Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL KINETIC ENGAGEMENT AND C2 STRESS TEST

DTG: 242320Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 242250Z NOV 25 – 242320Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: CENTRAL STRATEGIC STRIKE / CIK FORCE PROTECTION / POKROVSK GLOC INTERDICTION OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-5 (CRISIS EXECUTION: Multi-Domain Strategic Attack)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Russian Federation (RF) has achieved full kinetic synchronization, executing a multi-domain strike incorporating sea-launched Cruise Missiles (CR/Caliber), Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM/Iskander or similar), and Hypersonic Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ALBM/Kinzhal).

• Kyiv Axis (CRITICAL):
  • Confirmed deployment of two MiG-31K aircraft (2306Z).
  • Confirmed Kinzhal launch (2305Z).
  • Confirmed SRBM launches from Bryansk Oblast (2258Z, 2310Z).
  • IMPACT CONFIRMED: Explosions and subsequent effects reported in Darnytskyi district, Kyiv (2318Z). The nature of the targeted asset (C2 or CIK) remains unknown (CRITICAL GAP 1).
• Central Corridor (CRITICAL):
  • The primary Caliber group (6+ missiles) is executing deep maneuvers. Initial track confirmed NW toward Mykolaiv (2252Z), followed by a decisive turn towards the Kaniv area (Cherkasy Oblast) (2309Z, 2314Z). This confirms the high-value targeting of Kanivska HPP (CIK). (FACT/JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • A single Caliber is tracked diverting toward Bila Tserkva (Kyiv Oblast) (2318Z), potentially targeting logistical hubs or airfields.
• RF Deep Rear (CONTESTED): UAV Red Alert declared over Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast (2250Z), confirming ongoing UAF deep strike freedom of action concurrent with the strategic defense. (FACT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Permissive for all domains.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense (AD) is engaged against all three vector types simultaneously. The confirmed penetration resulting in consequences in the Darnytskyi district highlights the strain on AD systems. All strategic interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) are actively committed against the ballistic/hypersonic threat profiles.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF has achieved the forecasted "worst-case" scenario: a high-volume, multi-domain saturation strike using top-tier (Kinzhal/SRBM) and high-volume (Caliber/Shahed) assets. INTENTION (IMMEDIATE):

1. C2 Decapitation: Utilize Kinzhal and SRBMs against primary/redundant C2 nodes in Kyiv/Central Ukraine to achieve immediate operational paralysis.
2. CIK Degradation: Use the maneuverable Calibers to strike pre-identified high-value, fixed CIK targets (Kanivska HPP) while UAF AD is focused on the higher-speed threats.
3. IO Amplification: Maximize psychological impact by having state media immediately confirm the use of the strategic arsenal.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The deployment of the Kinzhal ALBM confirms RF prioritizes the complete destruction of the targeted C2 nodes over resource conservation. This increases the threat profile from CRITICAL to EXTREME, as the Kinzhal is significantly harder to intercept than SRBM or CR. The maneuver of the Calibers to Kaniv confirms the dynamic targeting shift reported previously.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics demonstrate sufficient capacity to execute complex, multi-modal strategic strikes. Statements from Rostec leadership (Chemezov) promoting increased production capability are integrated into the kinetic sequence, suggesting a confidence in sustainment for a protracted high-intensity phase.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, achieving optimal timing for the coordinated attack exactly within the forecasted window (NLT 240000Z).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Full AD deployment across Central Ukraine. AD fires confirmed in Kyiv. READINESS: CRITICAL/DEGRADED. The successful penetration of Kyiv defenses (Darnytskyi impact) indicates temporary degradation of air superiority, likely due to simultaneous ballistic/hypersonic and cruise missile pressure. Operational readiness is severely stressed.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Confirmed continuing UAF deep strike operations, diverting RF AD resources (Yelets alert). Evidence suggesting damage or destruction of an aircraft in Taganrog (2316Z). SETBACK: C2 EXPOSED. The confirmed impact in Kyiv's Darnytskyi district confirms successful enemy kinetic targeting of the capital area during the critical phase. The effectiveness of the C2 redundancy plans (J6 activation) is being tested in real-time.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Immediate expenditure of high-end strategic interceptors was necessary for the Kinzhal/SRBM threat. The priority now shifts to conserving remaining strategic assets while successfully neutralizing the incoming CRs targeting Kanivska HPP. CONSTRAINT: The volume and variety of the strike force RF utilized place maximum stress on interceptor conservation doctrines.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF state channels (Colonelcassad, Z-channels) are utilizing the successful strike as immediate proof of military superiority, listing the assets used ("Calibers, Kinzhals, Iskanders, and Gerans") to maximize panic and undermine morale. This is designed to synergize with the previous "peace optimism" narrative by demonstrating overwhelming strength while suggesting diplomacy.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

National morale is highly stressed due to the nationwide alert and confirmed use of high-end weapons (Kinzhal, SRBM) against the capital. The UAF counter-strike IO (Taganrog) helps mitigate the narrative of total RF dominance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The strategic strike directly contradicts the RF's recent push for a "peace framework." This juxtaposition must be immediately exploited by STRATCOM to ensure Western partners perceive the RF diplomatic move as pure deception, thus maintaining material support flows.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 1 Hour (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. CIK Strike Execution: The Caliber group currently maneuvering through Cherkasy Oblast will strike Kanivska HPP (or related CIK infrastructure) NLT 240000Z.
2. Secondary CR Strike: The isolated Caliber heading towards Bila Tserkva will attempt to strike a logistics or supply aggregation node in Southern Kyiv Oblast NLT 240015Z.
3. Immediate Ground Exploitation: Following confirmed damage to Kyiv C2 nodes, RF ground forces (Pokrovsk Axis) will initiate the planned reconnaissance-in-force attack on UAF defensive lines, attempting to penetrate GLOC M-30/T-05-15, NLT 250000Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 6 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF achieves strategic success on two fronts:

1. C2 Failure: BDA confirms that the SRBM/Kinzhal strikes effectively destroyed the primary and one redundant C2/J-FIRE node, leading to operational paralysis in coordinating the defense of the Pokrovsk axis.
2. Resource Depletion: UAF is forced to expend critical Patriot/SAMP-T reserves against a secondary, sustained Kinzhal/SRBM wave (highly probable), leaving inadequate defense against future strategic bomber (Tu-95MS) CR salvos.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): IMMEDIATE CIK HARDENING.

   • Action: Divert all available mobile SHORAD (Gepard/VAMPIRE/Manpads teams) immediately to the defense sectors surrounding the Kanivska HPP. This CIK is confirmed as the primary CR target.
   • Action: Retain remaining strategic interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) on alert status for a potential, follow-on strategic strike (MDCOA). Use only against confirmed SRBM/ALBM threats.
   • Rationale: Preventing the CIK strike limits long-term national paralysis, while conserving assets prepares for follow-on attacks.

2. COMMAND & CONTROL (J-6/J-3): POKROVSK VULNERABILITY MITIGATION.

   • Action: Immediately task the J-6 to prioritize establishing connectivity (via alternative SATCOM, radio, or courier teams) with the Plan 7-B MOD deployment corridor.
   • Action: J-3 must issue pre-emptive tactical guidance to Pokrovsk Axis commanders, authorizing immediate, aggressive counter-battery fire and defensive fire missions upon receiving the first RF ground assault indicators (NLT 250000Z), regardless of centralized C2 status.
   • Rationale: The main strategic threat is C2 paralysis enabling a tactical breakthrough. Local initiative is now paramount.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): COUNTER-PROPAGANDA.

   • Action: Release coordinated information immediately confirming the Kinzhal/SRBM strike while simultaneously highlighting the UAF counter-strike success (Taganrog BDA confirmation). The message must frame RF use of strategic weapons as a desperate attempt to compensate for failure on the Pokrovsk Axis.
   • Rationale: Maintain domestic resilience and neutralize the RF IO attempt to couple strategic terror with misleading "peace" narratives.