Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241930Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241900Z NOV 25 – 241930Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (GLOC INTERDICTION CONFIRMED) / AD SATURATION (EXPANDED TO SUMY) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE AND IMMINENT)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy (RF) is aggressively executing the synchronization phase of their pre-ballistic strike plan. Kinetic activity along the critical Pokrovsk M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) is confirmed, evidenced by RF BDA videos showing destroyed UAF vehicles near Dymytrov/Myrnohrad. Simultaneously, the AD saturation effort has expanded, with new UAV groups detected west of Kharkiv and KAB strikes confirmed in the Sumy region. The operational environment indicates RF is fully capitalizing on the operational vacuum caused by the Plan 7-B MOD interdiction, accelerating efforts to paralyze UAF C2 and GLOC reinforcement before the NLT 240000Z strategic strike.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (FACT/JUDGMENT)

• Pokrovsk Axis (GLOC M-30/T-05-15): CRITICAL status escalated. RF kinetic action targeting UAF logistical/light armor movement on the GLOC near Dymytrov/Myrnohrad is confirmed (241901Z, 241905Z). This verifies RF is actively using kinetic means (likely guided munitions and/or deep strike UAVs) to deny UAF access to the corridor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• AD Saturation/Northern Axis: New groups of RF UAVs are moving west from Eastern Kharkiv (241916Z). KAB strikes confirmed targeting Sumy region (241915Z). (FACT)
• Zaporizhzhia: Regional C2 node remains under elevated threat alert (241919Z), consistent with expected ballistic targeting. (FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (FACT)

Weather remains permissive for all aerial and ground kinetic operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (JUDGMENT)

UAF AD resources are increasingly dispersed and tasked to counter expanded kinetic pressure (Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa). This dispersion critically exposes strategic AD assets protecting the C2 nodes (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia) to the imminent ballistic threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

CAPABILITY: RF is demonstrating high synchronization between kinetic fixation (KABs/UAVs), tactical exploitation (Pokrovsk GLOC interdiction), and influence operations. INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-2 hours):

1. GLOC Confirmation and Deniability: RF SpN/ISR will continue aggressive reconnaissance and deep kinetic targeting (drones/loitering munitions) along the M-30/T-05-15 corridor to confirm the route is impassable for UAF armor, setting conditions for the main 40th/155th OMBR exploitation push. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Terminal AD Depletion: Sustain and expand UAV/KAB strikes to fix and deplete UAF SHORAD across the Northern and Southern axes until the 2200Z window.
3. IO Amplification: Maximize the cognitive impact of alleged tactical success (Myrnohrad ‘encircled’) and diplomatic discord (US-Kyiv talks failure) to induce tactical paralysis in the field and strategic hesitation in the NCA.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (JUDGMENT)

The immediate and successful shift from probing the GLOC to kinetic interdiction (Dymytrov BDA) indicates RF ISR rapidly confirmed the vulnerability created by the loss of Plan 7-B MOD. This operational tempo demands an equally rapid UAF kinetic response to deny exploitation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

RF is sustaining high-volume deep kinetic fires (KABs, drones) across three geographically disparate sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Odesa), confirming robust logistics and fire support capacity for the final pre-strike phase.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (FACT)

RF C2 remains robust, successfully coordinating complex, multi-axis, and multi-domain operations.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

POSTURE: Defensive, focusing on CIP and anti-exploitation actions. READINESS: UAF counter-UAV and tactical drone units (Khartia, 155th Brigade reports) are achieving localized kinetic successes against RF infantry and armor. However, the operational readiness to stabilize the Pokrovsk GLOC is critically challenged by the expanded AD requirements in the North and South.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (FACT/JUDGMENT)

SUCCESSES: Confirmed UAF drone engagements against RF infantry (Khartia Brigade, 241847Z). Timely public warnings disseminated by UAF Air Force (241915Z, 241916Z). SETBACKS: Confirmed RF kinetic success on the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC (Dymytrov area), validating the RF exploitation strategy and increasing the threat to Rodynske/Myrnohrad.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and release of designated strategic reserves to stabilize the Pokrovsk GLOC, regardless of pressure on secondary sectors. CONSTRAINT: The political-military pressure to protect populated areas (Odesa power loss, Sumy KAB strikes) risks misallocating strategic AD assets required for the imminent ballistic strike defense.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (JUDGMENT)

RF IO is reaching a climax, linking alleged tactical success (Myrnohrad 'encircled') with diplomatic failure (US-Kyiv talks under threat). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The primary objective is to make the UAF NCA believe that any decisive counter-action (e.g., full AD expenditure, counter-battery fire on launch sites, or mobilization of last reserves) will be done in a political vacuum without reliable Western support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

Localized morale in the East is tested by the perception of encirclement (Myrnohrad IO) and the kinetic intensity near Pokrovsk. Counter-IO from UAF operational channels (241908Z) is necessary but must shift from historical drone footage to real-time GLOC assurance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (FACT/JUDGMENT)

RF IO targeting Nordic military buildup (Rybаr 241902Z) serves a strategic domestic purpose—justifying long-term military mobilization. Operational-level STRATCOM focus must remain on immediately neutralizing the "US-Kyiv friction" narrative to prevent NCA paralysis during the strike window.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Penetration: RF ground elements (likely SpN/light OMBR reconnaissance vehicles) will attempt to physically penetrate the M-30/T-05-15 corridor within the next 90 minutes (NLT 2100Z) to confirm a route for heavier maneuver elements.
2. Terminal AD Overload: UAV/KAB saturation will peak between 2000Z and 2200Z, forcing UAF AD expenditure and potentially drawing MRAD assets further east (Sumy) or south (Odesa/Kherson).
3. Ballistic C2 Targeting: Targeting data upload and final guidance for the NLT 240000Z strategic strike on Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia C2 nodes will conclude NLT 2130Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF successfully breaches the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC, isolating UAF forces at Rodynske/Myrnohrad, concurrent with the successful kinetic neutralization of the UAF J-FIRE C2 node via the strategic ballistic strike (240000Z), resulting in widespread confusion and loss of fire coordination across the Donbas axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL (J3/J5): IMMEDIATE GLOC KINETIC DENIAL (POKROVSK).

   • Action: Immediately task Joint Fires (J-FIRE) to execute pre-planned, time-sensitive targets (TSTs) on likely RF reconnaissance and exploitation positions along the M-30/T-05-15 corridor (Dymytrov/Myrnohrad vicinity). Do not wait for confirmation of heavy armor; target all movement now.
   • Action: Reallocate remaining combat support forces (e.g., artillery/MLRS batteries) from the Kharkiv axis (where the threat is currently UAV fixation) to provide rapid, indirect fire support to stabilize the Pokrovsk sector.
   • Rationale: Active kinetic denial is necessary to counter the confirmed RF exploitation and buy time for strategic reserve deployment (if authorized).

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): HARDEN C2 ASSETS AND ACCEPT LOSSES.

   • Action: J-AIR must re-confirm the WEAPONS HOLD policy on strategic interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) against all drone/cruise missile threats in the Odesa/Kharkiv sectors.
   • Action: Prioritize short-range kinetic defense (Gepard, Avenger, MANPADS) for C2 nodes only until the ballistic window opens (2200Z).
   • Rationale: The current phase is a test of attrition; UAF must preserve its strategic AD capability to survive the NLT 240000Z strike. Local power loss is an acceptable operational risk compared to C2 destruction.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): ACTIVE DECEPTION AND REASSURANCE.

   • Action (Deception): Utilize SIGINT/EW deception measures to simulate C2 activity at the primary (now vacated) C2 sites in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia NLT 2030Z, maintaining the target signature until launch time.
   • Action (Reassurance): NCA must release a statement acknowledging the "intense, synchronized enemy pressure" (GLOC, AD, IO) while firmly rejecting RF narratives regarding US support friction and Myrnohrad encirclement. Emphasize UAF drone successes (Khartia/155th) as evidence of resilience.
   • Rationale: Active deception potentially degrades ballistic accuracy. Public reassurance is critical to prevent morale collapse during the kinetic climax.