (KABs, UAVs) in the operational depth (Kharkiv/Sumy regions), forcing UAF air defense consumption and fixing reserves. MoD Russia claims the elimination of a UAF "Baba Yaga" UAS in Sumy Region (251403Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and dry conditions persist (based on previous report), favoring RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and precision strike capabilities (KABs, tactical UAS).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces are executing a highly synchronized multi-domain effort, leveraging maximized information warfare (IO) pressure to paralyze Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA) decision-making while accelerating ground exploitation in Donetsk Oblast. UAF forces are heavily engaged in static defense, with strategic reserve deployment decision points becoming critical and time-sensitive.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CRITICAL): Achieve kinetic and cognitive success simultaneously. RF intends to leverage the perception that Kyiv has agreed to unfavorable peace terms (800k limit, Trump plan) to undermine morale, halt Western aid, and freeze UAF reserve commitment, thus enabling a decisive breakthrough at Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka NLT 260000Z. CAPABILITY: Demonstrated ability to instantaneously amplify highly damaging diplomatic disinformation globally (ASTRA using CBS screenshot, 251411Z). RF maintains air superiority locally and possesses sufficient PGM stockpiles for interdiction (KABs/UAVs).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is actively propagating claims of UAF operational retreat/attrition along the Dnipropetrovsk direction, specifically mentioning Pokrovske and Novopavlivka, indicating a shift from localized holding actions to renewed offensive momentum (251411Z). This narrative supports the diplomatic IO by implying Kyiv is negotiating from a position of tactical weakness.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain adequate to support the current operational tempo. Diplomatic activity (Putin in Kyrgyzstan, 251406Z) is a projected image of regional stability intended to reassure internal RF audiences regarding long-term resource availability.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The immediate correlation between the NCA meeting in Abu Dhabi and the Russian media claiming Ukrainian agreement to the peace plan demonstrates centralized, rapid fusion of diplomatic and information operations, exceeding previous hybrid warfare standards.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is actively being degraded in the cognitive domain. The high-profile claim that Ukraine has agreed to the Trump peace plan (251411Z), which implies the 800k troop limit and unfavorable terms, is a direct, morale-sapping attack on the legitimacy of NCA decisions and the mobilization effort.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (CRITICAL COGNITIVE): The widespread, internationally distributed claim that Ukraine has agreed to the US-brokered peace plan framework without public confirmation is the most significant setback in the current reporting period. This demands an immediate, forceful, and transparent counter-narrative.
  • Note: Previous UAF deep strike capabilities (UA_REG TEAM messages) are long-term morale boosters but offer no immediate kinetic relief to the Pokrovsk axis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT: The primary constraint is the paralysis caused by the IO. Failure to authorize reserves NLT 252000Z to counter the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka thrust risks operational defeat in the ME. REQUIREMENT: Dedicated EW/C-UAS assets must be prioritized for the defense of the reserve deployment corridors against expected RF KAB/UAV interdiction.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF campaign has entered the deception phase: "Kyiv has agreed to surrender terms."

  • Key IO Vector (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE): The use of screenshots from Western sources (CBS News) by RF Telegram channels (ASTRA) claiming Ukraine has agreed to the US-backed plan (251411Z) maximizes credibility, forcing Western media to cover the claim.
  • Narrative Amplification (JUDGMENT/MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF sources are attempting to sow friction between the US and EU by highlighting US officials stating Washington wants to continue selling weapons to Europe after the conflict (TASS, 251403Z), suggesting US motives are purely commercial.
  • Internal Russian Debate (JUDGMENT/LOW CONFIDENCE): The criticism by some prominent RF military bloggers (Alex Parker, 251407Z) regarding Putin allowing the troop limit to rise to 800k serves to frame the current peace terms as a concession made by Russia, thus increasing pressure on the NCA to accept the terms before RF allegedly withdraws the offer.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public confidence in the NCA is at extreme risk. If the alleged agreement and troop limits (800k) are not immediately and convincingly refuted, domestic support for mobilization and the war effort is likely to suffer a sharp decline.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic engagement is now directly serving RF military objectives. Western partners, having pushed a framework, are now susceptible to the RF IO that aims to portray Ukraine as either capitulating or, conversely, as spoiling a consensus peace deal—leading to potential delays in critical military aid shipments.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): Coordinated Operational Breach and IO Lockdown. RF will intensify kinetic operations on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis NLT 260000Z, likely targeting UAF C2 and logistics nodes identified during the previous days’ ISR operations. Simultaneously, RF global media will flood the information space with the claim that the peace agreement is imminent and binding, specifically targeting Western parliamentary bodies and aid mechanisms, aiming for a 72-hour operational pause in Western support (J-4 materiel delivery) that RF can exploit for maximum ground gain.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Irreversible Political-Military Fracture. The lack of an immediate, decisive counter-IO from the NCA allows the narrative of Ukrainian agreement (251411Z) and the 800k troop limit to solidify domestically and internationally. This leads to large-scale reserve refusal/mutiny or political challenge, forcing the Ministry of Defense to delay the critical deployment to the Kostiantynivka flank. RF forces achieve a tactical envelopment of a key UAF formation along the T-05-15 axis and seize a critical depth objective (e.g., Rodynske or Kostiantynivka itself) within 4 days (NLT 290000Z).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (REVISED - URGENCY INCREASED)

EventEstimated Timeline (Z)Decision Point / Action Required
CRITICAL IO Counter-AttackURGENT (NLT 251600Z)NCA must deliver a televised, coordinated (President/MOD/JGS) rejection of the "agreement" claim and the specific 800k troop limit figure.
Commitment of ME ReservesNLT 252000ZJ3 must execute the deployment of the ready reserve brigade to interdict RF movement on the T-05-15 axis.
RF Main Assault (Pokrovsk Axis)NLT 260000ZGround Forces Command must anticipate the highest intensity kinetic effort along this front, synchronized with deep strikes.
Fixation Strike Salvo (KAB/UAV)NLT 260600ZJ2 Air Force predicts concentrated RF strike activity (Kharkiv/Poltava/Sumy) targeting supply depots and AD assets.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: NCA / J7 (STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS)

  1. Immediate & Forceful Refutation (CRITICAL PRIORITY): The NCA must issue a joint statement (Presidency, Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry) NLT 251600Z explicitly denying that Ukraine has agreed to any peace plan that compromises territorial integrity or restricts force structure below operational requirements. Frame the leaks/claims as hostile psychological warfare designed to facilitate RF ground offensive operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  2. Mobilization Reassurance: The IO counter-attack must directly address the 800,000 troop limit, confirming that mobilization continues and that future force ceilings are non-negotiable outside of full RF withdrawal.

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / GROUND FORCES COMMAND

  1. Secure T-05-15 (CRITICAL PRIORITY): Assume the critical Ivanopolye gap (GAP 1D) is fully exploited. The ready reserve must be deployed and positioned to block and contain RF movement toward Kostiantynivka via the T-05-15 GLOC NLT 252000Z.
  2. C2 Redundancy (Northern Sector): Increase redundancy and security for C2 nodes and logistics hubs in the Kharkiv/Poltava/Sumy operational rear, anticipating increased KAB and drone interdiction attempts (GAP 17 related).

TO: J2 (INTELLIGENCE) / COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

  1. Confirm RF Force Composition (GAP 1D): Prioritize national collection assets (GEOINT/IMINT) to confirm the specific RF brigades/regiments exploiting the Pokrovsk salient and their immediate objectives (e.g., Rodynske, Kostiantynivka C2 nodes). (COLLECTION PRIORITY: CRITICAL)
  2. IO-Kinetic Correlation: Continue monitoring the synchronization between international diplomatic messaging (US, UK, RF MFA) and shifts in RF kinetic activity and targeting, specifically along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka front.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

GAP IDGAP DESCRIPTIONPRIORITYCOLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
GAP 1D (CRITICAL)RF force composition and depth exploiting the Pokrovsk salient toward the T-05-15 GLOC and the Kostiantynivka western flank.CRITICALDedicated GEOINT/IMINT (UAS/Satellite) targeting the area between Ivanopolye and Pokrovsk. NLT 251700Z.
GAP 14 (CRITICAL)Quantified functional Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on strategic logistics and energy nodes (Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk region) from previous strikes.CRITICALJ4/J2 BDA reports focusing on GLOC viability and strategic power grid resilience. NLT 252000Z.
GAP 17 (HIGH)RF methodology and unit responsible for targeting KAB strikes in the Northern/Central sectors.HIGHSIGINT/ELINT sweep focused on identifying specialized RF ISR platforms (Orlan/Supercam) or Spetsnaz/DPR units conducting targeting for KAB delivery.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-11-25 14:13:59Z)

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