Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - PHASE TRANSITION

DTG: 242130Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 242050Z NOV 25 – 242130Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (GROUND HOLD) / AD ATTRITION (MYKOLAIV/CHERNIGIV) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL CRISIS: GLOC INTERDICTION ACTIVE)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational environment has transitioned from preparatory kinetic fixation to the execution phase of the Air Defense (AD) saturation campaign preceding the anticipated ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z). The critical strategic threat posed by Russian Federation (RF) Information Operations (IO) regarding diplomatic progress has been successfully neutralized by the National Command Authority (NCA). Operational focus is now entirely kinetic: securing the Pokrovsk Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) and managing AD expenditure against new, geographically diversified Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) ingress routes.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (M-30/T-05-15): UAF 425th Separate Assault Regiment ("Skela") reports maintaining defensive positions in the center of Pokrovsk (242102Z). This confirms that RF elements have not yet achieved full operational control of the urban core, but the approaches and critical supply arteries (the GLOC) remain under severe threat of interdiction. (FACT/JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Fires Corridors (AD Saturation): UAV activity is expanding and diversifying:
  • Confirmed UAV ingress from the Black Sea towards Mykolaiv Oblast (Ochakiv) (242105Z). This confirms the RF intent to target southern operational logistics/CIK nodes.
  • New UAV groups reported over Chernihiv Oblast (North/Southeast), heading west (242103Z). This is assessed as a deliberate diversionary effort to draw high-value AD systems north. (FACT)
• RF Rear Area Strikes (Counter-Fixation): Confirmed drone strikes targeting CIK and residential areas in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai (242049Z, 242110Z), forcing RF AD resources to divert internally and providing a counter-narrative leverage point. (FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Permissive for all domains.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF is holding the Pokrovsk defensive line. The most critical operational constraint remains the unconfirmed, real-time status and communications integrity of the GLOC Stabilization Force (Plan 7-B MOD). The absence of a status update past the 2100Z critical decision point signifies either C2 degradation or active enemy Electronic Warfare (EW)/interdiction success.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF maintains high capacity for synchronized kinetic operations across multiple domains (AD attrition, kinetic interdiction, IO). INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-2 hours):

1. Reserve Interdiction: RF Spetsnaz and ISR will utilize the communications-dark window to target the GLOC Stabilization Force movement, likely cuing massed fires (KABs and conventional artillery) on identified chokepoints. (JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. AD Saturation Peak: Achieve maximum AD expenditure along Southern and Northern axes via diversified UAV flow to ensure the ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) faces minimal high-value interception threats.
3. IO Exploitation: Immediately pivot IO messaging to exploit the temporary cognitive success achieved by the NCA, focusing on "US abandonment" narratives to sow doubt among Western partners and UAF forces.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF adaptation is evident in the rapid geographical diversification of UAV attacks (Chernihiv/Mykolaiv/Kharkiv) to maximize AD system dispersion and fatigue. They are also utilizing C2 and ISR superiority to capitalize on the communications degradation of the UAF reserve force.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain adequate for the ongoing AD saturation campaign and the preparation for the strategic ballistic strike. High volume UAV launches confirm sufficient materiel stocks.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, successfully managing complex, time-sensitive, multi-axis operations. Their ability to immediately shift the IO focus following the Zelenskyy speech demonstrates C2 responsiveness.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive holding in Pokrovsk; active deep strike (Novorossiysk); Strategic C2 resilience achieved (NCA IO victory). READINESS: Tactical readiness in Pokrovsk is sustained (425 OShP confirmation). However, operational readiness is critically degraded by the failure to confirm the status of the GLOC Stabilization Force and the high AD expenditure rate.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: NCA fully neutralized the RF diplomatic entrapment IO (242115Z). UAF deep strikes against Novorossiysk CIK/ports demonstrates strategic offensive capacity and forces RF AD system displacement. SETBACK: CRITICAL: The absence of the GLOC Stabilization Force status (Plan 7-B MOD) past the 2100Z decision point must be treated as a major communications/C2 failure, significantly increasing the probability of kinetic interdiction success by RF forces.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Immediate tactical EW/C2 relay activation for the Stabilization Force corridor. Allocation of mobile Counter-UAS assets to the Mykolaiv axis, which protects vital southern logistics nodes. CONSTRAINT: Potential communications failure affecting reserve force coordination and synchronization of subsequent counter-attack/relief efforts.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF quickly executed an IO pivot following the failure of the "peace plan" narrative. The current high-priority RF message, amplified immediately via pro-Kremlin channels (242052Z, 242107Z), asserts that the US has ceased funding the conflict. This is a deliberate attempt to undermine the credibility of the NCA's diplomatic success (242115Z) and create localized tactical demoralization.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is reinforced by the clear communications from the NCA regarding diplomatic progress and the high-profile confirmed UAF strikes into RF territory (Novorossiysk). Public acknowledgement of energy limitations (242053Z) maintains realism.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Zelenskyy’s 2115Z statement confirms successful negotiations in Geneva, reducing the complexity of the peace framework and confirming sustained constructive engagement with Western partners. This strategic IO victory prevents decision paralysis at the strategic level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Concentrated Interdiction Fire: RF will employ pre-staged artillery and KABs to achieve a decisive strike on the suspected movement corridor of the GLOC Stabilization Force (Plan 7-B MOD) before 2300Z, effectively pinning or destroying the relief capacity.
2. Saturation Peak: UAV influx across Mykolaiv/Chernihiv will peak between 2200Z and 2330Z, aiming to deplete 70% of SHORAD resources ahead of the ballistic launch.
3. Ballistic Launch: Strategic ballistic strike (Iskander/KN-23) targeting C2/J-FIRE nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia regions will occur NLT 240000Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF successfully interdicts the GLOC Stabilization Force, simultaneously achieving a high rate of attrition against tactical and strategic AD assets. The resulting ballistic strike severely degrades UAF Joint Fires coordination capacity, leading to localized isolation of forces defending the Pokrovsk sector and subsequent RF mechanized exploitation toward Rodynske/Kurakhove.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL (J3/J6): EMERGENCY C2 AND FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION.

   • Action: J6 must immediately deploy Mobile Communication Teams (MCTs) and tactical EW assets (e.g., Bukovel-AD units) along the identified movement corridor of Plan 7-B MOD to establish emergency, high-bandwidth C2 relays.
   • Action: If communications remain severed NLT 242145Z, J3 must authorize the Stabilization Force commander (via pre-planned, timed protocols) to implement DISPERSE & HIDE maneuvers off the known GLOC, using anti-drone EW to prevent kinetic cuing.
   • Rationale: Preventing kinetic destruction of the reserve force is paramount, even at the cost of operational delay.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): TACTICAL PRIORITIZATION.

   • Action: Divert all available mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard, VAMPIRE, dedicated MANPADS teams) to intercept the confirmed UAV groups ingress to Mykolaiv Oblast. The Chernihiv wave is a lower-priority diversion.
   • Action: Reiterate the WEAPONS HOLD order for Patriot/SAMP-T against all cruise missile/UAV threats. These systems must be reserved exclusively for the strategic ballistic threat NLT 240000Z.
   • Rationale: Mykolaiv is critical for southern logistics; protecting it provides greater operational benefit than engaging the Northern diversion wave.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): NEUTRALIZE RF IO PIVOT.

   • Action: Issue immediate, high-visibility counter-messaging directly refuting the RF narrative of "US funding cessation" (242052Z). Utilize the positive diplomatic framing (Zelenskyy 2115Z speech) as proof of enduring alignment.
   • Action: Immediately leverage the confirmed UAF strikes into Novorossiysk to frame UAF operations as a necessary, effective response to RF escalation and CIK targeting.
   • Rationale: Sustain the cognitive advantage and prevent RF from capitalizing on the critical strategic strike window with demoralizing IO.