Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 250715Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / RF OPERATIONAL FIXATION AND HYBRID DEFLECTION REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250645Z NOV 25; Previous Daily Intel Summary 241530Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF strategy continues to leverage the shock of the layered kinetic strike (Kyiv/Central Axis) to facilitate ground interdiction operations (Southern Axis) while utilizing KABs to fix UAF Air Defense Forces (ADF) in the Northeast.

• Kyiv/Central Axis (FACT): Confirmed civilian fatalities remain 6. Critical urban infrastructure damage has resulted in emergency power outages/blackouts (FACT, NLT 250709Z) across multiple districts, compounding the loss of heat supply reported earlier. This indicates successful penetration and degradation of redundancy systems.
• Southern Axis (Pokrovsk Corridor): The ground reinforcement GLOC (Plan 7-B MOD) remains the center of gravity for RF kinetic interdiction efforts.
• Northeast Axis (Sumy/Kharkiv): Confirmed KAB usage maintains operational pressure, fixing UAF SHORAD assets away from the Southern corridor.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (JUDGMENT)

High visibility favors RF tactical aviation for KAB delivery in the Northeast and enhances RF ISR support for interdiction fires in the South. Emergency blackouts in Kyiv and surrounding regions significantly degrade civil support to the military effort, complicating rear-area stabilization.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (JUDGMENT)

• RF Forces (RED): RF is executing a rapid transition from kinetic shock exploitation to a hybrid deflection strategy (see Section 4). Kinetic focus is now strictly on C2 disruption (Starlink success noted by RF milbloggers) and GLOC interdiction. RF forces in Kupyansk claim successful engagements against foreign fighters (FACT/IO).
• UAF Forces (BLUE): ADF posture is reactive, responding to infrastructure damage and the dispersed kinetic threat. CRITICAL FACT: The deadline for confirming the status of Plan 7-B MOD (GAP 1A) has elapsed (NLT 250645Z). Assume the main column is compromised or immobilized.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

INTENTION: The RF's primary objective is now twofold: (1) Ensure the operational failure of the UAF reinforcement column (Plan 7-B MOD). (2) Neutralize international diplomatic leverage arising from confirmed civilian casualties (6 KIA) and NATO airspace violations by deploying a highly sensitive, internal security counter-narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT: RF demonstrates sustained capability for synchronized kinetic and hybrid operations. The immediate launch of a nationwide FSB/TASS narrative regarding the Kaliningrad "Ukrainian-directed terrorist plot" confirms the RF capacity for highly centralized and rapid Information Operations (IO) deployment simultaneous with combat operations.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (FACT/JUDGMENT)

1. C2 Interdiction Confirmation: RF milblogger focus on Starlink targeting ("Goal Number One," Colonelcassad, 250701Z) indicates that the destruction of UAF C2 assets is considered a major operational success and will be repeated.
2. Immediate IO Pivot: The rapid, high-saturation dissemination of the FSB's alleged Kaliningrad terrorist plot (FACT, multiple sources NLT 250708Z) is a direct, calculated attempt to divert global media attention from the Kyiv civilian casualties and infrastructure failure.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

The confirmation of sustained high-rate fire capability (layered strike, KABs) suggests RF logistics remain robust. RF milblogger fundraising for the Zaporizhzhia front (Dva Mayora, 250701Z) indicates decentralized support for tactical units is ongoing, but does not suggest critical logistical failure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (JUDGMENT)

RF C2 remains effective, particularly in coordinating VKS assets (KAB/Missile strikes) with strategic FSB/IO messaging. The rapid response post-strike confirms centralized control over multi-domain operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

The UAF and supporting civilian authorities are highly responsive to the immediate infrastructure crisis (Kyiv blackouts, heat loss) and are executing critical rear-area stabilization protocols. UAF StratComs are focused on memorialization and stabilizing internal morale (9:00 silence, multiple official channels, NLT 250704Z). Tactical readiness is high, but the necessity of dealing with rear-area crises directly compromises the resource allocation flexibility needed for the Southern operational front.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (FACT/JUDGMENT)

• SETBACK: Confirmed emergency blackouts in Kyiv (FACT). Plan 7-B MOD status remains unverified past the CRITICAL deadline (JUDGMENT: Assume compromise).
• SUCCESS: UAF civilian support structure (e.g., Come Back Alive foundation) maintains high engagement levels, successfully leveraging counter-drone footage for fundraising (FACT).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

The prioritization of mobile SHORAD/EW resources is now severely constrained by the confirmed infrastructure damage in the Central/Northeast axes. There is a critical need to immediately re-route resources to protect tertiary C2 nodes against the MDCOA, given the confirmed RF success against a Starlink terminal.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (FACT/JUDGMENT)

RF PRIMARY NARRATIVE SHIFT: The main focus has rapidly pivoted from the "Peace Plan" narrative to the "Ukrainian-Directed Terrorism" plot (Kaliningrad teenager arrest). This is a classical, highly toxic deflection campaign designed to:

1. Obscure the confirmed civilian death toll (6 KIA) and infrastructure crimes.
2. Portray Ukraine as a terrorist state targeting Russian domestic infrastructure, thus justifying future strikes.
3. Target domestic Russian support via appeals to religious security (Orthodox church target). EXTERNAL SUPPORT NARRATIVE: TASS reporting of President Macron's denial of French troop deployment (FACT) is used by RF IO to sow distrust and confirm Western weakness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

Public morale in affected regions (Kyiv, Sumy) is under maximum duress due to kinetic attacks compounded by utility failure (heat, power). Official UAF communications are correctly focusing on national unity and commemoration to stabilize sentiment.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (JUDGMENT)

The confirmed escalation (KABs, 6 KIA, Starlink targeting) provides decisive evidence of RF intent to escalate, directly contradicting their diplomatic messaging. This evidence must be immediately used to counter the RF's new "terrorism" narrative and secure tangible, rapid delivery of AD/EW assets.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): GLOC Exploitation and Persistent Hybrid Attack. RF units (Vostok Grouping) will intensify kinetic strikes (artillery/KAB) on the Uspenovka GLOC, seeking to confirm the destruction of the compromised Plan 7-B MOD asset. Concurrently, the RF IO apparatus will maintain peak saturation of the "Kaliningrad Terrorist Plot" narrative throughout the next 12 hours (NLT 251900Z) to fix media attention and dilute reports of the Kyiv atrocity.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 85%): Coordinated Strike on C2 Redundancy. RF VKS/Long-Range Missile Command, having confirmed the vulnerability of UAF communications networks (Starlink success), will exploit the stretched ADF posture by executing the pre-planned surgical strike against a secondary/tertiary Operational Command (OpCom) node (e.g., Poltava or Vinnytsia C2) NLT 251000Z. This strike will utilize high-precision standoff munitions (Kh-59/69, possibly Iskander) aimed at paralyzing reinforcement coordination across the Southern Axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / SOUTHERN OPERATIONAL COMMAND

1. Immediate Protocol BLUE-DOG Execution (CRITICAL): Given that the 250645Z deadline for Plan 7-B MOD verification has passed, assume the main column is compromised. IMMEDIATELY ENACT PROTOCOL BLUE-DOG. All subsequent movement along the Uspenovka GLOC must be small-unit, dispersed, and supported by organic EW cover.
2. EW Prioritization (NE): Prioritize deployment of mobile EW platforms (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to the Sumy-Kharkiv line NLT 250745Z. The objective is to deny GPS/GLONASS guidance to KABs, forcing tactical aviation to operate closer and risk interception, thereby reducing the KAB strike density and fixing the RF VKS threat.

TO: J6 (COMMUNICATIONS) / AD COMMAND

3. C2 Node Security (MDCOA Mitigation): J6 must immediately confirm the operational status and physical security of all non-Starlink/hardened communication routes and command redundancies at tertiary OpCom nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia). Assume these locations are already targeted for the MDCOA. All non-essential C2 personnel must be dispersed or moved underground NLT 250800Z.
4. SHORAD Reallocation: Relocate remaining mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/VAMPIRE) from Central/Western sectors directly to protect the confirmed or highly suspected tertiary OpCom nodes (MDCOA targets). The protection of these C2 hubs is now more critical than protecting non-essential infrastructure in the immediate aftermath of the strike.

TO: J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) / MFA

5. Deflection Counter-Strategy (URGENT): Immediately deploy a unified communications strategy that links the FSB's Kaliningrad "terrorism plot" directly to the RF's desperate need to divert international attention from the confirmed 6 civilian deaths in Kyiv and the ongoing war crimes against critical infrastructure. Frame the FSB announcement as clear evidence of psychological warfare designed to provide moral cover for kinetic escalation.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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