Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 250615Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / LAYERED ATTACK AND NATO BORDER PROBE REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250545Z NOV 25; Previous Daily Intel Summary 241530Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Russian Federation (RF) layered strike is transitioning from initial strategic shock exploitation to localized attrition and international probing.

• Kyiv/Central Axis: Confirmed kinetic penetration of defenses has resulted in 4 confirmed fatalities and at least 3 wounded in the Sviatoshynskyi district (FACT). This confirms the high lethality of the RF layered attack components (ballistic/cruise penetration followed by BpLA secondary targeting).
• Southern Axis (AD Probe): Multiple RF BpLAs (Shahed/Geran) have probed and confirmed successful penetration of neutral Moldovan and NATO Romanian airspace (FACT, NLT 250550Z). This maneuver is designed to stretch UAF Air Defense Forces (ADF) resources and test NATO's rules of engagement (ROE).
• Zaporizhzhia/Pokrovsk Corridor: The critical Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) for the Plan 7-B MOD reinforcement column remains under intense interdiction pressure from the RF Vostok Grouping. The operational priority remains the isolation and destruction of this reserve force.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Dawn is established. High visibility favors RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets tracking UAF ground movements (Plan 7-B MOD) and hinders low-altitude BpLA penetration tactics (although the volume of the secondary wave negates some vulnerability).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (RED): Committing BpLAs to the Western Black Sea corridor to distract and force ADF resource allocation away from key operational rear areas (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava). RF ground forces maintain fixation fires in the Zaporizhzhia corridor.
• UAF Forces (BLUE): ADF is currently engaged in the immediate BpLA threat mitigation, reporting success in shooting down some threats while confirming the international border penetration. Command and Control (C2) remains functionally decentralized, but the primary operational risk is the continued exposure of Plan 7-B MOD.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION: The RF is executing a coordinated multi-domain objective: 1) Achieve operational success near Pokrovsk by preventing UAF reinforcement (destruction of Plan 7-B MOD). 2) Exhaust UAF SHORAD stockpiles by forcing their continued use in defending non-strategic assets (Kyiv). 3) Generate international friction and probe NATO responsiveness via BpLA airspace violations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT: RF demonstrates sustained capability for synchronized, layered strikes across domains. The immediate shift of BpLA operational geometry toward NATO borders indicates tactical flexibility and deliberate intent to escalate international tensions while maintaining operational focus on the ground.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The deliberate routing of Shahed/Geran BpLAs through Moldovan/Romanian airspace (FACT) is a key tactical adaptation. This complicates UAF interception, forces critical decision-making regarding interception near foreign borders, and may draw NATO air assets into monitoring/response posture.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supporting the current high rate of fire in the Zaporizhzhia sector. Recruitment efforts via local government contracts (Moscow Oblast) continue, sustaining troop replacement capacity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is robust and effective, coordinating complex aerospace operations (AD saturation, NATO probe) while maintaining ground force fixation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

ADF readiness is high but extremely strained by the continuous, layered threat. The increase in civilian casualties in the capital (FACT) validates the effectiveness of the initial strategic penetration. Ground forces (Plan 7-B MOD) status remains unknown and critical.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK: Increased kinetic damage and confirmed casualties in Kyiv (4 KIA, 3+ WIA). Confirmed international airspace penetration by RF BpLAs (Moldova/Romania).
• SUCCESS: UAF Air Force (ПС) tracked and reported the BpLA border crossings efficiently, allowing for timely notification to international partners. UAF Information Operations (IO) are effectively propagating enemy casualty figures (1120).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The necessity to track and respond to threats along the Western border (Moldova/Romania) further stresses already thin ADF resources, delaying the critical reallocation of mobile SHORAD assets needed to protect tertiary operational C2 nodes in the rear (Poltava/Vinnytsia).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF continues its primary Strategic IO theme: The "US Peace Talks" Narrative. Messages confirming US Army Secretary Driscoll's meetings in Abu Dhabi are being amplified across RF, state-aligned, and pro-Ukrainian channels (reporting the RF claim) (FACT).

• Belief Score: Dempster-Shafer supports the 'Agreement on Peace Process' hypothesis at 0.317809 (HIGH).
• Objective: Cement the narrative that high-level US-RF talks are imminent, justifying the RF's aggressive kinetic campaign as "securing positions before negotiation" and increasing internal pressure on Kyiv to agree to unfavorable terms.

Secondary IO: RF is simultaneously attempting to generate a counter-narrative of successful UAF drone attacks on Southern Russia resulting in casualties (FACT), likely to mitigate Western perception of the RF as the sole aggressor immediately following the use of high-end strikes (Kinzhal/Kh-69).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is strained due to civilian casualties and the constant aerial threat. UAF messaging relies on strong declarations (Crimea return) and high enemy loss figures to maintain cognitive resilience.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed RF BpLA penetration of NATO Romanian airspace (FACT) must be leveraged immediately to solidify Western support, contrasting the RF's simultaneous escalation (kinetic strike, NATO probe) with its attempt to introduce the deceptive 'peace talks' narrative.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): Maintenance of Operational Fixation and Resource Attrition. RF Vostok Grouping will sustain high-volume, drone-cued fires (artillery, guided munitions) against the Plan 7-B MOD GLOC until the reinforcement column is verified as non-viable (destroyed or dispersed). The low-cost BpLA campaign will continue NLT 250930Z across Central and Western Ukraine, forcing UAF SHORAD expenditure and delaying critical force reallocation. This prepares the battlefield for a concerted ground push on the Pokrovsk M-30 GLOC NLT 251200Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - 75%): Coordinated Strike on Operational Rear C2. RF, having confirmed the successful BpLA draw-down of mobile AD assets in the North/West, will execute a surgical strike using remaining medium-range cruise missiles (Kh-59/69 stocks) against a less-defended tertiary Operational Command (OpCom) node (e.g., Poltava or Vinnytsia backup C2) NLT 251000Z. This strike would compound the disruption caused by the anticipated interdiction of the Plan 7-B MOD column.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / SOUTHERN OPERATIONAL COMMAND

1. Immediate Contingency Activation (CRITICAL): If Plan 7-B MOD status (GAP 1A) is not verified by 250630Z, assume the main column is compromised. IMMEDIATELY ENACT PROTOCOL BLUE-DOG: Reinforcement effort must shift to dispersed, small-unit movement (platoon/company level) via tertiary routes, abandoning large-scale convoy movement on the Uspenovka GLOC.
2. ISR Prioritization: Divert tactical ISR assets (UAV/SIGINT) from routine monitoring tasks to focus exclusively on locating and assessing the attrition status of Plan 7-B MOD (GAP 1A).
3. C2 Hardening: Preemptively relocate non-essential personnel and critical data from secondary (and especially tertiary) OpCom nodes in Poltava/Vinnytsia, anticipating the MDCOA strike NLT 251000Z.

TO: J7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) / MFA

4. NATO Airspace Violation Exploitation (URGENT): Use the confirmed BpLA penetration into Romania (NATO airspace) immediately in all public and diplomatic communications. Frame this act as a clear, intentional escalation simultaneous with the "peace talks" IO, reinforcing RF deceit and aggressive intent.
5. Counter-IO Campaign (CRITICAL): Issue formal, high-level denial of any US official conducting peace talks, using language that explicitly links the disinformation campaign (GAP 5D) to the RF's recent use of Kinzhal/Kh-69 missiles against civilian targets.

TO: AIR FORCE / AD COMMAND

6. Western Border AD Posture: While respecting international boundaries, position EW and SHORAD assets (e.g., Bukovel-AD) along the Odesa-Moldova-Romania border zone to jam or engage BpLAs before they approach or violate foreign airspace, mitigating international risk and complicating RF targeting (JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE).
7. Resource Commitment Discipline: Maintain strict discipline on reserving strategic interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) for confirmed Kh-59/69/ballistic threats against C2 nodes, despite the ongoing BpLA nuisance attacks.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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