Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 251030Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / POKROVSK AXIS DEFENSE AND DEEP STRIKE RECIPROCATION REFERENCE: Previous ISR 251030Z NOV 25; Daily Intel Summary 241530Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational tempo remains critically high, dominated by simultaneous RF offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk Axis and escalating RF fixation operations in Zaporizhzhia.

• Pokrovsk Axis / Central Donetsk (FACT): RF forces maintain maximum pressure across the key logistical corridor. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GS UAF) confirms heavy fighting near Rodynske, Myrnohrad, and Pokrovsk, indicating the operational GLOC (M-30/T-05-15) is under direct kinetic threat. GS UAF also reports clashes near Ivanopillya and Oleksandro-Shultyne, confirming the enemy’s attempt to consolidate a western flank around Kostiantynivka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Huliaipole Direction (FACT/CLAIM): RF forces are transitioning their fixation effort into an active assault. TASS (RU source) claims a direct assault on the outskirts of Huliaipole. GS UAF confirms continued ground clashes and recent RF aviation strikes in the area (Vozdvyzhivka, Huliaipole). This escalates the threat of an open secondary axis of advance. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)
• Deep Operations (FACT): UAF successfully executed a strategic drone strike against the RF Black Sea Fleet base and oil terminal in Novorossiysk (Krasnodar Krai), indicating active long-range penetration capabilities and immediate reciprocation for the Kyiv ballistic strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

RF forces continue to leverage air assets, specifically KABs, against Donetsk front infrastructure (UAF Air Force report, 250955Z). This use confirms suitable clear-sky conditions for high-precision aviation guidance over the FEBA. Drone activity persists across central and northern Ukraine (Sumy/Poltava, Mykolaiv), indicating favorable UAS flight weather.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (RED): RF is executing a coordinated strategy: Exploitation (Pokrovsk), Fixation-to-Attack (Huliaipole), and Air Defense Suppression/Cueing (Sumy/Poltava). The 110th OMSRB is confirmed to be using FPV drones in tactical engagements.
• UAF Forces (BLUE): UAF is balancing critical defensive maneuvers in the east with effective, timely deep retaliatory strikes (Novorossiysk). The primary control measure is maintaining cohesion along the Pokrovsk defensive line despite overwhelming RF kinetic pressure on key logistical nodes.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CRITICAL): RF intent is to achieve operational envelopment or collapse of the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka defensive pocket within the next 12 hours, while simultaneously preventing UAF reinforcement/extraction using intensified efforts on the Huliaipole front.

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT (Glide Bombs/UAS): RF demonstrates high tactical proficiency in using unguided/UAS assets for deep reconnaissance and saturation strike cueing. Air Force reports persistent UAS activity in multiple deep rear regions (Mykolaiv, Sumy heading toward Poltava), supporting the predictive MDCOA targeting assessment.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (JUDGMENT)

The claimed shift from fixation to assault at Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia) is a significant tactical adaptation. If confirmed, this indicates RF is willing to commit greater forces to the secondary front, possibly due to observed UAF resource constraints or the need to preemptively block any potential deployment of UAF reserves (like Plan 7-B MOD, if located).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

The successful UAF strike on the Novorossiysk oil terminal and VMF base will inflict strategic logistical damage, particularly impacting fuel supply to the Southern Axis and Black Sea Fleet operations. However, this disruption will have a lag time (T+72 hours) and is unlikely to immediately constrain the localized RF ground offensive currently underway in Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (JUDGMENT)

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain strikes (ballistic/UAS/KABs) and ground operations. The rapid, synchronized diplomatic IO (Lavrov statements) coinciding with tactical escalations demonstrates centralized C2 integration across diplomatic, IO, and kinetic domains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is defensively focused, characterized by decentralized command execution (evidenced by the timely Novorossiysk strike). Readiness status in the Pokrovsk area is CRITICALLY stressed due to the continuous assault on GLOCs (Myrnohrad, Rodynske).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC): Coordinated deep strike on Novorossiysk (oil terminal and VMF base). This represents a successful strategic counter-escalation.
• SETBACK (TACTICAL): Continued RF advance forcing engagement around key defensive points (Rodynske, Myrnohrad). GS UAF reports confirm UAF units are heavily engaged across the Pokrovsk axis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Plan 7-B MOD. The zero update on the status of this reinforcement column (GAP 1C) is the single greatest immediate constraint. Its absence means the defensive perimeter is operating without guaranteed, imminent relief capacity for the expected Myrnohrad GLOC failure (NLT 251200Z).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO channels are focusing on two major themes:

1. Diplomatic Flexibility: Lavrov claims RF is ready to discuss the Trump peace plan wording received via "unofficial channels," intending to portray Moscow as the reasonable actor.
2. Western Disunity/Sabotage: Lavrov simultaneously accused the West of attempting to "pervert" the Trump plan, aiming to sow discord and delay concerted diplomatic action.
3. Domestic Unity: Intensified fundraising drives ("Everything for Victory") and claims of UAF war crimes are designed to maintain internal mobilization and public support for the offensive push.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is buoyed by visible deep strikes (Novorossiysk) but likely strained by the intense fighting in Donetsk and the persistent RF strategic strikes against civilian centers (Kyiv). Internal RF morale indicators show some strain (video appeal from Nizhny Novgorod residents regarding infrastructure failures), but state-controlled media counters this with high-production propaganda.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Estonian PM Kallas’s firm rejection of G8 talks without substantial RF concessions (army size, nuclear capability) directly contradicts the RF narrative of diplomatic inevitability. Finnish President Stubb's comments underscore the perception in allied capitals that a critical, high-stakes diplomatic window is currently open (aligned with the Umerov-Trump meeting timeline).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): Pokrovsk Isolation and Huliaipole Escalation NLT 251600Z. RF will commit maximum conventional and air effort (KABs, massed artillery) to functionally isolate Pokrovsk by seizing control or maintaining kinetic interdiction along the remaining GLOCs (Myrnohrad/Rodynske). Simultaneously, the claimed assault on Huliaipole will intensify to fix UAF 1st Echelon reserves, preventing their use in the Donetsk sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Coordinated Strike on Alternate C2/Logistics Network NLT 251800Z. Following the initial strategic strike, RF ISR (UAS detected moving towards Poltava) will finalize targeting for a precision follow-up. This strike will use Iskander/Kinzhals to target alternate J-FIRE or logistics hub nodes in the Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk region, aiming to disrupt the ability of UAF High Command to manage the expected operational collapse scenario in the Pokrovsk sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / GROUND FORCES COMMAND

1. Pokrovsk Contingency Execution (CRITICAL): Preemptively activate counter-battery protocols (J-FIRE) to suppress observed RF aviation launch sites/KAB staging areas in response to the continued KAB use on Donetsk. Prepare for the activation of withdrawal or final defense protocols for forces north of Myrnohrad at 251200Z.
2. GAP 1C Closure (REITERATED URGENCY): Shift all long-range ISR assets (including tactical SSO drone teams) to execute a HIGH-RISK, high-tempo sweep along the Rodynske-Myrnohrad secondary corridors for Plan 7-B MOD. Failure to confirm status NLT 251130Z requires immediate declaration of non-viability.
3. Huliaipole Confirmation: Deploy specialized ISR (EW/SIGINT) immediately to the Huliaipole sector to verify the troop density and tactical composition of the claimed assault. Confirm if this is a divisional-level push or a combined arms brigade effort.

TO: J2 (INTELLIGENCE) / J6 (COMMUNICATIONS)

4. UAS Threat Assessment (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk): Increase ELINT/COMINT focus on RF C2 chatter regarding the Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk regions, correlating with the UAS movement detected in Sumy. Assume these drones are laser/IR spotters for the MDCOA follow-up strike.
5. Novorossiysk BDA: Initiate rapid BDA on the Novorossiysk strike (IMINT/SIGINT) to quantify the precise damage to the oil terminal and VMF assets. This BDA is crucial for future targeting cycles and IO messaging.

TO: J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) / MFA

6. Diplomatic Counter-Narrative: J7 must coordinate with allied StratComs to emphasize the gap between RF diplomatic "openness" (Lavrov's statement) and their military escalation (Pokrovsk assault, Kyiv strike, Moldova violation). Frame the RF diplomatic move as a deliberate, cynical cover for tactical aggression.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

//END OF REPORT//