Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - POST-STRIKE EXPLOITATION

TIME: 250545Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / RF LAYERED ATTACK EXPLOITATION REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250515Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Russian Federation (RF) has immediately followed its high-end strategic strike (Kinzhal/Kh-69) with a secondary, layered attack designed for exploitation and exhaustion.

• Kyiv/Central Axis: Confirmed kinetic penetration of UAF Air Defense Forces (ADF) perimeter in the capital, resulting in two confirmed civilian fatalities (including an 86-year-old female) and damage to non-residential infrastructure in the Sviatoshynskyi district (FACT). A secondary wave of 10+ BpLAs (Shahed/Geran) continues to probe the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions (FACT), confirming the RF strategy of AD saturation (JUDGMENT).
• Zaporizhzhia/Southern Axis: RF Vostok Grouping continues aggressive fixation efforts. Confirmed strikes against UAF manpower are reported in the Huliaipole direction (FACT), reinforcing the assessment that the immediate objective is the interdiction of the Plan 7-B MOD reinforcement column.
• Operational Intent: RF is seeking to achieve kinetic and cognitive paralysis through overlapping, continuous strikes, allowing ground forces to isolate and destroy key UAF operational reserves before they can reinforce the Pokrovsk axis.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Dawn is established (approx. 05:45Z), diminishing operational security for low-flying threats but increasing the effectiveness of visual and thermal ISR for both sides. BpLA threat remains persistent.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (RED): The immediate threat from high-speed MiG-31K launch platforms has been reported as neutralized ("minus") (FACT). RF forces are committing follow-on BpLA assets to the central theater while maintaining sustained high-intensity fires in the south.
• UAF Forces (BLUE): ADF resources are currently committed to defeating the BpLA wave in the capital, diverting crucial SHORAD assets from covering critical operational rear areas (JUDGMENT). C2 nodes, particularly the tertiary backup nodes, must assume high-alert status following the RF demonstration of precision targeting capability.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION: Exploit the temporary exhaustion of UAF strategic interceptors by forcing the further expenditure of tactical AD resources (SHORAD) in the capital, while simultaneously guaranteeing the operational isolation and destruction of the Plan 7-B MOD reinforcement column through concentrated artillery and drone-cued fires in the Zaporizhzhia corridor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT: RF has demonstrated the ability to execute an aggressive, highly synchronized secondary strike, indicating resilient C2 and adequate stocks of BpLAs and conventional stand-off munitions (Kh-59/69) to sustain pressure.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed immediate follow-on BpLA wave (secondary attack) after the high-value strategic strike is a tactical shift designed to prevent UAF ADF from consolidating and reallocating resources. This forces a continued high operational tempo on the UAF side.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics sustain the current high rate of fire in the ground domain (Huliaipole direction). UAF strike BDA on Taganrog resulted in 3 fatalities (FACT), but does not confirm disruption of industrial or strategic air assets critical for future strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, successfully pivoting from the complex high-end strike to immediate low-cost BpLA exploitation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

ADF readiness is high, evidenced by the defense against the complex strike, but capacity is critically strained by the ongoing BpLA secondary wave. Ground force vulnerability is extreme in the Zaporizhzhia corridor (Plan 7-B MOD GLOC), where they are under active kinetic interdiction pressure from the Vostok Grouping.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS: The immediate threat from the MiG-31K hypersonic launch platforms appears mitigated ("minus").
• CRITICAL SETBACK: Confirmed civilian fatalities and property damage in the capital resulting from kinetic penetration, validating the strategic strike effectiveness.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The necessity to defend the capital against the secondary BpLA threat prevents the immediate withdrawal and reallocation of mobile SHORAD assets necessary to protect operational C2 centers further south.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are actively attempting to generate confusion and paralysis. A critical piece of disinformation, originating from RF-aligned sources, claims US Army Secretary Dan Driscoll is conducting peace negotiations with Russia in Abu Dhabi (FACT). This narrative is designed to:

1. Sow Doubt: Undermine confidence in sustained Western support immediately after a maximal kinetic strike.
2. Facilitate Paralysis: Support the previous IO narrative that Kyiv is intransigent, encouraging delays in vital resource commitments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed civilian casualties and relentless, multi-modal nature of the strike package (ballistic, cruise, BpLA) are generating significant fatigue and psychological strain among the civilian population and frontline personnel.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The immediate and aggressive counter-IO required against the "Abu Dhabi talks" narrative is paramount to ensure the confirmed RF escalation (Kinzhal/Kh-69 use) translates into accelerated material support and avoids diplomatic erosion.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 95%): Ground Fixation and AD Exhaustion. RF Vostok Grouping will maintain concentrated, high-volume fire (artillery, guided munitions) on the Huliaipole/Orikhiv corridor for the next 4 hours (NLT 250945Z) to ensure the complete destruction or dispersal of the Plan 7-B MOD reinforcement. Simultaneously, the low-cost BpLA attrition campaign against Northern/Central UAF AD units will continue until the assets are exhausted or successfully repelled, setting the conditions for a concentrated RF breakthrough attempt on the Pokrovsk M-30 GLOC NLT 251200Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - 75%): Coordinated Strike on Operational Rear C2. Following the confirmation that MiG-31K platforms are temporarily withdrawn ("minus"), the MDCOA shifts to the use of available long-range cruise missiles (Kh-59/69 stocks) for a surgical strike on a less-defended secondary Operational Command (OpCom) node (e.g., Poltava or Vinnytsia backup C2) NLT 251000Z. This strike would coincide with the confirmation of Plan 7-B MOD failure, ensuring maximum ground C2 disruption for UAF forces stabilizing the Pokrovsk axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: J3 (OPERATIONS) / SOUTHERN OPERATIONAL COMMAND

1. Immediate Contingency Activation (CRITICAL): If Plan 7-B MOD status (GAP 1A) is not verified by 250630Z, Protocol BLUE-DOG must be enacted immediately. DO NOT attempt to push the main reinforcement column through the compromised Uspenovka GLOC.
2. Deep Fire Missions (DFMs): Utilize all available long-range CBF assets (HIMARS, heavy artillery) to execute immediate, concentrated DFMs against Vostok Grouping fire positions and C2 nodes targeting the Huliaipole corridor. Prioritize suppression of RF ISR cuing elements over material destruction.
3. C2 Dispersal: Ensure the tertiary C2 backup node for Southern OpCom is fully operational and has deployed sufficient EW (e.g., Bukovel-AD) and mobile SHORAD protection, anticipating the MDCOA shift away from Kyiv.

TO: STRATCOM / G7 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS)

4. Counter-IO Campaign (URGENT): Immediately issue a high-level public statement formally denying the "US Peace Talks in Abu Dhabi" (GAP 5D). Explicitly link this disinformation campaign to the RF's maximal kinetic aggression (Kinzhal use and civilian casualties) to inoculate Western partners against the RF peace narrative.

TO: AIR FORCE / AD COMMAND

5. SHORAD Reallocation: Upon successful mitigation of the current BpLA wave (NLT 250930Z), immediately reallocate mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/VAMPIRE) from the capital to protect the activated tertiary C2 nodes and critical logistics hubs in the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava region.
6. Cruise Missile Tracking: Refocus ELINT and IMINT assets to track potential Kh-59/69 reload/launch preparation, specifically at Black Sea Fleet assets and known bomber/launch airfields (GAP 4 refinement).

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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