Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241505Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241450Z NOV 25 – 241505Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (CRISIS CULMINATION) / ZAPORIZHZHIA (FIXATION) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational environment is characterized by the convergence of critical kinetic threats on the primary axis (Pokrovsk) and increasing kinetic fixation on the Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia), synchronized with a persistent, high-level diplomatic deception campaign. The immediate priority remains securing the movement and integrity of Plan 7-B MOD ahead of the confirmed NLT 240000Z ballistic strike.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): Pressure remains focused on interdicting relief forces moving toward Rodynske via the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (ESCALATION): Confirmed Russian Federation (RF) glide bomb (KAB) launches targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast (241451Z, 241453Z) underscore the continuing effort to fix UAF Southern reserves and further degrade local infrastructure/logistics nodes. This reinforces the previous assessment that the RF is maneuvering west of Stepnohirsk to prevent relief force deployment.
• Sumy Axis (STATUS QUO): Infrastructure strike (241443Z) continues to draw attention, but no new strikes reported in this period.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain generally favorable for RF strike operations (UAV, FPV, KAB). The messaging regarding widespread mine contamination (241457Z) serves as a constant constraint on UAF maneuver speed and post-attack infrastructure repair/access.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The highest priority control measure remains the timely and secure transit of Plan 7-B MOD. UAF command must maintain operational rigidity by conserving Strategic Air Defense (AD) assets.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: The RF is demonstrating high integration of kinetic fixation (Zaporizhzhia KAB), culmination effort (Pokrovsk ground maneuver), AD deception (Sumy), and strategic Information Warfare (IO). INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-6 hours):

1. Isolate and Interdict: Intensify kinetic targeting (KAB, artillery) along the suspected Plan 7-B MOD movement corridor, potentially leveraging Spetsnaz forward observation units that are "anticipating" success (241452Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Cognitive Reinforcement: Utilize high-level RF official endorsements of the US "peace plan" (241452Z) to sow maximum diplomatic confusion and leverage the perceived ambiguity between Washington, Kyiv, and Brussels regarding the 19-point framework. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed KAB launches on Zaporizhzhia immediately following the previous SITREP timeline confirms the transition from static fixation to active, destructive fixation on the Southern axis, consuming further UAF resources.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF units show high morale and anticipation of imminent success (241452Z), suggesting that immediate logistics are secured for the current operational tempo, particularly the planned NLT 240000Z ballistic strike.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the synchronization of three distinct operational vectors (Pokrovsk, Sumy, Diplomatic IO). The emotional tone of RF channels ("Визжат. Предвкушают.") suggests clear communication of objectives and high expectation among frontline forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF must execute a difficult holding action on the Pokrovsk axis while simultaneously defending C2 centers and enabling the reserve maneuver. READINESS: Tactical readiness remains high, but strategic reserves (7-B MOD) are at maximum risk during transit.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS (DIPLOMATIC/IO): Successfully modifying the RF-favored 28-point peace plan to the UAF-acceptable 19-point framework provides international leverage. SETBACK (KINETIC RISK): The continued, synchronized multi-axis threat compounds the operational difficulty of safely moving Plan 7-B MOD.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: CRITICAL GAP 1 remains paramount: Urgent, real-time status check on Plan 7-B MOD. CONSTRAINT: The heightened risk of KAB strikes in Zaporizhzhia further constrains UAF ability to maneuver supporting fire assets or reposition logistics from the south.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF is actively exploiting the diplomatic ambiguity created by the 19-point plan. By having high-ranking officials endorse the plan (241452Z), Moscow aims to convince Western partners that Kyiv is the intransigent party, generating friction ahead of the critical ballistic strike window.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is volatile, balanced between perceived diplomatic success and confirmed infrastructure damage (Sumy) and persistent kinetic threats (Zaporizhzhia KABs). RF social media anticipation suggests Moscow believes the combination of IO and kinetic pressure is effectively reducing UAF resolve.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The reported phone call between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping (241456Z) introduces a potentially destabilizing factor. If the US and China move toward a coordinated diplomatic effort coinciding with the RF kinetic culmination, it risks creating external pressure on Kyiv to freeze military operations, which would immediately favor the RF operational aims on the Pokrovsk axis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Target Acquisition and Interdiction (0-3 hours): RF ISR (UAV/Spetsnaz) will attempt to capitalize on the high morale/anticipation (241452Z) by confirming the precise location of Plan 7-B MOD. Kinetic saturation fire (KAB/Artillery) will commence NLT 241700Z along the movement corridor.
2. Preparation for Ballistic Strike (3-6 hours): Low-cost, expendable assets (Shahed/Geran) will continue probing Northern and Central infrastructure (Kharkiv, Poltava) to force the firing of UAF SHORAD, guaranteeing AD depletion ahead of the NLT 240000Z ballistic wave.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) Successful RF interdiction of Plan 7-B MOD coupled with the political paralysis induced by diplomatic pressure (Trump/Xi/RF endorsement) delays tactical response authorization. The NLT 240000Z ballistic strike achieves catastrophic C2 node destruction (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia), forcing UAF units at Rodynske to conduct a disorganized fighting retreat, leading to the collapse of the forward Pokrovsk defense.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - FORCE PROTECTION)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): HARDENING 7-B MOD TRANSIT.

   • Action: Immediate re-tasking of tactical ground-based jamming systems (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to provide route protection along the Plan 7-B MOD corridor, specifically targeting Russian Orlan/Supercam ISR drones attempting to cue KAB strikes.
   • Action: Disperse all high-value logistics and C2 vehicles within the convoy into reinforced, non-contiguous cells. If interdicted, the protocol is immediate dispersion into tree lines/built-up areas rather than attempting to fight through.
   • Rationale: Active EW protection is the best immediate countermeasure to KAB cueing.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-FIRE / AIR FORCE): C2 HARDENING AGAINST BALLISTIC STRIKE.

   • Action: Implement redundant, hardened, subterranean C2 alternates immediately within the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia sectors. Assume the primary C2 node will be destroyed NLT 240000Z. Ensure communications switching and backup power protocols are confirmed.
   • Action: Maintain the rigid policy of conserving high-value interceptors. MANPADS should be placed on alert to deal with any low-flying bomber platforms attempting to deploy cruise missiles after the initial ballistic wave.
   • Rationale: The MDCOA risk of C2 collapse is too high; redundancy is mandatory.

3. OPERATIONAL C2 (J2/STRATCOM): NEUTRALIZE DIPLOMATIC COGNITIVE PARALYSIS.

   • Action: Issue a robust, coordinated, and highly visible statement (backed by European allies) confirming the modification of the peace plan was required because the original RF terms were non-starters. Preemptively denounce the RF endorsement of the US plan as a cynical attempt to use diplomacy to cover imminent kinetic escalation.
   • Rationale: Defuse the cognitive threat stemming from the RF/Trump narrative before the ballistic strike lands, minimizing hesitation among NCA and international partners.