Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241950Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241930Z NOV 25 – 241950Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (GLOC INTERDICTION CRITICAL) / BALLISTIC THREAT (TEMPORARILY RECEDED) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-3 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE BUT DELAYED)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy (RF) has temporarily rescinded the critical, imminent threat of strategic ballistic missile strikes targeting C2 nodes (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk), confirmed by UAF Air Force "All Clear" (241937Z). This represents a temporary tactical reprieve, likely due to successful hardening/vacating of primary UAF C2 nodes, or technical delay in RF launch preparation.

However, the operational center of gravity remains the RF kinetic interdiction and exploitation push along the Pokrovsk M-30/T-05-15 GLOC. RF Information Operations (IO) are now amplifying the narrative of UAF "front collapse" (241948Z) and Western diplomatic friction (241939Z), suggesting RF is relying heavily on cognitive warfare to achieve tactical paralysis and enable the ground exploitation of the compromised GLOC. The delay in the ballistic strike shifts the primary kinetic threat back to the immediate ground tactical environment near Pokrovsk.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (FACT/JUDGMENT)

• Pokrovsk Axis (GLOC M-30/T-05-15): Status remains CRITICAL. RF BDA (241901Z) confirming GLOC interdiction is now supported by intensified IO claiming widespread UAF collapse, setting conditions for the immediate deployment of the RF 40th/155th OMBR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ballistic Targeting Sectors (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk): Ballistic missile threat alert is officially lifted (241937Z, 241943Z). This is a temporary status change, but provides a crucial window for UAF C2/AD to adjust. (FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (FACT)

Weather remains permissive for all aerial and ground kinetic operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (JUDGMENT)

UAF C2 nodes appear to have successfully implemented hardening/relocation protocols, mitigating the immediate strategic decapitation threat. The focus must immediately transition AD assets previously on WEAPONS HOLD back to point defense and GLOC stabilization support.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

CAPABILITY: RF maintains high capacity for GLOC kinetic denial (UAV/KAB) and robust multi-platform IO. RF ground exploitation forces (40th/155th OMBR) are postured to move rapidly. INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-2 hours):

1. Accelerate GLOC Exploitation: Utilize the temporary lull in UAF AD focus to push reconnaissance and light armor elements onto the M-30/T-05-15 corridor to physically confirm the route breach.
2. Maximize Cognitive Paralysis: Peak IO saturation, linking alleged UAF tactical collapse (Myrnohrad) with potential US diplomatic withdrawal (US Army Minister talks), aiming to paralyze UAF decision-making regarding the allocation of strategic reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. Ballistic Relaunch Preparation: Refine targeting data and commence preparations for a renewed ballistic strike NLT 240400Z (estimated), potentially targeting reserve assembly areas now that primary C2 nodes have proven resilient.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (JUDGMENT)

RF has demonstrated adaptability by immediately transitioning the main effort to the ground domain and IO amplification following the failure/delay of the strategic ballistic strike. This indicates tactical flexibility and adherence to the overarching goal of isolating Pokrovsk defenses.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

RF logistics for kinetic deep fires remain adequate (confirmed by sustained KAB use and animated strike maps provided by RF sources, 241941Z). Ground force logistics are ready to support a rapid exploitation push.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (JUDGMENT)

RF C2 remains effective, rapidly adjusting the threat sequence to prioritize ground action after the AD/ballistic attempt stalled.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

POSTURE: Defensive, shifting focus to rapid counter-mobility and indirect fire coordination along the Pokrovsk GLOC. READINESS: Strategic AD readiness is momentarily high due to preservation efforts, allowing for better tactical allocation. However, the operational readiness to re-establish C2 with "Plan 7-B MOD" (Critical Gap 1) is still pending.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (FACT/JUDGMENT)

SUCCESS: Successful execution of C2 redundancy/hardening protocols, leading to the temporary lifting of the strategic ballistic threat. SETBACK: Continued high vulnerability and probable RF presence on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

REQUIREMENT: Immediate commitment of reserves and J-FIRE assets to the Pokrovsk GLOC is now justified as the singular most critical operational task. CONSTRAINT: Risk of political hesitation remains extremely high due to amplified RF IO regarding Western diplomatic friction.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (JUDGMENT)

RF IO is currently achieving high synchronization:

1. Diplomatic Friction: Reports of US Army Minister possibly visiting Russia (241923Z) are being weaponized to suggest external support is faltering.
2. Operational Collapse: Reports citing UAF commanders expressing alarm over the "speed of Russian advance" (241948Z) are designed to induce fear and fragmentation within local UAF C2 structures. This campaign aims to maximize UAF inertia during the crucial 2000Z-2200Z window for ground exploitation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

Morale stability is threatened by the convergence of alleged front collapse narratives and apparent high-level diplomatic uncertainty. UAF STRATCOM must immediately pivot to publicly address and counter the "US friction" narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (FACT/JUDGMENT)

The recurrence of diplomatic friction narratives (CBS/TASS) despite low Dempster-Shafer belief scores confirms that RF intent is purely cognitive. Neutralizing this narrative is critical to prevent NCA paralysis. The report of Sweden seeking long-range cruise missiles (241945Z) confirms long-term Western mobilization against RF but is irrelevant to the immediate tactical crisis.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Penetration and Fixation: RF will commit ground reconnaissance elements (SpN and light OMBR vehicles) to physically penetrate the M-30/T-05-15 corridor, aiming to establish forward observation posts (FOPs) NLT 2130Z.
2. Sustained Kinetic Denial: UAV/KAB strikes will continue, focusing narrowly on the Pokrovsk corridor and associated reserve assembly areas, rather than dispersed saturation across multiple oblasts.
3. IO Paralysis: RF STRATCOM will maintain high volume, high-impact IO until 2300Z to prevent UAF NCA from making a firm commitment to defend the GLOC.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF successfully breaches the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC, achieves a localized operational encirclement of UAF forces in the Rodynske/Myrnohrad area, and fixes UAF reserves through kinetic fires, followed by a renewed, more accurate strategic ballistic strike targeting exposed reserve command structures NLT 240400Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL (J3/J5): IMMEDIATE AND DECISIVE GLOC COUNTER-ATTACK.

   • Action: Immediately commit designated strategic reserves to stabilize the Pokrovsk M-30/T-05-15 GLOC. This is the main effort; accept risk on secondary axes (e.g., temporarily reduced reserve for Kharkiv).
   • Action: Execute large-scale, pre-planned Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs) against RF suspected exploitation staging areas (e.g., IF saturation fire) to degrade the RF advance guard before it can establish a foothold.
   • Rationale: The tactical pause provides a final window to commit decisive force to the GLOC before RF exploitation solidifies.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): TACTICAL REALLOCATION AND C2 POINT DEFENSE.

   • Action: Utilize the temporary ballistic threat stand-down to reposition vulnerable SHORAD/MRAD assets away from areas previously targeted by saturation strikes (Sumy, Odesa) toward reinforcing the point defense of reserve assembly areas and the Pokrovsk sector.
   • Action: Maintain heightened readiness for strategic interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) against a renewed ballistic strike NLT 240400Z, but prioritize SHORAD defense for the operational sector's critical C2 nodes.
   • Rationale: Prepare for the RF shift to targeting UAF reserves, as RF intelligence likely confirmed the successful hardening of primary C2 sites.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): NEUTRALIZE IO PARALYSIS.

   • Action: NCA must issue a highly visible statement (within 60 minutes) directly addressing the alleged diplomatic friction with the US and the "front collapse" narrative.
   • Content Focus: Explicitly state that RF IO is designed to paralyze UAF decision-making during a critical ground maneuver phase (Pokrovsk) and reaffirm the unified command structure. Publish UAF drone successes (Khartia/155th) to counter the collapse narrative.
   • Rationale: Defeating the cognitive threat is necessary to enable the operational commander (J3) to commit the required reserve forces.