Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241900Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241830Z NOV 25 – 241900Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (GLOC EXPLOITATION IMMINENT) / ODESA (AD SATURATION PHASE 4) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE AND IMMINENT)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy (RF) is in the final preparation phase for the anticipated NLT 240000Z ballistic strike, marked by intensifying, layered AD saturation efforts across the South and North-East. Confirmed power outages in multiple Odesa districts due to persistent UAV activity confirm RF intent to maximize infrastructure damage and strain UAF AD resources immediately before the main strike. The critical operational vacuum along the Pokrovsk M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains the central vulnerability, compounded by reported systemic stress on UAF reserves across multiple axes.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (FACT/JUDGMENT)

• Odesa/Southern Axis: Sustained UAV strikes have caused confirmed electricity loss in several districts (241820Z). This kinetic pressure is maintained specifically to fix and deplete UAF interceptor stocks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Pokrovsk Axis (GLOC M-30/T-05-15): Status remains critical. The presumed interdiction of Plan 7-B MOD has created an exploitable window for RF probing attacks aimed at Rodynske reinforcement objective.
• Kharkiv/Central Axis: New groups of RF UAVs reported moving south from Northern Kharkiv region (241837Z). This indicates a coordinated, multi-axis AD saturation strategy designed to draw UAF SHORAD/MRAD assets away from the primary ballistic targets (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (FACT)

Weather remains permissive for all aerial and reconnaissance operations across the primary operational axes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (JUDGMENT)

UAF AD continues active engagement against low-cost threats (UAVs/Shahed), but high expenditure risk is sustained. RF is demonstrating effective synchronization between kinetic operations and informational warfare (IO) efforts targeting UAF command decision-making.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT)

CAPABILITY: RF maintains robust deep strike, ground maneuver (fixation operations near Gulyaipole), and sophisticated multi-domain IO capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-3 hours):

1. Maximize AD Drawdown: Utilize massed drone attacks (Kharkiv/Odesa) to exhaust UAF SHORAD and force tactical reallocation of strategic interceptors before 2200Z.
2. Cognitive Neutralization: Intensify IO output via state media (TASS, Colonelcassad) promoting the narrative that UAF leadership (Zelenskyy’s entourage) is internally fractured and risks losing US support (241821Z, 241832Z). This is directly aimed at inducing hesitation in UAF National Command Authority (NCA) regarding counter-strikes or decisive AD usage.
3. Confirm GLOC Status: RF SpN/OMBR units will likely initiate aggressive tactical reconnaissance or direct action along the Pokrovsk GLOC to confirm the attrition of Plan 7-B MOD and prepare an operational exploitation path toward Rodynske.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (JUDGMENT)

The shift to actively targeting regional power distribution nodes (Odesa) prior to the ballistic window demonstrates RF optimization toward maximizing kinetic paralysis. RF is also proactively reinforcing internal narratives through high-profile arrests and official displays of support for frontline troops (Kadyrov, 241834Z), insulating their domestic rear before the kinetic escalation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (JUDGMENT)

Frontline supply remains consistent with offensive operations, particularly in the Zaporizhzhia and Pokrovsk sectors. RF domestic IO indicates reliance on veteran integration programs ("Time of Heroes") to manage personnel needs.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (FACT)

RF strategic C2 remains highly synchronized, integrating the deep strike mission, fixation operations (Zaporizhzhia), and diplomatic IO pressure (Geneva/US political environment). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (JUDGMENT)

POSTURE: Defensive, prioritizing critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and maintaining anti-exploitation posture at Pokrovsk. READINESS: Tactical readiness remains high in AD units; however, internal reporting confirms operational stress (Sternenko, 241848Z) and systemic human resource allocation problems persist, degrading long-term combat sustainability in frontline brigades.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (FACT/JUDGMENT)

SUCCESSES: Confirmed UAF counter-UAV operations launched towards Crimea and Krasnodar Krai (241842Z), indicating active deep fire shaping operations and initiative. Successful debunking of RF propaganda regarding control of Kostiantynivka (241840Z). SETBACKS: Confirmed infrastructure damage and power loss in Odesa due to persistent UAV attacks. Critical operational stress reported in sectors outside of Pokrovsk/Gulyaipole, indicating wider strain on reserve capacity.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (JUDGMENT)

REQUIREMENT: Urgent requirement to implement the personnel allocation priority system to support depleted combat units. Immediate logistical support prioritization to stabilize the critical operational stress identified in secondary sectors. CONSTRAINT: Continued reliance on volunteer/NGO funding (Khartiya Brigade 241606Z) to meet essential military procurement needs suggests state logistical mechanisms remain constrained or sub-optimal.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (JUDGMENT)

RF IO is actively attempting to shift the narrative away from UAF diplomatic success (Geneva) and towards internal friction and impending US abandonment (TASS 241821Z, OpZ 241832Z). The goal is to maximize NCA hesitation in the hours leading up to the ballistic strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (JUDGMENT)

Public morale in the South is tested by the power outages and strikes (Odesa). However, active UAF counter-propaganda and the clear demonstration of sovereignty in negotiations provide key resilience factors.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (FACT/JUDGMENT)

RF is attempting to revive the threat of diplomatic paralysis using US political dynamics (Trump/White House narrative). The UAF STRATCOM must immediately counter this by leveraging the Geneva success to maintain international unity. The noted 'silence' from Russian political figures on sanctions suggests RF believes the current kinetic action will dominate the international conversation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Terminal AD Saturation: RF will sustain UAV waves (Odesa, Kharkiv) until the 2200Z window opening. Attacks will prioritize disruption of electricity grids and drawing AD south and north, clearing the flight path for the primary ballistic strike targeting C2 nodes.
2. ISR-Driven GLOC Exploitation: Aggressive RF ISR assets (UAS, SpN) will attempt to physically confirm the destruction or interdiction of Plan 7-B MOD along the M-30/T-05-15 corridor, providing cueing for immediate ground forces (OMBR) penetration.
3. Ballistic Launch Sequence: Final launch parameters will be uploaded and sequencing initiated for the NLT 240000Z strategic strike, targeting C2 nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF simultaneously achieves the kinetic destruction of the primary UAF J-FIRE C2 node (via ballistic strike) and successfully exploits the resulting confusion to secure a tactical lodgment on the M-30/T-05-15 Pokrovsk GLOC, isolating defending forces at Rodynske and preventing effective, coordinated counter-attack authorization.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL (J3/J5): IMMEDIATE GLOC DENIAL ACTIONS (POKROVSK).

   • Action: Immediately task engineering units to execute pre-planned demolition/obstacle placement (anti-tank ditches, minefields) along the Pokrovsk M-30/T-05-15 GLOC's critical chokepoints.
   • Action: Reallocate remaining combat support forces (e.g., mortar platoons, ATGM teams) from less active secondary sectors (identified by Sternenko report) to reinforce the immediate vicinity of Rodynske and the alternate reinforcement corridor perimeter.
   • Rationale: Active denial of movement, even token efforts, buys time and prevents RF exploitation of the perceived vacuum caused by 7-B MOD's loss.

2. C2 AND FORCE PROTECTION (J6/J3): HARDEN AGAINST BALLISTIC STRIKE.

   • Action: All non-essential personnel must vacate primary C2 nodes (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia) NLT 2000Z and transition to hardened subterranean or highly dispersed backup sites.
   • Action: Initiate a "communications silence" protocol (except for AD/Ballistic warning networks) from 2200Z to 0030Z in the C2 sectors to reduce SIGINT footprint prior to and during the strike window.
   • Rationale: Minimizing personnel loss and SIGINT signatures ensures C2 functionality survives the imminent strategic strike.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): NEUTRALIZE IO PARALYSIS.

   • Action: STRATCOM must coordinate with the NCA to preemptively release a statement confirming the necessity of ongoing diplomatic efforts (including any potential US travel) while explicitly labelling RF IO (TASS, FT reporting) as a desperate attempt to induce paralysis and cover imminent war crimes (the Odesa strikes and the NLT 240000Z ballistic attack).
   • Rationale: Neutralizing the RF "pause signal" is essential to guarantee NCA decisiveness during the kinetic crisis, preventing strategic hesitation.