Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 250930Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / C2 DEFENSE & GLOC INTERDICTION COUNTERMEASURES REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250815Z NOV 25; Daily Intel Summary 241530Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The strategic center of gravity remains centered on two domains: I) National Energy/C2 resilience following the mass kinetic strike, and II) Tactical stability on the Pokrovsk Axis.

• Pokrovsk Corridor (FACT): The Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) between Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk is confirmed as the primary operational objective for Russian Federation (RF) forces. Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces (DShV) report that RF intent is to imminently cut this land connection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kyiv (FACT): Strikes on Kyiv TEP 5 and TEP 6 are confirmed by pro-RF sources, directly causing widespread heating outages (7 districts) and necessitating emergency power schedules across Kyiv and three other regions (Ukrenergo). This validates the strategic effectiveness of the previous saturation strike.
• Persistent Threat (FACT): Low-cost Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) probes are confirmed over Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia (Komyshuvakha), Mykolaiv (Pivdenne), and Nikopol, indicating continuous RF ISR and tactical targeting efforts designed to keep Ukrainian Air Defense (AD) dispersed and prevent consolidation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Widespread infrastructure damage has compounded the effects of cold weather. Utility failure critically increases the civilian casualty risk, diverting military resources (National Guard, Engineers) from front-line support tasks to rear-area stabilization.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (RED): RF is executing the exploitation phase. Kinetic strikes utilized in-port launched Kalibr cruise missiles (Novorossiysk), demonstrating increased flexibility and reduced reconnaissance exposure for high-value launch assets. Ground forces are maintaining operational fixation across the Zaporizhzhia front while preparing for an immediate breakthrough maneuver near Pokrovsk.
• UAF Forces (BLUE): UAF AD successfully neutralized 452 of 486 incoming targets (93% rate). However, the resulting resource drain (interceptor expenditure) and the infrastructure repair commitment prevent the effective consolidation of AD assets against the confirmed MDCOA (Second Wave Precision Strike).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

INTENTION: RF intent is to catalyze a localized operational collapse on the Pokrovsk Axis by cutting the primary GLOC (Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk) while simultaneously preventing UAF AD resupply or consolidation through low-level kinetic attrition and high-level IO (Diplomatic Ambiguity). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT: RF demonstrated sustained capacity for high-volume kinetic strikes and the ability to execute high-precision strikes via rapidly deployed naval assets (in-port Kalibr). They continue to possess the layered capability to synchronize kinetic action with strategic IO.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (FACT/JUDGMENT)

1. Pokrovsk Isolation (FACT): RF shifted immediately from fixing UAF reinforcements (Plan 7-B MOD) to targeting the core logistical/withdrawal route into Pokrovsk (Myrnohrad GLOC). This is an acceleration of the operational timeline.
2. VKS Vulnerability (FACT/JUDGMENT): Pro-RF milbloggers report high losses of advanced RF strike aircraft (Su-34/Su-35S) and criticize the widespread failure of on-board EW systems (Khibiny). This suggests that while RF C2 is synchronized, their electronic warfare protection against UAF AD remains substandard and exploitable. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

Confirmation of in-port Kalibr launches suggests a high readiness state and sufficient missile reserves for sustained strategic deep strikes. Decentralized low-cost drone (Shahed) activity confirms the depth of RF drone inventory necessary for attrition warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (JUDGMENT)

RF C2 remains highly effective in synchronizing the kinetic (mass strike) and informational (diplomacy) domains. However, persistent vulnerabilities in VKS EW integration suggest tactical C2 execution at the platform level (Air Force) is weaker than strategic synchronization. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

UAF posture is one of strategic defense and infrastructure stabilization. Front-line readiness on the Pokrovsk corridor is at CRITICAL. Tactical leaders (DShV) are correctly identifying the imminent threat to the Myrnohrad GLOC. UAF counter-propaganda efforts (General Bakulin video from Kostiantynivka) are effective in maintaining military presence optics.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS: Successful neutralization of 452 of 486 air targets (93%). This represents a major tactical AD victory against the drone component of the strike.
• SETBACK: Confirmed loss of significant energy capacity (Kyiv TEPs). The critical resource constraint remains the high expenditure of interceptors needed to achieve the 93% neutralization rate.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate tactical reinforcement and engineering support to harden the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk GLOC. The demand for high-end AD interceptors remains CRITICAL, as the confirmed saturation attack successfully strained reserves.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (FACT/JUDGMENT)

RF PRIMARY NARRATIVE: Diplomatic Ambiguity and Domestic Paralysis.

1. Diplomatic Fencing (FACT): RF officials (Peskov) confirmed receipt of the US plan but immediately rejected the updated version as "unpromising" while maintaining a dialogue channel (Abu Dhabi talks). This achieves the strategic goal of appearing open to dialogue while continuing the kinetic offensive.
2. Hybrid Escalation (FACT): The SVR/UK/Trump narrative continues, attempting to fracture US political will for further military aid by framing UK intelligence as actively interfering with US democracy.
3. Psychological Warfare (FACT): Pro-RF channels are actively disseminating imagery and commentary aimed at maximizing fear and panic among the civilian population following the TEP strikes.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

Morale in affected areas (Kyiv, Central/Northern regions) will be heavily tested by the combination of kinetic strike BDA (damage) and the critical loss of heat/power. UAF StratComs must maintain high-frequency messaging to counter the RF psychological operations exploiting panic.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (FACT/JUDGMENT)

French President Macron’s statement that the "Coalition of the Willing" will not place troops on the front line reduces external intervention risk but necessitates greater focus on accelerated material delivery to UAF. The Abu Dhabi channel remains a key indicator of RF strategic intentions.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): GLOC Interdiction and Persistent Low-Intensity Attrition. RF ground and air forces will prioritize cutting the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 251400Z, utilizing sustained KAB and artillery fire, potentially supported by limited, targeted armored probes, forcing UAF forces in the Pokrovsk vicinity to rely on insecure secondary routes. Simultaneously, low-cost drone activity (Shaheds/ISR) will be maintained over key utility nodes (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia) to fix UAF AD assets further south and east.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Coordinated C2 Decapitation and Tactical Breakthrough. RF will leverage the confirmed UAF AD resource depletion to launch a second, medium-scale precision missile strike (6-12 high-end missiles, e.g., Iskander/Kalibr) targeting primary or secondary J-FIRE/Operational Command (OpCom) nodes in the Poltava/Vinnytsia/Dnipropetrovsk complex. This kinetic action will be synchronized with an RF ground offensive designed to breach the isolated Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk line, aiming to achieve localized command fragmentation followed by tactical encirclement NLT 251800Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / GROUND FORCES COMMAND

1. Prioritize GLOC Defense (CRITICAL): Immediately designate the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk route as the highest priority tactical defensive objective. Deploy mobile engineering teams and dedicated armor support to establish immediate hardpoints and alternate bypass routes.
2. Verify 7-B MOD Status (URGENT): Given the escalated threat to the Pokrovsk GLOC, the status of Plan 7-B MOD must be verified immediately. J3 must determine if the column has bypassed the previous interdiction zone and if it is capable of reinforcing the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk defense.
3. AD Interceptor Conservation (RIGID): Maintain rigid restriction on high-end interceptor usage (Patriot, SAMP-T). Authorize use ONLY for defense of primary C2/J-FIRE nodes and incoming ballistic/quasi-ballistic threats. Low-cost drones must be handled exclusively by mobile fire groups (SHORAD/EW).

TO: J6 (COMMUNICATIONS) / J2 (INTELLIGENCE)

4. Targeted VKS EW Exploitation: J6 must immediately leverage the reported RF EW system failures by increasing signal intensity and frequency-hopping within active KAB engagement zones (e.g., Avdiivka, Zaporizhzhia sectors) to disrupt RF targeting and degrade the effectiveness of VKS operations.
5. C2 Hardening Verification: J6 must confirm that all primary, secondary, and tertiary C2 nodes (especially Poltava/Vinnytsia) have zero electronic signature dependency on civilian networks (cellular/ISP) and are fully transitioned to hardened redundancy systems to survive the MDCOA.

TO: J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) / MFA

6. Diplomacy Counter-Narrative: Immediately frame the RF rejection of the 19-point plan (as reported by Bloomberg) as confirmation that Moscow is not interested in genuine peace, but rather in using diplomatic talks (Abu Dhabi) solely as a cover for continued kinetic aggression against civilian infrastructure.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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