Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241755Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241730Z NOV 25 – 241755Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (CRITICAL CULMINATION) / STRATEGIC (AD DEPLETION PHASE 2) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE AND IMMINENT)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The Russian Federation (RF) has successfully executed the kinetic exhaustion phase of its pre-strategic strike strategy. Confirmed massed drone attacks ("Geranium" / Shahed) have struck Odesa, causing direct damage to the thermal power plant (TETs) and leading to power interruptions (241722Z, 241728Z). This validates the assessment that RF is forcing the expenditure of Ukrainian Air Defense (UAF AD) reserves ahead of the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike. Crucially, the 241730Z deadline for Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on the Plan 7-B MOD relief convoy has expired without confirmation. Force planning must now assume catastrophic attrition or interdiction of the convoy.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Odesa/Southern Axis (NEW CRITICALITY): The confirmed kinetic destruction of critical energy infrastructure (TETs) shifts the focus from simple AD depletion to strategic infrastructure degradation. This strike aims to complicate C2 redundancy and maintenance operations in the South ahead of the ballistic attack.
• Central/Eastern Axis (Saturation): Confirmed low-level UAV movement in Central Kharkiv (S) and Eastern Poltava (W) indicates RF is maintaining geographically dispersed pressure to stretch mobile AD groups.
• Pokrovsk Axis (GLOC M-30/T-05-15): The failure to confirm the status of 7-B MOD means the critical Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains vulnerable to RF exploitation, specifically by the 40th/155th Separate Marine Brigades (OMBR).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Weather remains permissive for kinetic and ISR operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD posture is strained due to successful RF saturation and confirmed hits on high-value targets. The failure to obtain BDA on 7-B MOD paralyzes operational reinforcement decisions for the Pokrovsk sector. RF C2 is highly synchronized, linking the Odesa strikes to the ongoing diplomatic IO effort.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF has confirmed the capability to execute high-volume, synchronized, deep-strike drone operations targeting key energy nodes (Odesa TETs). Pro-RF IO reinforces the capacity for mass production of PGM/glide bombs (KABs), supporting the fixation strategy in Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-4 hours):

1. Exploit AD Depletion: RF will continue drone saturation to maximize AD strain until the ballistic launch window (approx. 2200Z).
2. Bolster IO/Justification: Leverage the confirmed Odesa infrastructure damage and the fragmentation of Western diplomatic opinion (Trump/Xi dialogue) to justify the NLT 240000Z strike as a necessary response to Kyiv's 'maximalism.'
3. Confirm 7-B MOD Kill: RF ISR is likely performing final BDA on the M-30/T-05-15 corridor, preparing for localized ground probing to exploit the presumed operational paralysis resulting from the convoy's loss.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The explicit targeting and achievement of kinetic effects against energy infrastructure (TETs) is a refinement of the AD saturation tactic, indicating a higher priority on disrupting rear C2 and power grids ahead of the strategic strike. RF is also using financial incentives (KhMAO payments) to counter personnel quality issues, suggesting a high-level logistical adaptation to manpower constraints.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF personnel sustainment is increasingly reliant on regional financial incentives to drive contract recruitment, compensating for systemic internal security and morale issues. Logistics supporting frontline KAB usage and deep drone strikes remain robust.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 is highly effective in executing the multi-domain plan. The immediate IO response following the Odesa strike demonstrates integrated, rapid strategic messaging. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive, focused on damage control in the South and strict AD resource management. READINESS: Tactical readiness is generally high, supported by confirmed external training pipeline (Operation Interflex participation by Sweden). Strategic readiness is challenged by confirmed infrastructure damage in Odesa and the critical operational uncertainty regarding Plan 7-B MOD.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Confirmed international support for long-term training (Sweden/Operation Interflex). UAF STRATCOM successfully maintaining the NATO membership option as a key security guarantee component in the face of peace negotiations pressure. SETBACKS: Confirmed kinetic loss of a critical energy node (Odesa TETs) and associated power interruptions. The expired BDA deadline for Plan 7-B MOD constitutes the most critical operational setback in the Pokrovsk axis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: IMMEDIATE SHIFT TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING for Rodynske reinforcement, assuming 7-B MOD is lost. Need for immediate emergency power generation deployment to the Odesa region to support C2 and medical facilities. CONSTRAINT: High-value interceptor reserves are now under extreme pressure following the successful Odesa strike. Political pressure from fragmented Western diplomatic signals is increasing the constraint on aggressive defense measures.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO strategy is succeeding in converging diplomatic pressure with kinetic reality.

• RF Framing: RF channels amplify the Trump/Xi dialogue concerning a "fair deal," placing diplomatic pressure on Kyiv while simultaneously broadcasting the success of the Odesa strikes. The narrative is that Kyiv’s refusal to negotiate seriously forced the escalation.
• Western Disunity: Confirmed internal disagreement among Western partners (US vs. UK/France/Germany) regarding the peace framework (Politico report) provides crucial operational space for the RF to strike without immediate unified condemnation.
• UAF Counter-IO: Needs immediate focus on framing the Odesa attack not merely as AD saturation, but as a deliberate war crime targeting civilian infrastructure (TETs) during peak diplomatic activity, linking RF aggression directly to the peace talks.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF civilian morale in affected regions (Odesa) is temporarily impacted by power outages and sustained strikes. UAF efforts to maintain NATO membership as a goal provide a strategic morale boost. RF continues to focus on financial incentives (KhMAO) and domestic IO (UAV claims over Moscow) to stabilize rear area morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The convergence of the Trump/Xi dialogue (241456Z, 241743Z) and the reported EU/US policy divergence (241746Z) confirms a highly complex and fragmented diplomatic environment. This fragmentation increases the immediate risk of the RF strategic strike achieving its political objectives (decapitation strike without consequence).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours

(VERY HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Intensified AD Saturation: RF will maintain UAV pressure across Poltava, Kharkiv, and remaining Southern sectors until 2200Z.
2. Strategic C2 Targeting: RF launch sequence preparation for the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike will focus on maximizing lethality against C2 nodes, leveraging the distraction caused by the Odesa strike.
3. Pokrovsk Fixation: RF forces will initiate localized, low-intensity ground probing (SpN/Dismounted Infantry) near the M-30/T-05-15 corridor to confirm the operational paralysis resulting from the assumed loss of Plan 7-B MOD.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully exploits the operational vacuum created by the interdiction of Plan 7-B MOD. Simultaneously, the strategic ballistic strike achieves high-confidence BDA against primary UAF C2 nodes (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia), leading to localized tactical unit isolation and a coordinated RF push to seize Rodynske within 24 hours.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - EXPIRED DEADLINE)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL (J3/J5): POKROVSK CONTINGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION.

   • Action: Immediately transition operational status of Plan 7-B MOD to "INTERDICTED." Implement PR protocols for high-value personnel and EW systems along the M-30/T-05-15 corridor.
   • Action: Execute the contingency plan for Rodynske, prioritizing the establishment of alternate, dispersed logistics and fire support positions, and reallocating any surviving reinforcement assets to stabilize the immediate defensive perimeter.
   • Rationale: Time is exhausted. Maintaining an "unknown" status wastes resources and risks strategic surprise at Rodynske.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR): AD RESOURCE REALLOCATION AND TARGETING.

   • Action: Reinforce the C2 hardening and AD for the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia C2 sector, potentially re-positioning a Patriot launcher (if feasible) to maximize coverage against the NLT 240000Z ballistic threat.
   • Action: Conduct rapid BDA on the Odesa TETs strike, prioritizing deployment of mobile SHORAD/drone defense groups (VAMPIRE, MANPADS) to protect emergency power infrastructure and alternate C2 sites in the South.
   • Rationale: The successful Odesa strike proves the critical need to preserve interceptors for the primary ballistic threat and defend operational redundancy.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / MFA): COUNTER-IO USING WAR CRIMES NARRATIVE.

   • Action: STRATCOM must immediately issue a statement NLT 241815Z explicitly linking the verified attack on the Odesa civilian energy infrastructure (TETs) to the ongoing RF diplomatic maneuver (peace plan endorsement). Frame the attack as a deliberate war crime intended to blackmail the international community.
   • Action: Intensify outreach to European capitals (specifically leveraging PM Tusk's earlier stance) to highlight the contradiction between RF diplomatic words and kinetic actions, counteracting the paralyzing effect of the US/China peace dialogue.
   • Rationale: Aggressive counter-IO is essential to prevent international acceptance of the upcoming strategic strike as a justifiable military action.