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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-25 08:14:00Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-25 07:14:00Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 250815Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / POST-KINETIC EXPLOITATION AND C2 DEFENSE REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250715Z NOV 25; Daily Intel Summary 241530Z NOV 25


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF has executed a multi-axis kinetic strike employing over 486 targets (drones/missiles) against central, northern, and southern sectors. The strategic center of gravity has shifted from rear-area stabilization (Kyiv blackouts) to defending operational Command and Control (C2) redundancy against confirmed follow-on strikes.

  • Central/Northern Axis (FACT): Confirmed widespread energy infrastructure damage in Kyiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts (Minenergo). This damage represents a successful kinetic action aimed at nationwide C2/logistical degradation. Kyiv Municipal Military Administration (KMVA) reports 13+ impact/debris sites across six districts.
  • Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia/Pokrovsk): The Zaporizhzhia sector is confirmed as an active fixation zone. RF milbloggers claim successful disruption of UAF reinforcement rotations near Huliaipole.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (JUDGMENT)

No significant adverse weather factors impacting RF VKS operations (KAB/Missile delivery). Widespread infrastructure blackouts and utility failure (compounding the previous loss of heat supply) significantly degrade civil support and complicate military logistics in affected oblasts.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

  • RF Forces (RED): RF is executing the exploitation phase of the mass strike. VKS focus is confirmed on sustained KAB usage against Kharkiv (Air Force report 250808Z) to fix Air Defense Forces (ADF). RF MoD claims unverified tactical success (capture of Otradnoye, Dnipropetrovsk).
  • UAF Forces (BLUE): UAF ADF achieved a high neutralization rate against drones (94%) but a lower rate against missiles (63%, 14/22 neutralized/suppressed, FACT). ADF assets are now critically dispersed across multiple damaged oblasts, confirming the RF fixation strategy success. Rear-area resources are committed to infrastructure BDA and stabilization.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

INTENTION: The RF intent is to ensure operational paralysis on the Southern Axis by stretching UAF ADF and kinetic repair resources, while concurrently utilizing the global diplomatic window (Abu Dhabi talks, US peace plan) to launch highly specific, strategic Information Operations (IO) targeting Western unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT: RF demonstrated sustained capacity for mass saturation attacks (486 total targets). The confirmed violation of NATO-aligned Romanian and Moldovan airspace by Shahed drones indicates RF intent to escalate regional risk without deploying high-value assets.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (FACT/JUDGMENT)

  1. Mass Saturation Success (FACT): RF successfully forced UAF ADF to expend significant interceptors across multiple domains, achieving widespread infrastructure degradation in 5+ oblasts.
  2. Direct Diplomatic Interdiction (JUDGMENT): The immediate deployment of the SVR narrative claiming UK interference with Trump (250759Z) is a highly specific hybrid action designed to paralyze US strategic focus by creating domestic political risk for future military aid decisions.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

The mass strike confirms deep reserves of Shahed/Geran drones and sufficient standoff missile capability (22+ launched). Continued decentralized fundraising appeals (DNR Militia, People's Front) suggest localized sustainment gaps persist but do not impede strategic operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (JUDGMENT)

RF C2 is highly effective, demonstrating real-time synchronization between the mass kinetic strike, diplomatic messaging (Peskov, TASS), and intelligence warfare (SVR). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

UAF posture is defensive and reactive to the mass strike. ADF capabilities are strained by the high volume of incoming targets (464+ drones, 22+ missiles). The most critical constraint is the confirmed depletion of high-end interceptors used to counter the missile segment of the strike. The immediate framing of the strike as a terrorist act (Operatyvny ZSU) demonstrates high IO readiness.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • SETBACK: Confirmed widespread energy system degradation across five key oblasts. UAF has been forced to commit high-value AD assets to C2/infrastructure defense rather than focusing on Southern Axis maneuver support.
  • SUCCESS: High neutralization rate (94%) against the drone threat stream, protecting key military assets from saturation. Successful counter-IO framing of the strike against diplomatic efforts.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

The critical resource requirement is the immediate resupply of high-end AD interceptors. The geographic dispersal of damage requires immediate reassessment of SHORAD/EW reallocation to protect tertiary C2 nodes, as prioritized in the previous report.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (FACT/JUDGMENT)

RF PRIMARY NARRATIVE: Strategic Division and Diplomatic Ambiguity. RF IO seeks to capitalize on the Abu Dhabi talks and US peace proposals:

  1. SVR Campaign (Division): High-level disinformation campaign claiming the UK (London) is fabricating anti-Trump dossiers to prolong the war and secure billions in UAV supply revenue. Goal: Discredit US partners and sow distrust in NATO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  2. Peskov (Ambiguity): Simultaneously dismisses US plan details ("informational bacchanalia") while calling the framework "substantive" and reaffirming openness to talks, projecting diplomatic reasonableness to mask kinetic escalation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

The widespread blackouts and infrastructure damage will place maximum strain on public endurance. UAF StratComs have correctly pivoted to framing the strike as a terrorist response to diplomacy, reinforcing national resilience and justifying continued Western military support.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (FACT/JUDGMENT)

The confirmed US-RF meeting in Abu Dhabi (FACT, Driscoll/Russian delegation) introduces volatility. This backchannel activity requires careful monitoring. The Shahed violation of Romanian/Moldovan airspace provides immediate, actionable evidence for diplomatic leveraging regarding NATO's eastern flank security.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 90%): C2 Attrition, IO Sustainment, and Southern Fixation. RF will execute repeated, smaller-scale strikes utilizing cheaper assets (Shaheds/KABs) against previously damaged energy nodes and tertiary C2 hubs to exploit UAF repair efforts and AD depletion. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will intensify artillery/KAB strikes on the Uspenovka GLOC/Huliaipole area, focusing on confirming the destruction of the compromised Plan 7-B MOD asset. The SVR/Terrorism IO campaigns will maintain peak saturation NLT 251900Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Second Wave Precision Strike on Hardened C2. RF, having confirmed AD saturation success, will leverage the window provided by current BDA/repair operations to launch a second, high-precision missile strike against pre-planned, hardened primary/secondary OpCom nodes in Poltava, Vinnytsia, or Dnipropetrovsk. This strike (NLT 251600Z) is designed to create command fragmentation, capitalizing on the temporary depletion of long-range interceptors.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (Z)Decision Point
Confirmation of OpCom Node SecurityIMMEDIATE (NLT 250900Z)J6 confirms physical security and electronic hardening (EW umbrella) of Poltava/Vinnytsia/Dnipropetrovsk backup C2 facilities.
SHORAD Reallocation CompleteNLT 251000ZJ3 confirms dedicated SHORAD/EW assets (relocated from Central/West) are operational and positioned to defend priority C2 nodes against the MDCOA.
Counter-SVR/Terrorism IO LaunchNLT 250930ZStratCom/MFA publishes briefing detailing the SVR disinformation regarding the UK/Trump and explicitly linking the Russian MO to psychological operations covering war crimes.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / AD COMMAND

  1. Immediate SHORAD Deployment to C2 Protection (CRITICAL): Reinforce the defense of confirmed/suspected tertiary OpCom nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia/Dnipropetrovsk) by immediately dedicating the most effective mobile SHORAD systems (e.g., NASAMS, Gepard) to C2 node protection. DO NOT commit these assets to non-critical infrastructure defense.
  2. Kinetic Interdiction/GLOC Focus: Maintain Protocol BLUE-DOG on the Uspenovka GLOC. Tactical units must prioritize the destruction of RF ISR assets cuing KAB strikes in the Zaporizhzhia/Huliaipole sector to allow dispersed reinforcement movement.
  3. Huliaipole Defense Assessment: J3 must immediately verify the RF MoD claim of Otradnoye capture, as this suggests a localized breakthrough near the Dnipropetrovsk LBS, potentially flanking the Pokrovsk corridor.

TO: J6 (COMMUNICATIONS) / J2 (INTELLIGENCE)

  1. C2 Electronic Hardening: J6 must ensure all critical C2 data transmission pathways at secondary nodes utilize hardened, non-Starlink alternatives. J2 must monitor RF tactical communications for indicators of imminent high-precision launch targeting the confirmed MDCOA areas (Poltava/Vinnytsia).
  2. International Airspace Violation Leverage: J2/MFA must immediately present definitive evidence of the Romanian/Moldovan airspace violations to NATO counterparts, demanding accelerated delivery of short-range/mobile AD systems for border protection and release pressure on internal AD assets.

TO: J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) / MFA

  1. SVR Counter-Exposure: Immediately expose the Russian SVR/FSB narratives (Terror plot, UK/Trump dossiers) as a unified, coordinated hybrid warfare deflection campaign. Frame the SVR claims as blatant attempts to destabilize NATO solidarity and justify further kinetic escalation following the mass infrastructure attack.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

GAP IDGAP DESCRIPTIONPRIORITYCOLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
GAP 1BCurrent interceptor magazine depth (High-end: Patriot, SAMP-T) following the 25NOV strike.CRITICALJ4/J3 inventory status report.
GAP 2CVerification of RF MoD claim regarding the capture of Otradnoye (Dnipropetrovsk region).CRITICALDedicated tactical ISR (UAV/SIGINT) over the disputed area. DEADLINE 250930Z.
GAP 4BOperational assessment of RF VKS sorties (launch bases and frequency) targeting Sumy/Kharkiv with KABs.HIGHIMINT/ELINT focus on forward RF tactical air bases (e.g., Voronezh, Lipetsk) to predict KAB strike periodicity.
GAP 5ESpecific munition type and flight trajectory analysis (MDA) for the 14/22 neutralized missile targets to inform future interception algorithms.HIGHBDA and radar tracking data review by AD Command.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-11-25 07:14:00Z)

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