Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241730Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241700Z NOV 25 – 241730Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (CRISIS CULMINATION) / STRATEGIC (DECAPITATION STRIKE IMMINENT) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE AND IMMINENT)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The transition to the kinetic culmination phase of the Russian Federation (RF) strategic plan is confirmed. RF Air Defense (AD) saturation operations are generating kinetic effects, with a confirmed explosion in Odesa (241710Z) and ongoing UAV activity detected in Cherkasy Region (241657Z), further depleting Ukrainian Air Defense (UAF AD) interceptor reserves ahead of the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike. The status of the crucial Plan 7-B MOD relief convoy remains unknown, forcing operational planners to assume high attrition unless immediate Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is obtained by the 241730Z deadline.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): The M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains the critical decision point. Failure to confirm the status of 7-B MOD by the BDA deadline forces a contingency shift toward reinforcing Rodynske via alternate routes and prioritizing recovery operations over reinforcement.
• Southern/Central Axis (AD Engagement): RF UAV attacks are confirmed across Odesa and now Southern Cherkasy, successfully forcing the commitment of AD assets in geographically dispersed areas. RF maintains operational surprise regarding the exact timing and payload of the confirmed strategic ballistic strike.
• RF Deep Rear: An Air Alert declared in Lipetsk Oblast (241652Z) indicates RF is implementing protective measures in deep rear areas, potentially preempting UAF Long-Range Fires or ISR operations targeting launch assets.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Weather remains permissive for both kinetic and ISR operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD posture is defensive and dispersed, focusing on mobile fire groups (SHORAD/VAMPIRE) to counter the drone saturation while maintaining WEAPONS HOLD for high-value interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T). RF C2 is synchronized, linking diplomatic pressure with sustained, multi-axis kinetic operations.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF continues to demonstrate multi-domain dominance in synchronization (IO, AD saturation, strategic strike preparation). New data confirms the RF ability to sustain frontline logistics using heavy hexacopters ("Mangas Grouping," 241717Z), offsetting reported ground supply vulnerabilities. INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-6 hours):

1. Maximize Political Friction: RF channels are leveraging the Stefanchuk (Crimea) statement and the purported "Trump Plan" acceptance (Axios framing) to justify immediate, non-negotiated kinetic action, specifically the NLT 240000Z strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Sustain AD Pressure: Maintain the current tempo of low-cost UAV attacks until NLT 2200Z to ensure maximum depletion of UAF interceptor reserves. (CONFIDENCE: VERY HIGH)
3. Kinetic Exploitation: RF will likely initiate localized ground probing operations targeting the M-30/T-05-15 corridor, leveraging the assumed paralysis of Plan 7-B MOD.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed internal security crisis within the RF (fugitive convicts in Leningrad Oblast, 241655Z; corruption/extortion rings targeting wounded soldiers, 241717Z) indicates that RF operational sustainability relies heavily on coercive, low-quality human resources. This requires RF C2 to dedicate effort to rear security, potentially reducing focus on frontline operational planning.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adapting to deep rear personnel quality crises. The prioritization of heavy hexacopters for resupply (water, ammunition) suggests persistent issues with vehicular supply chains or high interdiction risk along GLOCs, particularly in the vicinity of Pokrovsk. Sustained, direct recruitment campaigns (Moscow Oblast) confirm long-term personnel commitments, despite high visible attrition issues.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains effective in synchronizing the military-diplomatic offensive. Local C2 may face increased friction due to the need to manage internal security threats (fugitive hunting, corruption investigations). The declaration of an air alert in Lipetsk (deep rear) suggests proactive AD C2 is engaged. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Active defense and C2 hardening. READINESS: UAF tactical readiness is high, demonstrated by effective CQC (3rd Separate Assault Brigade, 241649Z) and localized FPV drone dominance (413th Regiment, 241717Z). Strategic readiness is bolstered by key EU pushback (Tusk, 241652Z) against the RF diplomatic maneuver, creating a political firewall against calls for immediate, disadvantageous negotiation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Confirmed localized tactical success in counter-personnel operations (3rd Assault Brigade) and successful use of FPV/strike drones against enemy equipment. SETBACKS: Confirmed kinetic effects (explosion) in Odesa, validating the success of the RF AD saturation strategy. The inability to confirm 7-B MOD status is a critical operational liability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: IMMEDIATE BDA on 7-B MOD (M-30/T-05-15 corridor). Decision-making is paralyzed without this intelligence. CONSTRAINT: Limited high-value interceptor reserves due to sustained RF drone pressure. This constraint becomes terminal if not managed strictly until the 2200Z window.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO focus is to secure international acquiescence to the NLT 240000Z strike by proving Kyiv's "unreasonableness."

• RF Framing: Amplification of Speaker Stefanchuk's statement on Crimea (241708Z, 241715Z) to show Kyiv's maximalism, coupled with the Axios report framing the purported "Trump Plan" acceptance as forced surrender (241653Z).
• UAF Opportunity (CRITICAL): Polish PM Tusk’s public rejection of key elements of the proposed peace framework (241652Z) provides crucial leverage for UAF STRATCOM to dismantle the RF narrative of a unified international demand for peace concessions.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stressed but showing resilience through operational successes shared by frontline units. RF morale is confirmed to be suffering systemic breakdowns, evidenced by the high-profile convict escape and the deep-seated corruption/extortion rings targeting wounded soldiers—these are indicators of failing institutional control.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The explicit division among Western allies regarding the modified peace framework (Tusk's statement vs. US reports) is strategically beneficial for Ukraine, as it undermines diplomatic pressure for an immediate ceasefire following the anticipated ballistic strike.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Final AD Exhaustion Phase: RF will maintain high-density, low-cost UAV strikes (e.g., Shahed) across Southern and Central Ukraine until approximately 2200Z, preceding the ballistic window.
2. Information Justification: RF IO will intensify the campaign linking the upcoming strategic strike to Kyiv's 'unacceptable' demands (Crimea) and 'failure to negotiate seriously.'
3. Launch Sequence Initiation: RF will commence final technical preparations and launch sequence authorization for the strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z, targeting C2 nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully executes the strategic strike, achieving catastrophic BDA against 50%+ of primary and alternate C2 nodes, including the J-FIRE center. This decapitation, coupled with the confirmed successful interdiction of Plan 7-B MOD, results in localized operational communication failures, leading to unauthorized, uncoordinated operational withdrawal from the critical Pokrovsk sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - BDA & C2)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. JOINT FIRES (J-FIRE / J3): CONVOY CATASTROPHIC BDA PROTOCOL.

   • Action: Immediately transition the status of Plan 7-B MOD from "Communications Dark" to "CRITICALLY COMPROMISED/INTERDICTED" NLT 241730Z if BDA is not confirmed.
   • Action: Redirect assets originally slated for 7-B MOD reinforcement to bolstering the immediate defensive perimeter of Rodynske and preparing alternate, dispersed fire support positions.
   • Rationale: The inability to confirm status signals operational failure in time-critical combat environment. Force planning must proceed based on the MDCOA to prevent further tactical collapse.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR / J-FIRE): ENFORCEMENT OF WEAPONS HOLD.

   • Action: Issue a theater-wide FLASH message re-confirming that the RF AD saturation is a decoy operation. Use of Patriot/SAMP-T against confirmed UAVs must be investigated immediately for disciplinary action unless deemed a direct threat to NCA assets.
   • Action: Maximize the efficiency of mobile SHORAD/fire groups (e.g., Gepard, VAMPIRE, anti-drone rifles) to counter the sustained UAV wave, strictly preserving the strategic interceptor inventory for the 2200Z – 0200Z ballistic window.
   • Rationale: The primary objective is surviving the decapitation strike, which requires maximum interceptor availability.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / MFA): FRACTURE THE PEACE TRAP.

   • Action: STRATCOM must immediately issue a statement NLT 241745Z that amplifies PM Tusk's statement, specifically highlighting that the RF continues to negotiate in bad faith by simultaneously executing a pre-strike diplomatic maneuver and conducting a massive AD saturation campaign targeting civilian infrastructure (Odesa explosion).
   • Action: Initiate a controlled IO campaign targeting RF rear personnel (Leningrad Oblast, Moscow Oblast recruits) that utilizes the confirmed internal security crises (fugitive convicts, corruption rings) to sow discord and discourage recruitment/deployment.
   • Rationale: Active counter-IO using verified failures in RF governance is necessary to prevent international paralysis and exploit critical RF vulnerabilities ahead of the strategic strike.