Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - AD SATURATION EXPANSION AND REAR AREA DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

DTG: 242230Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 242200Z NOV 25 – 242230Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK GLOC INTERDICTION / AD SATURATION EXPANSION (Kirovohrad) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL CRISIS: GLOC Stabilization Force Synchronization Failure)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy AD saturation campaign has intensified and expanded, with UAV groups confirmed transitioning north into Kirovohrad Oblast, threatening secondary CIK and C2 nodes ahead of the NLT 240000Z strategic ballistic strike. Simultaneously, UAF counter-fixation deep strikes into Krasnodar Krai are verified as highly effective, forcing RF internal civil defense activation (Novorossiysk) and confirming civilian casualties (Gelendzhik). The crisis surrounding the GLOC Stabilization Force (Plan 7-B MOD) remains acute, with no C2 re-establishment past the 2145Z critical decision point, requiring confirmation of successful force dispersion.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Central Axis (Kirovohrad): Multiple groups of RF UAVs (Shahed/Geran) confirmed entering southern Kirovohrad Oblast (242156Z), tracking northbound. This expands the area of AD engagement significantly beyond Mykolaiv and Poltava, directly challenging central operational reserves and C2 redundancy centers. (FACT/JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Rear Area (Krasnodar Krai): UAF deep strike operations have achieved confirmed kinetic and psychological effects.
  • Novorossiysk: Temporary Vulnerability Centers (PVRs) established in schools (242213Z). This indicates sustained damage requiring civilian displacement. (FACT: PVR established; JUDGMENT: High operational impact).
  • Gelendzhik: One civilian casualty confirmed in Kabardinka village (242215Z). (FACT).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Permissive for all domains.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The status of Plan 7-B MOD remains the critical operational gap. Immediate priority is to confirm that the previously mandated "Disperse and Hide" protocols were successfully executed by subordinate commanders to avoid decisive attrition from RF deep fires. UAF AD assets are highly stressed by the expanded saturation zone (Mykolaiv and Kirovohrad).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF continues synchronized multi-domain attacks, leveraging EW (against 7-B MOD C2), kinetic saturation (Kirovohrad UAV ingress), and coordinated IO (undermining the peace narrative). INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-1 hour):

1. Maximize AD Exhaustion: RF will drive UAV formations toward key Kirovohrad logistical hubs (potential target: rail heads, fuel depots) to force UAF AD resources to engage high-volume, low-cost threats far north, ensuring high-value interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) are out of position or expended before the strategic ballistic launch. (JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Confirm 7-B MOD Neutralization: RF ISR/deep fire assets are currently searching for and striking elements of Plan 7-B MOD along the Pokrovsk M-30 GLOC.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The expansion of the UAV saturation zone into Kirovohrad Oblast is a tactical adaptation, confirming RF intelligence prioritization of striking secondary operational centers after achieving fixation on Mykolaiv. This forces UAF operational staff to defend a wider array of high-value targets.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes are creating verifiable friction in the RF Southern Military District logistics chain (Novorossiysk is a key naval/logistics port). The establishment of PVRs confirms damage to civilian infrastructure adjacent to military targets, indicating potential disruptions to port operations and local movement. (JUDGMENT: MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, based on BDA).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, coordinating simultaneous, multi-axis kinetic operations (Pokrovsk interdiction, Kirovohrad saturation) and rapid IO exploitation.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive resilience maintained. Strategic deep strike capacity (UAVs) demonstrates offensive freedom of action against RF rear areas. READINESS: Critical due to sustained AD expenditure and the uncertainty surrounding the combat effectiveness of Plan 7-B MOD.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Confirmed damage and civil defense activation in RF deep rear (Novorossiysk/Gelendzhik) forces RF AD and resources away from the frontline. SETBACK: CRITICAL: The C2 silence from Plan 7-B MOD places UAF operations on the Pokrovsk axis in a state of high risk. The requirement now is damage limitation and force recovery.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Urgent need to allocate mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard, Avenger) to the newly confirmed Kirovohrad threat zone without depleting the Mykolaiv CIK defense. CONSTRAINT: The mandatory conservation of strategic AD interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) for the NLT 240000Z strategic ballistic threat remains paramount.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF state media (TASS, 242157Z) is actively pushing the narrative that President Zelenskyy "refused" an invitation to the US for peace talks this week.

• Analysis: This is a coordinated strategic IO move designed to achieve two objectives: 1) Undercut the National Command Authority (NCA) narrative of successful diplomatic progress; 2) Portray Ukraine as the obstacle to peace, justifying the simultaneous kinetic escalation (ballistic strike preparation).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal sentiment is temporarily bolstered by reports of high-profile anti-corruption actions (DBR/State Labor Service, 242154Z), supporting the narrative of internal reform and accountability despite wartime pressures.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF IO focus on the alleged rejection of US travel must be countered immediately to ensure continued bipartisan political support in partner nations, particularly during the kinetic climax period.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 2 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Strategic Strike Sequence: UAVs in Kirovohrad will probe targets (rail, power) NLT 2330Z. The strategic ballistic launch will proceed NLT 240000Z, targeting priority C2/J-FIRE nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia regions.
2. 7-B MOD BDA: RF ISR will confirm successful interdiction/immobilization of Plan 7-B MOD elements. This success will trigger localized, high-confidence RF ground assaults on key Pokrovsk defensive positions (40th/155th OMBR) to test the integrity of UAF lines, leveraging the perceived lack of relief capacity.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF successfully interdicts 7-B MOD, achieves decisive AD attrition (due to expanded Kirovohrad saturation), and the strategic ballistic strike degrades UAF C2/J-FIRE capacity by 50%+. This operational paralysis allows RF mechanized forces to achieve a deep tactical penetration of the Pokrovsk line NLT 250600Z, forcing the UAF to execute a rapid withdrawal under fire.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL (J3): ACCOUNTABILITY AND FORCE PRESERVATION.

   • Action: Immediately initiate emergency, decentralized reporting protocols to establish accountability for Plan 7-B MOD. Assume all kinetic interdiction attempts were successful until proven otherwise. Redesignate dispersed elements as "Holding Reserves (Type 3)" with a mission priority of force preservation and delay, rather than movement/relief.
   • Rationale: Shift focus from synchronization to survival. Preserved force is a strategic asset; a destroyed force is an operational deficit.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): AD RESOURCE REALLOCATION (Kirovohrad).

   • Action: Rapidly deploy the equivalent of two full mobile SHORAD fire groups from the static Northern reserves to establish point defense over one primary C2 backup site and one critical rail hub within Kirovohrad Oblast.
   • Action: Reinforce the rule: WEAPONS HOLD for Patriot/SAMP-T systems must be strictly maintained for the ballistic threat, regardless of UAV saturation levels in Mykolaiv or Kirovohrad.
   • Rationale: The expanded UAV threat requires immediate reallocation to protect critical central nervous system assets.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): IO DAMAGE CONTROL.

   • Action: Issue an immediate, coordinated statement from the NCA and MFA clarifying the context of US travel plans, explicitly stating that diplomatic flexibility is essential during the current strategic kinetic window (ballistic strike threat). Counter the RF narrative by linking RF media claims directly to the simultaneous UAV saturation campaign.
   • Rationale: Neutralize the RF attempt to leverage political dynamics to delay or diminish Western support during the climax of the RF offensive.