Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 251145Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / POKROVSK AXIS CULMINATION AND KOSTIANTYNIVKA STABILIZATION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The strategic center of gravity for the past 24 hours, the Pokrovsk defense sector, is now assessed as operationally lost.

• Pokrovsk (CRITICAL FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE): Multiple RF military and affiliated channels (MoD Russia, Alex Parker) released video and text confirming the occupation of Pokrovsk (referred to by RF as Krasnoarmeysk). RF sources claim UAF forces are no longer present. This culminates the RF deep breakthrough operation and validates the loss of the city NLT 251135Z.
• Kostiantynivka (IMMEDIATE FOCUS): Kostiantynivka has become the new forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The city's southern and southwestern approaches (facing the captured Ivanopillya and Pokrovsk) are now the most critical points requiring immediate reinforcement and fire support.
• Logistics Damage (BDA Confirmed): A major civilian logistics hub (NOVUS) was confirmed destroyed by missile strike, incurring casualties. This represents a significant disruption to civilian supply lines near the capital, confirming RF intent to maximize societal pressure following the deep strike.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain clear across the Eastern Theater, enabling persistent RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and high-volume deployment of KABs (Glide Bombs) and tactical UAVs. UAV activity is confirmed near Dnipro, indicating continued pressure on central Ukrainian operational depth.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (RED): RF is consolidating gains in Pokrovsk/Ivanopillya and immediately leveraging these positions to establish fire control over the T-05-15 GLOC and the approaches to Kostiantynivka. Drone activity in Dnipro suggests continued attempts to fix UAF reserves or target C2 nodes in Central Ukraine.
• UAF Forces (BLUE): UAF forces are executing a complex operation involving active withdrawal from the Pokrovsk sector and simultaneous deployment of stabilizing reserves to define the new Main Line of Resistance (MLR) centered on Kostiantynivka.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE - T+6 hours): RF will exploit the vacuum created by the UAF withdrawal from Pokrovsk to deny UAF the time necessary to establish a hardened defense perimeter around Kostiantynivka. RF aims to maintain kinetic synchronization between strategic disruption (logistics strikes) and tactical exploitation (ground advance). CAPABILITY: Demonstrated ability to synchronize large-scale strategic strikes (Kinzhal/Ballistic) with rapid ground force breakthroughs and effective, immediate Information Operations (IO).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF focus on rapidly generating and disseminating video evidence of Pokrovsk's capture (using the name Krasnoarmeysk) underscores a high priority on capitalizing on the psychological shock wave (cognitive domain advantage). RF reporting of UAF IED tactics in Zaporizhzhia is likely a preparatory information operation intended to justify future targeting of UAF units as "terrorists."

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Logistics (STRATEGIC SETBACK CONFIRMED): UAF long-range counter-action has confirmed damage to an RF Landing Ship in Novorossiysk (ASTRA report), in addition to the previously confirmed damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal. This imposes a quantifiable, high-cost constraint on RF Black Sea Fleet operations and petroleum supply flows. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex multi-domain operations. Lavrov's aggressive diplomatic messaging serves as a synchronized protective layer for the ongoing kinetic offensive, aiming to deter or delay Western response. UAF C2 must assume all primary C2 nodes in the Central/Eastern sectors are compromised targets.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is critical. The failure to secure the Pokrovsk axis despite the previously anticipated Plan 7-B MOD deployment suggests reserves were unavailable or interdicted. Force readiness is severely strained by confirmed losses of logistics infrastructure (NOVUS) and high tactical pressure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL COUNTER): Successful strategic engagement resulting in damage to an RF Landing Ship in Novorossiysk. This success must be immediately utilized for morale and international leverage.
• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL): Confirmed operational loss of Pokrovsk. Confirmed destruction of the NOVUS logistics center, adding to strategic vulnerability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT: FORCE ALLOCATION: Due to the probable failure of Plan 7-B MOD, UAF must urgently reallocate all available mechanized and fire support assets to the Kostiantynivka Southwestern Flank. CONSTRAINT: INTERNAL COHESION RISK: High-profile internal corruption investigations (NABU on "Midas," "Mindich-gate") are creating internal friction and may distract strategic leadership from the immediate operational crisis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations are rapidly pivoting to maximize the Pokrovsk victory and the strategic strike success:

1. Victory Framing: Video evidence of Pokrovsk is being used to demonstrate irreversible momentum.
2. Diplomatic Leverage: Lavrov is forcefully rejecting any immediate European role in negotiations, stating RF will not "run to the table," strengthening the perception that Russia dictates the terms of engagement.
3. Transatlantic Discord: RF channels continue to highlight alleged European anger at US diplomatic maneuvers (Rubio/Trump plan), aimed at eroding NATO and EU cohesion. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

National morale is highly sensitive due to the casualty counts in Kyiv, the loss of Pokrovsk, and the disruption of civilian supply chains (NOVUS). UAF IO must immediately amplify the strategic success of the Novorossiysk strikes to demonstrate capability and cost imposition on the RF. Local morale support (Zaporizhzhia regional aid) provides localized resilience.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Focus remains on managing the political fallout of the US-EU division regarding potential peace plans. Lavrov's aggressive diplomacy aims to establish a high baseline for any future negotiation, asserting Russian strength in the wake of kinetic successes.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 90%): Consolidation and Immediate Pressure on Kostiantynivka MLR. RF forces (40th/155th OMBR elements, supported by assault engineering and KABs) will prioritize establishing fire superiority over the main withdrawal routes and pressuring the newly formed Kostiantynivka defensive perimeter. Initial RF thrusts will utilize captured positions in Pokrovsk and Ivanopillya to probe the defenses along the T-05-15 axis and assess UAF reserve capacity NLT 252000Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE - 80%): Bypassing and Deep Penetration via Western Flank. If UAF reserves are committed strictly to the direct Kostiantynivka defense, RF mobile groups will bypass the city to the west, aiming to seize control of secondary logistical and command nodes further inland (Myrnohrad/Selydove region). This would achieve functional encirclement of Kostiantynivka, forcing a catastrophic UAF collapse in the entire Western Donetsk sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (REVISED)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / GROUND FORCES COMMAND

1. Establish Kostiantynivka MLR (IMMEDIATE PRIORITY): Commit maximum reserve forces immediately to fortify the Southwest (Pokrovsk) and South (Ivanopillya) sectors of Kostiantynivka. Utilize dense minefields and anti-tank barriers to channel RF exploitation attempts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. EW/C2 Security: Increase dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) coverage over the Kostiantynivka C2 nodes and surrounding withdrawal corridors to mitigate RF ISR cuing and prevent further strategic strikes on C2.
3. Dnipro UAV Response: J3 Air Forces must ensure adequate SHORAD coverage is maintained for Dnipro C2/logistics nodes, anticipating RF attempts to distract or degrade C2 capacity further west.

TO: J2 (INTELLIGENCE) / J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS)

4. Maximize Novorossiysk Success: J7 must immediately develop and deploy an Information Operations package focusing exclusively on the damage to the RF Landing Ship in Novorossiysk. Narrative: UAF imposes strategic costs even amidst tactical pressure, validating asymmetric capability.
5. Logistics BDA Refinement (GAP 8B): Prioritize high-resolution BDA on the NOVUS center and other deep strike targets to quantify operational loss beyond casualty count. Assess impact on the civilian economy NLT 251600Z.
6. Internal IO Mitigation: J7 must coordinate with NCA/NABU to ensure messaging regarding corruption investigations is managed to prevent internal focus from distracting from the immediate military crisis.

TO: NAVAL COMMAND / J3 STRATEGIC TARGETING

7. Black Sea Fleet Exploitation: Given confirmed damage to high-value naval assets and the CPC terminal, immediately task ISR and targeting teams to identify additional RF Black Sea Fleet assets and logistics vulnerabilities for follow-on strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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