Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL GLOC STATUS

DTG: 242050Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 242030Z NOV 25 – 242050Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (GLOC INTERDICTION) / DEEP STRIKE (AD ATTRITION PEAKING) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL CRISIS: GLOC PENETRATION PENDING RESERVE CONFIRMATION)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis on the Pokrovsk M-30/T-05-15 GLOC remains at the critical threshold following the passing of the 2030Z deadline for proactive denial. Russian Federation (RF) forces have intensified kinetic fixation operations, utilizing guided aerial bombs (KABs) and UAV strikes across Donetsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts to suppress any potential Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) counter-attack or reserve movement.

Critically, the National Command Authority (NCA) successfully stabilized the Information Environment (IE) by confirming significant diplomatic progress, neutralizing the primary RF cognitive warfare objective of decision paralysis. Operational focus must now shift entirely to physical commitment of the GLOC Stabilization Force and disciplined Air Defense (AD) posture management ahead of the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (M-30/T-05-15): STATUS RED. Immediate confirmation of RF lead element penetration is the highest collection requirement. The next 90 minutes are determinative for operational control of this corridor. (JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Fires Corridors (Donetsk/Kherson/Mykolaiv): Confirmed KAB strikes targeting Donetsk and Kherson (242020Z, 242028Z) reinforce the assessment that RF is actively using stand-off munitions to fix UAF reinforcement routes outside the immediate Pokrovsk perimeter. UAV groups are confirmed tracking towards Mykolaiv Oblast (242047Z). (FACT)
• Critical Infrastructure (CIK): An RF mass drone strike successfully hit critical infrastructure in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast (242029Z), confirming the RF secondary intent to degrade logistical resilience beyond just AD depletion. (FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Permissive for all domains (unchanged).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD resources remain heavily engaged in counter-UAS operations in the East and South. The critical constraint is the lack of confirmed, real-time status of the GLOC Stabilization Force movement (Actionable Requirement 1).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF maintains high capacity for localized tactical breakthroughs supported by synchronized deep fires (KAB, UAV, future Ballistic). INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-2 hours):

1. GLOC Consolidation: RF elements are highly likely consolidating forward operating positions (FOPs) on the M-30/T-05-15, preparing for the introduction of mechanized exploitation forces.
2. Kinetic Fixation: Sustain and potentially increase KAB strikes on identified UAF reserve mobilization areas and logistics hubs along critical routes linking Zaporizhzhia/Mykolaiv to Pokrovsk.
3. AD Saturation: Continue multi-directional, high-volume UAV flow (now pivoting heavily towards Mykolaiv) to deplete SHORAD inventories ahead of the confirmed 240000Z ballistic window. (JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF tactical sequence remains robust: IO failure $\rightarrow$ Increased kinetic application (KABs/UAVs) $\rightarrow$ Ballistic Strike. RF is adapting by broadening the geographic scope of its kinetic fixation (KABs targeting Kherson/Donetsk routes, UAVs hitting Kharkiv CIK).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain adequate for the current deep strike campaign. The high frequency of KAB launches (reported across multiple axes) indicates sufficient air ordnance stockpiles. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, executing complex, multi-axis, multi-domain operations (UAV movement, KAB targeting, IO amplification) seamlessly within the established operational timeline.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive maneuver focused on GLOC stabilization. READINESS: Strategic readiness is optimized due to the neutralization of the cognitive threat. Tactical readiness is directly constrained by the high rate of SHORAD expenditure and the unconfirmed movement status of the GLOC Stabilization Force.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: UAF NCA’s successful counter-IO strategy (Zelenskyy’s confirmation of fewer than 28 peace points and continued Western alignment) prevents strategic paralysis. (FACT/JUDGMENT: HIGH CONFIDENCE) SETBACK: Ongoing high vulnerability to RF fixed-wing KAB strikes targeting maneuvering elements and fixed CIK, evidenced by strikes in Chuhuiv and new KAB launches in the South.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Immediate commitment confirmation and robust fire support coverage for the GLOC Stabilization Force. Allocation of dedicated counter-UAS systems to the Mykolaiv axis. CONSTRAINT: Potential degradation of local power/communications resilience due to CIK strikes (e.g., Chuhuiv).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO channels (TASS, ASTRA) are amplifying two distinct narratives:

1. Diplomatic Entrapment Mitigation: They are attempting to control the narrative regarding the peace framework reduction, portraying it as a positive step led by "US partners" but delaying crucial in-person meetings (Trump/Zelenskyy meeting "not planned"). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Defeatism/Attrition: Amplification of RF claimed counter-UAV successes (31 UAVs shot down over Russia) and disseminating defeatist imagery regarding UAF losses and burials (Lviv cemetery expansion).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is stabilized and focused by the clear warning and confirmed diplomatic progress. UAF resilience is reinforced by the high-profile Crimean Platform Summit (242045Z), demonstrating sustained international political legitimacy.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmation from Zelenskyy and the White House (242046Z) that the peace framework points are significantly reduced confirms constructive engagement and refutes the narrative of diplomatic isolation. This is a strategic win, providing the necessary cognitive space for immediate operational decision-making. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Interdiction Hardening: RF will use IF and light armor/SpN to establish a fixed operational bottleneck on the Pokrovsk GLOC, delaying and fixing UAF elements attempting counter-attack.
2. Attrition Axis Shift: UAV activity will intensify heavily over Mykolaiv and potentially shift east toward Dnipropetrovsk/Kryvyi Rih to saturate the AD corridor leading to the strategic strike targets.
3. KAB Sustainment: KAB strikes will remain the primary method of fixing UAF reserves and degrading logistics nodes supporting the Pokrovsk sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF successfully utilizes the period NLT 240000Z to achieve a total operational penetration:

1. RF lead elements establish a strong anti-tank screen on the Pokrovsk GLOC, neutralizing the lead elements of the UAF Stabilization Force.
2. Exhaustion of SHORAD systems allows the ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) to hit the primary UAF Joint Fires Center (J-FIRE), crippling UAF ability to coordinate effective counter-battery and indirect fire support, leading to a localized collapse near Rodynske.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL (J3/J-FIRE): FORCE PROTECTION AND CONTACT IMMINENCE.

   • Action: J3 must issue a GO/NO-GO status report on the GLOC Stabilization Force movement (Confirmation 1) NLT 242100Z. If movement is confirmed, J-FIRE must execute pre-planned artillery/missile strikes on high-probability RF interdiction points immediately.
   • Action: Dedicate Counter-Battery Radar (CBR) assets to provide immediate warning and strike capability against RF artillery systems cueing KABs within 50 km of the reserve movement corridor (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia axes).
   • Rationale: The kinetic fixation is underway (KABs confirmed on adjacent fronts); immediate application of friendly fires is required to ensure force arrival.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): PIVOT SHORAD TO CIK/RESERVE PROTECTION.

   • Action: Re-task high-mobility SHORAD assets (e.g., AVENGERS/VAMPIRE) immediately toward the Mykolaiv Oblast axis to intercept the inbound UAV groups confirmed by Air Force (242047Z), preventing further CIK strikes like the one in Chuhuiv.
   • Action: Maintain strict WEAPONS HOLD on Patriot/SAMP-T systems for the NLT 240000Z ballistic threat. Use MANPADS and heavy machine gun units exclusively for current Shahed waves.
   • Rationale: Preventing CIK damage in secondary axes limits RF ability to degrade national resilience while maintaining interceptor stockpiles for the strategic strike.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): DEFLECT IO DIVERSION.

   • Action: STRATCOM must issue a tailored message emphasizing that while diplomatic progress (reduced points) is positive, RF is simultaneously escalating kinetic pressure (KABs, CIK strikes) to cover their operational failures.
   • Action: Directly counter the RF propaganda regarding the Lviv cemetery expansion by reframing the narrative around the confirmed deaths of RF personnel during the Novorossiysk UAV strike.
   • Rationale: Maintain the cognitive advantage gained by the NCA speech and prevent RF from re-introducing defeatism or political distraction into the operational planning cycle.