Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241600Z NOV 25 – 241700Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (CRISIS CULMINATION) / STRATEGIC (DECAPITATION STRIKE IMMINENT) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE AND IMMINENT)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The critical tactical window for the interdiction of the Plan 7-B MOD relief convoy (NLT 241630Z) has expired. Immediate Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of the M-30/T-05-15 corridor is the highest operational priority. RF forces are actively executing the Air Defense (AD) saturation phase of the strategic strike plan, with confirmed drone movements threatening key logistics hubs in the South (Odesa). RF Information Operations (IO) achieved a critical success by confirming the removal of the asset seizure clause from the proposed peace framework, setting conditions for potential National Command Authority (NCA) paralysis ahead of the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): Status of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC is unknown following the anticipated 1630Z kinetic strike. Assumed high attrition requires immediate confirmation of the location and integrity of the 7-B MOD dispersed elements.
• Southern Axis (AD SATURATION): Confirmed group of 10+ UAVs (Shahed/Geran) inbound toward Odesa/Chornomorsk from the Black Sea (241630Z, 241644Z). This confirms the RF intent to draw high-value AD interceptors away from potential ballistic strike targets in Central/Eastern Ukraine.
• Command/Control: Zelensky conducted meetings with government officials (241621Z), attempting to project stability and continuity, confirming UAF awareness of the RF IO strategy targeting internal unity.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Weather remains permissive for kinetic and ISR operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF is stabilizing C2 posture against IO friction. The transition to decentralized, preemptive defensive action (MCS-3) for 7-B MOD needs immediate verification. RF signaling the activation of UVG-76 ("Doomsday Radio") (241623Z) is assessed as a high-impact psychological operation designed to accompany the kinetic sequence.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF continues to demonstrate multi-domain synchronization, linking major strategic IO victories (peace plan erosion) with tactical action (AD saturation and KAB strikes). The simultaneous high-incentive recruitment campaigns in Moscow Oblast (241624Z, 241627Z) suggest RF is preparing for a sustained, high-attrition conflict beyond the immediate strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-6 hours):

1. Execute Ballistic Strike Precursor: Maintain intense, geographically dispersed drone saturation (Odesa, Kharkiv) to exhaust UAF AD reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Maximize Political Friction: Exploit the successful removal of the asset seizure clause (241634Z, 241648Z) to pressure international actors into demanding a "goodwill pause" NLT 240000Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed escalating use of KAB strikes (Zaporizhzhia) followed by the opening of the 1630Z Pokrovsk strike window, synchronized with the Odesa drone wave, confirms the shift from localized attrition to coordinated operational paralysis ahead of the main event. RF is effectively using psychological warfare (UVG-76 signaling) to increase stress on UAF C2.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supporting multi-axis simultaneous kinetic operations. The robust recruitment push (Moscow Oblast) indicates a steady commitment to replenishing personnel losses, offsetting reported localized morale collapses (241639Z, family report).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in executing synchronized kinetic and cognitive attacks. The seamless timing between diplomatic signaling (TASS/Bloomberg reports) and tactical launches (Air Force reports) is indicative of integrated C2 structure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive, focused on C2 continuity and asset preservation. READINESS: UAF political readiness is holding, supported by swift official denials from the Office of the General Prosecutor (ОГП) regarding internal corruption rumors (241621Z, 241635Z), mitigating the RF "Political Vector" IO. Tactical readiness remains threatened by the escalating AD saturation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SETBACK (STRATEGIC): Confirmation that the US-proposed peace plan removed the $100 billion RF asset seizure provision is a significant strategic loss, validating the core RF diplomatic IO objective. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) SETBACK (TACTICAL): The commitment of AD assets to counter the Odesa drone wave confirms the success of the RF decoy strategy, reducing interceptor availability for the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Immediate BDA confirmation of 7-B MOD status and casualty estimates. CONSTRAINT: Political leadership risks being distracted by RF-generated internal friction (ministerial appointments, Haidai corruption allegations) at a critical operational juncture.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO focus has shifted from creating confusion to cementing concessions:

• Strategic Vector: TASS and major RF channels are amplifying the Bloomberg/Reuters report confirming the $100B asset seizure clause removal. This is a deliberate campaign to precondition international observers for a negotiated outcome favorable to Moscow post-strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Operational Vector: RF is amplifying UAF Speaker Stefanov’s insistence on the return of Crimea (241627Z), using it to portray Kyiv as intransigent and unwilling to accept the new "19-point" framework, thereby justifying continued kinetic action. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-IO Opportunity: Significant internal morale issues within specific RF units (reported high casualties, 241639Z) provide a valuable target for UAF STRATCOM to exploit locally and internationally.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stressed by the convergence of strategic political setbacks (peace plan changes) and continuous tactical threats (power rationing, drone strikes). RF morale appears unstable in specific frontline units (high attrition confirmed by family report).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The explicit removal of key strategic leverage (asset seizure funds) weakens the Ukrainian diplomatic position ahead of critical European meetings, making it harder to secure robust backing against post-strike RF ceasefire demands.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Continued AD Exhaustion: RF will sustain and potentially increase the volume of low-cost UAV attacks across multiple fronts (Odesa, Central, Northern) until NLT 2200Z to ensure high-value interceptor reserves are maximally depleted.
2. Tactical Exploitation (Pokrovsk): RF ground forces will attempt to probe or bypass the now-disrupted 7-B MOD corridor, leveraging the confirmed attrition/paralysis to increase pressure on Rodynske.
3. Ballistic Preparation: Final launch sequence preparation for the NLT 240000Z strategic strike, targeting hardened C2 nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia regions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully executes the NLT 240000Z strategic strike, achieving catastrophic BDA against 50% or more of primary and secondary C2 nodes across Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia. This C2 failure, coupled with the confirmed successful interdiction of Plan 7-B MOD, leads to a critical breakdown in communications and operational coordination, forcing an unauthorized operational withdrawal from the Pokrovsk sector under extreme duress.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - BDA & C2)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. JOINT FIRES (J-FIRE / J3): POST-STRIKE CONVOY MANAGEMENT.

   • Action: Immediately dedicate all available operational air assets (UAS, fixed-wing ISR) to BDA of the 7-B MOD corridor. Prioritize confirming if organic Electronic Warfare (EW) systems (e.g., Bukovel-AD) survived and are operational.
   • Action: If communications remain severed NLT 241730Z, assume high attrition and authorize nearby UAF elements (e.g., from Rodynske) to initiate small-scale search and rescue/recovery operations, while maintaining strict electromagnetic silence (EMCON).
   • Rationale: The transition from preventing the strike to managing the aftermath is now critical to salvage combat power and preserve morale in the Pokrovsk sector.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-AIR / J-FIRE): BALLISTIC COUNTER-PLAN IMPLEMENTATION.

   • Action: Reiterate and enforce the WEAPONS HOLD policy across all theater command sectors (South, Central, East). The observed drone saturation (Odesa, Kharkiv) must be defeated primarily by mobile fire groups (SHORAD/VAMPIRE), not high-value interceptors.
   • Action: Immediately confirm the readiness status of all hardened/alternate C2 facilities that will coordinate the strategic AD response between 2200Z and 0200Z.
   • Rationale: Preventing the successful decapitation strike (MDCOA) requires maximizing high-value interceptor reserves for the confirmed NLT 240000Z window.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / MFA): COUNTER-DIPLOMATIC BLACKMAIL.

   • Action: STRATCOM must issue a highly visible statement NLT 241730Z that explicitly links the RF diplomatic maneuver (removal of asset seizure clause) to the escalating AD saturation and the imminent NLT 240000Z ballistic strike. Frame the diplomatic negotiation as a "smoke screen for mass murder" to prevent Western partners from suggesting restraint.
   • Action: Exploit the reported localized RF morale failures (241639Z) through targeted IO aimed at demoralizing surrounding enemy units and encouraging defection.
   • Rationale: Active counter-IO is essential to mitigate the risk of political paralysis and ensure international support for aggressive defensive action against the ballistic threat.