Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 250645Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / RF LAYERED STRIKE AND OPERATIONAL FIXATION REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250615Z NOV 25; Previous Daily Intel Summary 241530Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (FACT/JUDGMENT)

The Russian Federation (RF) is executing simultaneous, multi-axis kinetic and fixation operations across three geographically distinct sectors (JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE).

• Kyiv/Central Axis: RF layered strike component is confirmed successful against critical urban infrastructure. Confirmed kinetic penetration has resulted in 6 confirmed fatalities (FACT, up from 4 in previous ISR) and has halted heat supply in seven districts of Kyiv (FACT). Air Raid status cleared NLT 250634Z.
• Northeast Axis (Sumy/Kharkiv): A new kinetic dimension has been introduced with confirmed use of KAB glide bombs (FACT, NLT 250638Z) against targets in Sumy Oblast. This directly stresses Air Defense Forces (ADF) previously focused on the Central/Southern axes. Critical UAF tactical loss confirmed (UAV platoon commander, 57th Brigade, Kharkiv Oblast) (FACT).
• Southern Axis (Pokrovsk Corridor): The focus remains on the isolation and destruction of the UAF reinforcement column, Plan 7-B MOD. This ground line of communication (GLOC) remains under intense interdiction pressure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (JUDGMENT)

Daylight and high visibility (FACT) continue to favor RF tactical aviation launching KABs in the Northeast and supporting RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets cuing indirect fires against Plan 7-B MOD. Emergency power outages introduced in Sumy Oblast (FACT) are compounding kinetic damage effects.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (JUDGMENT)

• RF Forces (RED): Actively transitioning from strategic shock (layered strike) to operational exploitation (KAB usage, C2 degradation, GLOC fixation). The simultaneous application of high-yield KABs in the Northeast and BpLA probes in the West indicates sufficient short-term standoff munition reserves.
• UAF Forces (BLUE): ADF resources are critically stretched by the need to manage threats on three axes (NE KABs, Central infrastructure defense, Western border patrol). The status of the critical ground force reserve (Plan 7-B MOD) is still unknown and represents the single greatest tactical risk.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

INTENTION: The RF is maximizing the temporary paralysis achieved by the layered strike to achieve operational victory near Pokrovsk and degrade UAF long-term fighting capacity through infrastructure attrition. The introduction of KABs in Sumy is intended to fragment UAF SHORAD reallocation efforts needed for the Southern front (JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE).

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT: RF demonstrates sustained capability for synchronized, multi-domain kinetic operations across the entire theater (ballistic penetration, BpLA saturation, KAB precision delivery, counter-UAV targeting, and tactical C2 disruption via Starlink targeting).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (FACT/JUDGMENT)

1. KAB Introduction (Northeast): Confirmed use of KABs in Sumy Oblast (FACT) significantly raises the kinetic threat ceiling on the northern flank, requiring reallocation of critical UAF AD assets.
2. C2 Disruption Priority: Confirmed targeting and destruction of a Starlink terminal (FACT) underscores the RF shift toward paralyzing UAF tactical communication and redundancy, aligning with the intent to isolate the Plan 7-B MOD column.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

RF logistics are adequately supporting the current high rate of fire, including the use of standoff munitions (KABs, long-range missiles). Force generation (Moscow Oblast recruitment) continues to sustain troop replacement rates. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (JUDGMENT)

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrating coordination between VKS tactical aviation, BpLA control groups, and strategic missile command to achieve layered objectives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

ADF readiness is high but is being forced into sub-optimal engagements due to the geographic dispersion and nature of the threats (nuisance BpLAs in West vs. high-yield KABs in NE vs. GLOC defense in South). Infrastructure damage (heat/power) complicates UAF rear area stabilization efforts.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (FACT/JUDGMENT)

• SETBACK: Civilian fatalities in Kyiv confirmed to be 6 (FACT). Critical energy/heat infrastructure damaged in Kyiv and Sumy (FACT). Loss of a key tactical C2/ISR asset (UAV Platoon Commander) in Kharkiv (FACT). The status of Plan 7-B MOD remains CRITICAL/UNKNOWN.
• SUCCESS: UAF AD successfully neutralized several BpLAs in the North (FACT). UAF tracking and international reporting of the Romanian airspace probe was timely.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The new KAB threat in Sumy Oblast directly competes with the need to relocate mobile SHORAD/EW assets to protect the Southern GLOC (Plan 7-B MOD) and the potential tertiary OpCom nodes (MDCOA). Prioritization of resources is essential NLT 250730Z.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (FACT/JUDGMENT)

RF Information Operations (IO) are shifting focus from immediate operational coverage to long-term political narratives:

• War Crimes Counter-Narrative: RF is actively promoting claims of UAF war crimes and documenting them (Colonelcassad/Tribunal), intended to neutralize the international diplomatic leverage gained from the RF's own recent mass casualty strike and NATO airspace violation (JUDGMENT: MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
• Internal Focus: Heavy RF domestic messaging on internal security successes (smuggling, counter-insurgency/terrorism arrests in Murmansk/Altai) aims to demonstrate stability and competence internally while external operations continue.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

Morale in Kyiv and Sumy will be severely tested by the compounding effects of kinetic attacks and infrastructure failures (loss of heat/power). UAF Strategic Communications must immediately address the infrastructure failures while maintaining focus on the RF's escalation (6 KIA, KABs, NATO probe).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (JUDGMENT)

The confirmation of sustained RF kinetic escalation (KABs, rising civilian toll, Starlink targeting) provides high-quality evidence to counter the RF's "US Peace Talks" narrative (GAP 5D from previous ISR). This evidence must be utilized urgently to secure immediate material support and firmer NATO border responses.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): Intensified Interdiction and Infrastructure Degradation. RF Vostok Grouping will maintain or increase the intensity of interdiction fires against the Plan 7-B MOD GLOC (GAP 1A) NLT 251000Z. RF VKS will prioritize KAB strikes in the Northeast (Sumy/Kharkiv) to maintain pressure and force ADF commitment, preventing the critical reallocation of SHORAD/EW assets to the South. The objective is to ensure the Plan 7-B MOD reinforcement fails to reach the operational area.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - 75%): Coordinated Strike on Operational Rear C2. RF, having successfully drawn UAF AD resources to mitigate the KAB threat (Sumy) and the infrastructure damage (Kyiv), will execute a surgical strike using remaining medium-range cruise missiles (Kh-59/69 stocks) against a less-defended tertiary Operational Command (OpCom) node (e.g., Poltava or Vinnytsia backup C2) NLT 251000Z. This will be coupled with continued Starlink terminal targeting to ensure C2 disruption is comprehensive.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / SOUTHERN OPERATIONAL COMMAND

1. Immediate Contingency Activation (CRITICAL): If Plan 7-B MOD status (GAP 1A) is not verified by 250645Z, assume the main column is compromised. IMMEDIATELY ENACT PROTOCOL BLUE-DOG: Shift reinforcement effort to dispersed, small-unit movement (platoon/company level) via tertiary routes. The Uspenovka GLOC must be considered contested and potentially saturated with RF kinetic fire.
2. KAB Mitigation (Northeast): Deploy ground-based Electronic Warfare (EW) systems (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to the Sumy-Kharkiv line NLT 250730Z to deny RF tactical aviation GPS/GLONASS guidance for KAB strikes. This protects forward units and infrastructure.
3. C2 Hardening Enforcement: J6 must confirm that all critical data and non-essential personnel have been relocated from secondary and tertiary OpCom nodes in Poltava/Vinnytsia in anticipation of the MDCOA strike (NLT 251000Z). Focus on tactical communication redundancy following the confirmed Starlink strike.

TO: J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) / MFA

4. NATO Airspace Violation Exploitation (URGENT): Immediately issue a comprehensive report to Western allies linking the rising civilian death toll (6 KIA), the infrastructure attacks (heat/power), the KAB escalation (Sumy), and the NATO airspace probe as evidence of RF intentional escalation designed to preemptively undermine the "US Peace Talks" narrative.

TO: AIR FORCE / AD COMMAND

5. SHORAD Prioritization: Mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/VAMPIRE) must be prioritized for deployment along the Plan 7-B MOD movement corridor immediately. The persistent, low-cost BpLA campaign must be treated as a secondary threat to the MDCOA and the ground defense of the Pokrovsk Axis.
6. EW Deployment (Western Border): Increase EW jamming capability along the Odesa-Moldova-Romania border zone to counter RF BpLAs before they violate foreign airspace, mitigating international diplomatic friction and preserving UAF interceptor stocks.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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