Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 251000Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / COUNTER-INTERDICTION AND DEEP STRIKE RESPONSE REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250930Z NOV 25; Daily Intel Summary 241530Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains bipartite: I) Immediate Tactical Defense on the Pokrovsk Axis, specifically the Myrnohrad GLOC; and II) Strategic Counter-Offense (Deep Strike) extending into RF strategic rear areas (Taganrog, Southern Russia).

• Pokrovsk Axis (FACT): RF ground forces are executing the previously predicted MLCOA. The 7th DShV Corps confirms intense pressure on Myrnohrad. This verifies that RF intent is immediate GLOC interdiction to isolate the Pokrovsk defensive line. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Strategic Rear (FACT): UAF deep strike operations successfully targeted and struck high-value RF assets, including an experimental A-60 AEW/ISR platform and associated infrastructure at the Taganrog Aircraft Repair Plant, as well as military factories and oil facilities in Southern Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Sector (FACT): UAF strikes caused significant disruption to civilian power infrastructure, reported by RF officials as affecting over 28,000 subscribers. This confirms UAF capacity to disrupt RF logistical and energy infrastructure supporting the Southern Front.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The combination of persistent cold weather and kinetic degradation of civilian infrastructure (Kyiv TEPs, Zaporizhzhia power grid) continues to generate critical civil-military friction and divert engineering/stabilization assets.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (RED): RF is executing a rapid exploitation maneuver at Myrnohrad. Their overall defensive posture in the deep rear is demonstrably permeable to indigenous UAF long-range strike capabilities (Neptune, Bars UAVs).
• UAF Forces (BLUE): UAF has shifted its operational profile to Simultaneous Defense and Strategic Depth Interdiction (S-DOD). This successful deep strike sequence relieves localized pressure by forcing RF to divert AD and assessment assets to their rear. CRITICAL WARNING: This success does not mitigate the immediate, imminent tactical threat to the Myrnohrad GLOC.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

INTENTION: RF intent is to capitalize on the tactical momentum at Myrnohrad to achieve a rapid, localized breakthrough before UAF deep strike effects force a strategic pause. The successful destruction of the A-60 forces RF to rely on more vulnerable ground-based C2/ISR assets or risk over-exposing existing VKS platforms.

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT: RF ground forces possess sufficient mass and indirect fire support (KAB/artillery) to execute the Myrnohrad offensive. However, UAF demonstrated the capability to conduct sustained, coordinated deep strikes, challenging RF strategic security assumptions.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (FACT/JUDGMENT)

1. Pokrovsk Acceleration (FACT): The immediate pressure on Myrnohrad confirms the acceleration of the RF timeline, prioritizing the GLOC cut over fixing wider UAF formations.
2. Strategic Vulnerability (JUDGMENT): The confirmed loss of the A-60 aircraft (AEW/ISR) is a high-impact tactical loss for RF, likely degrading their real-time targeting and C2 redundancy for VKS operations along the front line. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

The targeting of oil facilities and the Taganrog repair plant directly addresses RF sustainment. If the Taganrog facility handles critical VKS maintenance (e.g., Su-34/Su-35S), the repair cycle duration will increase significantly, compounding the vulnerability caused by poor EW integration (as noted in previous ISR). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (JUDGMENT)

RF C2 remains effective in tactical execution (Myrnohrad push) and strategic IO (rejecting peace plan). However, the failure of strategic air defense to prevent the coordinated Neptune/Bars strike indicates a localized C2 failure or resource misallocation in defending high-value strategic assets. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

UAF posture is defensively critical on the Pokrovsk corridor, but strategically offensive in the deep zone. The successful execution of the deep strike demonstrates mature multi-domain coordination (Rocket Forces, Navy, SSO). Immediate tactical readiness at Myrnohrad requires reinforcement or controlled withdrawal planning.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC): Confirmed destruction of the RF A-60 airborne platform and damage to military-industrial targets in Taganrog and Southern Russia.
• SETBACK (TACTICAL): Imminent threat of GLOC collapse at Myrnohrad.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate combat reserves and engineering support to prevent the total closure of the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk GLOC. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT (GAP): The status and location of "Plan 7-B MOD" are unknown and urgently required to assess the feasibility of reinforcing Myrnohrad.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (FACT/JUDGMENT)

RF PRIMARY NARRATIVE: Diplomatic Intransigence and Localized Victory.

1. Diplomatic Fencing (FACT): Russia rejected the updated US 19-point peace plan, using the rejection to signal continued military commitment and frame Kyiv/Washington as unrealistic negotiating partners.
2. Tactical IO (FACT): Pro-RF channels are exploiting the capture of a Ukrainian soldier from Pokrovsk, focusing on demoralization and claims of UAF misuse of civilian infrastructure.
3. UAF Counter-Narrative (SUCCESS): UAF StratComs immediately amplified the deep strike success (A-60, Taganrog) to counter recent reports of infrastructure loss in Kyiv/Zaporizhzhia. This narrative must be sustained.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

National morale is boosted by the deep strike success, demonstrating Ukrainian capacity to inflict proportional damage. This temporarily offsets the morale strain caused by the energy infrastructure losses. Domestic political support remains high (military personnel donating funds).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (FACT/JUDGMENT)

Umerov's stated expectation of an urgent November visit to the US to meet with Trump is the single most important strategic-diplomatic indicator. This suggests key agreements were reached (Geneva) and the UAF NCA is prioritizing securing long-term US support ahead of the US presidential transition. Macron's remarks on post-war "support forces" in Kyiv/Odesa serve to anchor long-term security commitments, despite current non-intervention policy.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): GLOC Closure and Isolation of Pokrovsk. RF ground forces will maintain maximum kinetic pressure on Myrnohrad NLT 251400Z, utilizing continuous artillery and KAB saturation fire to physically interdict and cut the GLOC. This action will be supported by concentrated EW efforts to further isolate DShV defenders and prevent organized counter-attacks or withdrawal. RF will prioritize exploiting the tactical gap created by the unknown status of "Plan 7-B MOD."

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Immediate Counter-Strike and Tactical Encirclement. In reaction to the A-60 loss and Taganrog strikes, RF will likely accelerate the MDCOA (Precision C2 strike) to achieve kinetic domain superiority. RF will launch a limited, high-precision ballistic/quasi-ballistic strike (Iskander/Kinzhals) NLT 251600Z targeting C2/J-FIRE nodes in the Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk region. This strike will be synchronized with the successful closure of the Myrnohrad GLOC, leading to the functional encirclement or critical attrition of UAF forces protecting Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / GROUND FORCES COMMAND

1. Myrnohrad Contingency Planning (CRITICAL): Assume the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk GLOC is unusable by 251200Z. J3 must immediately activate secondary/tertiary exfiltration routes and prepare ground forces in the sector for controlled defense or phased tactical withdrawal to pre-prepared, hardened positions further west.
2. Close GAP 1C (CRITICAL): Immediate, high-risk ISR (SSO/UAS) must be focused exclusively on locating and assessing the status of "Plan 7-B MOD" within the next 90 minutes. Use redundant communication methods (satellite burst/hardline) to re-establish C2.
3. Exploitation of A-60 Loss (TACTICAL): Immediately task UAF Air Command (J-AIR) to increase drone and fighter activity in the sector previously covered by the A-60's AEW zone to exploit the RF gap in high-altitude ISR coverage.

TO: J2 (INTELLIGENCE) / J6 (COMMUNICATIONS)

4. C2 Node Redundancy (URGENT): J6 must verify that all primary and hardened alternate C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia/Dnipropetrovsk) have implemented full electromagnetic silence protocols, anticipating the MDCOA counter-strike following the A-60 loss.
5. Targeting Cycle Acceleration (J2/J3): Prioritize SIGINT/IMINT efforts to identify the RF replacement C2/ISR architecture following the A-60 destruction (e.g., ground radar sites, alternate VKS C2 assets) for immediate follow-up targeting.

TO: J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) / MFA

6. Strategic Kinetic Narrative (IMMEDIATE): J7 must ensure official messaging frames the successful deep strikes (A-60, Taganrog) as Proportional Response and Self-Defense against continuous Russian strategic kinetic aggression (TEP strikes, imminent ballistic threat). This message provides diplomatic cover for the urgent Umerov visit.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

//END OF REPORT//