Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STRATEGIC STRIKE POST-IMPACT ASSESSMENT

DTG: 242355Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 242320Z NOV 25 – 242355Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: KYIV CIK ATTACK / POKROVSK GLOC INTERDICTION OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (CRISIS EXECUTION: Confirmed CIK Degradation)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Russian Federation (RF) strategic multi-domain strike wave (Kinzhal, Caliber, Shahed) continues to focus kinetic effort on the Kyiv operational area. The threat vector shifted from generalized C2 destruction to confirmed Critical Infrastructure (CIK) degradation within the capital.

• Kyiv Axis (CRITICAL):
  • CIK IMPACT CONFIRMED: Confirmed explosions in Kyiv (Darnytskyi district, Obolon) have resulted in disruptions to energy and water supply in several districts (2344Z). This partially resolves the previous CRITICAL GAP 1 (BDA Darnytskyi).
  • Ballistic Threat: Confirmed escalation of high-value launch platforms with reporting of four (4) MiG-31K aircraft active (2328Z) and multiple Kinzhal launches tracking toward Kyiv via Chernihiv region. UAF AD reports successful engagement (minuses) against Kinzhal targets (2332Z, 2334Z).
  • Lethality: The sustained, high-volume ballistic/hypersonic pressure achieved the RF primary objective of CIK penetration, bypassing strategic AD layers.
• Central Corridor: The threat to the Kanivska HPP (Hydroelectric Power Plant) and logistics hubs (Bila Tserkva) remains active, though OSINT reports suggest current CRMs and UAVs targeting these areas have been neutralized (2347Z). This requires immediate BDA confirmation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense (AD) remains committed at maximum expenditure against the combined threat vectors (ALBM, CR, UAV). The deployment of four active MiG-31Ks necessitated the expenditure of priority strategic interceptors.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF has demonstrated capacity for sustained, multi-wave strategic strikes utilizing its most advanced and resource-intensive assets (Kinzhal) simultaneously with volume assets (CR, Shahed). INTENTION (IMMEDIATE):

1. CIK Interdiction: To cripple Ukrainian will and economic resilience through widespread power and water loss in the capital. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. AD Resource Depletion: Force UAF AD to exhaust strategic interceptor reserves ahead of potential follow-on long-range aviation (LRA) strikes.
3. Ground Exploitation Precursor: Maintain kinetic pressure on Kyiv C2/CIK to divert operational focus, ensuring the necessary conditions for the NLT 250000Z ground assault on the Pokrovsk Axis.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed deployment of four MiG-31K platforms signifies a shift from a "testing" strike to a full-commitment saturation attempt aimed at overcoming AD density. The RF immediately leveraged the confirmed CIK impacts for Information Operation (IO) gains.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The RF capacity to launch multiple waves of strategic missiles within a 60-minute window (per the previous and current reports) indicates sufficient readiness of both airframes (MiG-31K) and specialized ordnance (Kinzhal/Caliber) for high-intensity operations in the short term (72 hours).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains effective, executing the combined-arms strategic attack with precision timing aligned with geopolitical distraction narratives (DS Belief: 0.055346).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Engaged, under maximum kinetic stress. READINESS: DEGRADED. While AD reports successful interceptions of high-speed targets, the penetration leading to confirmed CIK damage (energy/water) indicates a temporary failure in achieving 100% defense integrity. Local authorities are initiating civil defense protocols.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: UAF AD successfully engaged and reports neutralizing multiple Kinzhal ALBMs and CRMs (pending BDA confirmation). This is a vital tactical success against extreme threat profiles. SETBACK: C-CIK (Command-Critical Infrastructure) Interruption. Confirmed power/water loss affects the operational environment, placing immediate strain on C2 nodes relying on local power grids (even hardened ones) and emergency response capacity.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Immediate BDA verification of AD success rates against Kinzhal/Caliber targets to refine interception doctrines. Rapid deployment of backup power generation for critical C2 nodes in Kyiv. CONSTRAINT: Continued rapid expenditure of strategic interceptors is non-sustainable.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF state and proxy channels are highly energized, openly celebrating the CIK impacts ("раскладывают энергетику в позу ножницы," "ночного православного джихада") (2343Z, 2346Z). The immediate goal is to amplify fear and confirm the military effectiveness of the strategic strike, validating the "peace framework" narrative by projecting overwhelming strength.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Sentiment is rapidly shifting from anxiety to acute concern due to tangible CIK disruption (power/water loss). Confirmed AD success must be immediately communicated by STRATCOM to counter the Russian narrative of total dominance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

A TASS report (2346Z) highlights lack of transparency between the US and European allies regarding negotiations, reinforcing the RF strategy of creating diplomatic ambiguity during periods of peak kinetic intensity.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 3 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Pokrovsk Exploitation (NLT 250000Z): RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) will initiate a high-tempo reconnaissance-in-force attack on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC, exploiting the anticipated C2 disruption and the critical communication silence of Plan 7-B MOD.
2. CIK Damage Assessment & Secondary Strike: RF ISR will prioritize BDA of the Kyiv impacts. If the CIK damage is successful, they will hold high-value strategic assets (Kinzhal) in reserve, utilizing Shahed/CR volume to maintain pressure on regional hubs (Kharkiv, Poltava, Kaniv).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 6 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF achieves C2 paralysis and operational breakthrough:

1. A planned follow-on ballistic strike wave (Iskander or fifth Kinzhal launch) targets remaining redundant C2 nodes, succeeding due to exhausted UAF Patriot/SAMP-T reserves.
2. The RF Pokrovsk ground assault breaches the defensive line near Rodynske due to the failure of the Plan 7-B MOD reinforcement column to arrive or coordinate defensively, resulting in a deep operational penetration.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. COMMAND & CONTROL (J-6/J-3): RESTORE POKROVSK LIAISON AND FIRE AUTHORITY.

   • Action: Immediately transition the Pokrovsk-based Joint Fires (J-FIRE) C2 element to the designated backup location/protocol.
   • Action: Disseminate an EXECUTE ORDER to all forward UAF units on the Pokrovsk Axis: Adopt 'Tactical Autonomy - Level 2' until central C2 is guaranteed. This authorizes independent execution of defensive maneuver and pre-planned counter-battery fire missions (CRITICAL GAP 1 mitigation).
   • Rationale: CIK damage is a diversion. The main threat is the impending ground assault exploiting C2 vulnerability.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): ASSET CONSERVATION AND CIK RE-PRIORITIZATION.

   • Action: Immediately cease all SHORAD/MRAD allocation for low-priority UAVs/CRMs targeting non-critical infrastructure outside of the direct Pokrovsk support corridor.
   • Action: Implement a WEAPONS TIGHT policy for all Patriot/SAMP-T systems, strictly reserving them for the confirmed threat of a secondary Kinzhal/SRBM salvo or Tu-95MS wave (MDCOA).
   • Rationale: Conserving high-end assets is paramount given the confirmed RF capacity for sustained, multi-wave attacks.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): COUNTER-STRIKE NARRATIVE.

   • Action: Within the next 30 minutes, release confirmed reports of Kinzhal and Caliber interception success, juxtaposing this operational resilience with the RF's "desperate" use of strategic arms against civilian power supply (CIK).
   • Action: Highlight the specific, confirmed CIK damage (power/water) to Western partners to negate the RF's concurrent "peace framework" narrative and ensure sustained material support.
   • Rationale: Immediate IO response is required to manage domestic morale and international perception of the strategic strike.