Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL ALERT: 01

TIME: 250345Z NOV 2025 OPERATION: EASTERN THEATER / CRISIS INTERDICTION PHASE REFERENCE: Previous ISR 250333Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (Updated)

The operational picture is characterized by simultaneous RF tactical exploitation and RF strategic distraction, now complicated by confirmed, highly effective Ukrainian deep strikes.

• Pokrovsk Axis / Reinforcement Corridor (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia): No change to previous assessment. The immediate vulnerability remains the threatened operational breach near Uspenovka (Zaporizhzhia) exposing the southern Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) for Plan 7-B MOD.
• Deep Rear Targets (NEW VULNERABILITY): Ukrainian Forces (UAF) have successfully executed multiple, prolonged drone strikes deep into the Russian Federation (RF) rear. Confirmed targets include:
  • Taganrog: Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex (High-Value Asset).
  • Krasnodar Krai (Kuban): Confirmed "massive" and "prolonged" attacks, suggesting infrastructure damage (precise BDA pending).
• C2 Saturation Zone: RF drone saturation efforts continue, targeting C2 and AD assets. Inbound Shahed UAVs confirmed approaching Kyiv from the Northwest (250339Z), necessitating city-wide air alarms (250336Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility favors ongoing nocturnal UAV/strike operations. Clear skies over RF launch zones are optimal for a ballistic launch, which remains imminent.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (RED): RF is executing a coordinated triple threat: 1) Tactical exploitation (Uspenovka), 2) Kinetic interdiction (KABs on 7-B MOD route), and 3) Strategic AD fixing (Shahed saturation targeting Odesa/Kyiv).
• UAF Forces (BLUE): UAF demonstrates significantly enhanced deep strike capability, effectively imposing immediate costs and distracting RF Command and Control (C2) during the critical interdiction phase. Strategic Air Defense (AD) remains stressed by the simultaneous threat to Odesa and the new threat to Kyiv.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CONFIRMED): Achieve command paralysis (via ballistic strike) and operational annihilation (of Plan 7-B MOD) while maintaining tactical momentum (Uspenovka exploitation).

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT (UPDATED):

• Ballistic Strike (CRITICAL): Capability confirmed. The persistent drone activity over Kyiv and Odesa is calculated to draw high-value interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) away from the projected ballistic impact zones (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia C2 nodes). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Ground Maneuver (SUSTAINED): RF maintains the ability to exploit local breakthroughs (Uspenovka claim) and sustain precision air-delivered interdiction fires (KABs).
• C2 Effectiveness: RF C2 synchronization, while impressive in coordinating the Pokrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and AD saturation efforts, will be highly stressed by the confirmed UAF deep strikes on HVTs in Taganrog and Krasnodar. RF operational tempo may briefly slow as damage assessments are prioritized. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift of drone saturation efforts to include Kyiv is a critical tactical adaptation, increasing the political and psychological pressure on the Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA) to commit strategic AD assets to defend the capital, diverting resources from the Pokrovsk support corridor.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are clearly supporting high-volume precision glide bombs (KABs) and low-cost UAVs. UAF deep strikes against aviation complexes (Taganrog) and infrastructure (Krasnodar) will negatively impact RF maintenance and resupply in the short term.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains functionally effective but is now responding to a hostile counter-strike environment. RF media (TASS/Simonyan) is focused on damage control in the RF rear, indicating a temporary disruption of the primary IO narrative.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Deep Strike Posture: UAF long-range strike capability is validated and effective, hitting strategic targets required for RF power projection. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Defensive Posture: Readiness is high, but AD prioritization is strained due to simultaneous threats across the operational and strategic depths (Pokrovsk support, Odesa protection, Kyiv defense).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• MAJOR SUCCESS (DEEP STRIKE): Confirmed successful strikes on high-value aviation targets in Taganrog and significant infrastructure damage in Krasnodar Krai. This successfully imposes cost and complexity on RF operations.
• CRITICAL SETBACK (MANEUVER THREAT): The claimed loss of Uspenovka remains the highest kinetic threat, directly challenging the operational integrity of the Plan 7-B MOD movement.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid, non-7B MOD QRF deployment to the Uspenovka flank remains paramount.
• CONSTRAINT: Political pressure to commit strategic AD to Kyiv must be resisted to maintain readiness for the strategic ballistic strike targeting C2 assets supporting the Pokrovsk axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Updated)

RF IO is forced into a defensive posture, focused on framing UAF strikes (Krasnodar/Taganrog) as "terrorist attacks" on civilian areas to justify the anticipated ballistic escalation. The focus on Simonyan providing aid is an attempt to rally domestic support against the "Kyiv regime."

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF Deep Strike successes will provide a significant and immediate morale boost, demonstrating the ability to strike back despite heavy frontline pressure. This success must be leveraged by STRATCOM to mitigate the psychological impact of the drone swarm and the inevitable ballistic strike.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed UAF ability to strike RF HVTs directly supports the argument for urgent, long-range defensive systems (AD) and offensive systems (long-range fire) to international partners. STRATCOM should link RF internal damage control (Krasnodar) to RF diplomatic deceit (Peace Plan).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 90%): Strategic Strike Execution with Flank Exploitation. RF will attempt to ignore the damage caused by the UAF deep strikes and adhere to its core plan:

1. Launch Salvo: The strategic ballistic strike window remains active, with launch NLT 250430Z, targeting C2/logistics nodes supporting Plan 7-B MOD.
2. Exploit Flank: RF ground forces (Vostok Grouping) will push immediately southward from the claimed Uspenovka position to interdict the key M-30/T-05-15 GLOC, forcing Plan 7-B MOD elements to either halt or divert into less secure terrain.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - 75%): C2 Decapitation and Operational Paralysis. RF drone saturation (Kyiv, Odesa) successfully forces the NCA to release Patriot/SAMP-T systems against UAVs. This results in the strategic AD network being depleted. The subsequent ballistic strike (NLT 0430Z) successfully penetrates defenses and destroys the primary Joint Fires Coordination Center, resulting in total C2 paralysis for the operational rear supporting Pokrovsk. This allows RF to cut Plan 7-B MOD logistics without challenge.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

TO: NCA / J3 (Operations) - CRITICAL

1. Plan 7-B MOD Survival Protocol (IMMEDIATE): Reiterate the directive for Plan 7-B MOD elements to prioritize DISPERSAL AND EVASION over rigid timetable adherence, especially under confirmed KAB threat and the new Uspenovka flank threat. Movement must utilize off-road/secondary routes exclusively.
2. Uspenovka Threat (PRIORITY ONE): Confirm the execution status of the QRF tasking from the previous ISR. J3 must confirm that a stabilization force is moving to establish blocking positions along the key logistical routes southeast of Pokrovsk NLT 250415Z, irrespective of full BDA.
3. C2 Hardening: Given the confirmed shift of drone activity to Kyiv, all primary operational C2 personnel in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia must remain in hardened, backup nodes until the 0430Z ballistic threat window has closed.

TO: AIR FORCE / AD COMMAND

4. Strategic AD (NO CHANGE - WEAPONS HOLD): AD Command must strictly enforce WEAPONS HOLD on all strategic interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T). These assets are reserved solely for the anticipated ballistic strike targeting critical C2 infrastructure.
5. Kyiv Defense Strategy: Utilize mobile SHORAD units (Gepard, VAMPIRE, NASAMS) exclusively to counter the inbound Shahed UAVs approaching Kyiv (NW axis). Personnel must be explicitly briefed on the priority not to expend high-value assets for drone interception.

TO: J2 (Intelligence) / ISR ASSETS

6. Uspenovka BDA (CRITICAL GAP 1A): Maintain maximum collection pressure on the Zaporizhzhia sector (Uspenovka area) to determine the depth of RF penetration.
7. Deep Strike BDA (NEW REQUIREMENT): Prioritize initial BDA on the UAF strikes in Taganrog and Krasnodar Krai to quantify damage to RF aviation/logistics assets. This BDA is required for STRATCOM messaging.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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