Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241450Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241420Z NOV 25 – 241449Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (CRISIS CULMINATION) / SUMY (AD DECEPTION) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational environment remains critical, characterized by the synchronization of intense kinetic suppression on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk) and confirmed deep-rear infrastructure targeting (Sumy). This dual-axis pressure confirms the Russian Federation (RF) strategy to fragment Ukrainian Air Defense (AD) resources ahead of the anticipated strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z. Diplomatic efforts by RF to create cognitive paralysis via the "peace plan" narrative have been successfully countered by Ukrainian Command Authority (NCA), but the kinetic risk to the strategic reserve (Plan 7-B MOD) remains acute.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk/Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): High kinetic suppression continues, primarily via KAB and FPV saturation fire, aimed at preventing the relief force (Plan 7-B MOD) from reinforcing vulnerable positions near Rodynske.
• Sumy Axis (HIGH ATTENTION): Confirmed successful RF drone strike resulted in a significant power outage in Sumy City (241443Z). Further UAVs are tracked moving south (241432Z), confirming ongoing RF reconnaissance and strike preparation in the North/Center.
• Zaporizhzhia Front: RF "Vostok" Group of Forces claims continued pressure near Hulyaipole (241441Z), maintaining the fixation effort required to prevent UAF reserves from being deployed to Pokrovsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous period. Conditions favorable for continued RF UAV, FPV, and KAB operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

Strategic AD assets are postured for the NLT 240000Z ballistic defense. UAF Command Authority (C2) has achieved strategic clarity by rejecting the unfavorable 28-point peace plan proposal and confirming alignment with a modified 19-point framework.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: Demonstrated ability to execute synchronized, multi-domain operations (Pokrovsk kinetic culmination, Sumy infrastructure strikes, adaptive diplomatic IO). RF units, such as the 5th SGM Brigade, show effective combined arms use of FPV assets. INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-6 hours):

1. Force AD Fragmentation: Continue low-cost drone/KAB strikes on secondary infrastructure (Sumy) to divert SHORAD assets away from the primary defense of C2 hubs and the Plan 7-B MOD movement corridor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Maintain Diplomatic Ambiguity: RF will use official statements (e.g., Ushakov) to signal flexibility toward the US (Trump) plan while definitively rejecting European/Ukrainian modifications, ensuring the IO narrative continues to sow confusion and project RF moderation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed successful kinetic strike on civilian infrastructure in Sumy is the tactical adaptation required to execute the AD distraction component of the MLCOA.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment of conventional munitions remains robust. Evidence of high-level corruption within the RF defense-industrial base (RKK Energia conviction) points to potential long-term issues in advanced systems but does not restrict current theater operations.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, evidenced by the coordinated deployment of kinetic and information assets. The swift rejection of the modified peace plan by RF officials following UAF diplomatic success (241431Z) indicates an adaptive and centrally controlled IO structure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: High AD readiness is maintained, though stressed by dispersed threats. The political and diplomatic posture is stabilized following the rejection of RF influence in the peace talks. READINESS: Tactical readiness remains high, confirmed by successful counter-battery actions (46th Air Assault Brigade, 241438Z). Focus must now shift entirely to kinetic force preservation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS (STRATEGIC/IO): Successful rejection of the RF-favored 28-point peace plan, stabilizing the cognitive domain and affirming UAF red lines. SETBACK (TACTICAL/INFRASTRUCTURE): Confirmed power outage in Sumy due to RF drone strike validates the threat of AD diversion.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Immediate confirmation of the location, speed, and integrity of Plan 7-B MOD (CRITICAL GAP 1). CONSTRAINT: The geographical dispersal of kinetic threats (Pokrovsk, Sumy) severely limits the flexibility to redeploy high-value, limited mobile AD assets (Patriot, SAMP-T).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF propagandists are pivoting to discredit the diplomatic success, alleging US corruption and lack of seriousness regarding the modified 19-point plan. The exposure of RF railway sabotage in Poland (241439Z) confirms the continuation of hybrid warfare against UAF supply lines.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

National morale should be boosted by the perceived political success in the peace negotiations. However, local panic and pressure on infrastructure response teams will be generated by the Sumy power outage.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed arrest of RF-linked saboteurs in Poland underscores the need for NATO allies to strengthen security protocols for military and logistics transfers to Ukraine. UAF diplomatic firmness provides momentum for sustained international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Active Hunting of 7-B MOD: RF ISR will dedicate concentrated resources (UAV, Spetsnaz ground observation) to interdict the strategic reserve movement corridor, followed by heavy KAB/Artillery fire NLT 241800Z.
2. Infrastructure Continuation: RF will launch a secondary, non-critical preparatory strike wave (drones/unguided rockets) against central/northern infrastructure (e.g., Kharkiv, Poltava rail nodes) between 241800Z and 242000Z to further assess and degrade UAF AD capabilities before the main ballistic assault.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forward observation successfully locates and interdicts Plan 7-B MOD, inflicting critical attrition before deployment. Simultaneously, the Northern infrastructure strikes successfully deplete or misdirect sufficient AD interceptors, enabling the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike to achieve catastrophic C2 degradation in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia operational centers, leading to an uncontrolled operational retreat on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - FORCE PROTECTION)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): LOW VISIBILITY MOVEMENT.

   • Action: Immediately enforce the Minimum Emissions Protocol (MEP) for Plan 7-B MOD. All communications along the corridor must be pre-planned or relayed via low-power burst transmission or fiber/satellite link, minimizing RF SIGINT/ELINT target acquisition.
   • Action: Allocate all available FPV assets (even non-integrated units) ahead of the 7-B MOD column to conduct aggressive reconnaissance and suppression of suspected RF forward observers (Spetsnaz, FPV control stations) 1-3 km forward.
   • Rationale: Speed and radio silence are the primary defenses against KAB-based interdiction.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-FIRE / AIR FORCE): COUNTER-DISTRACTION RIGIDITY.

   • Action: Issue a flash order to all AD units reiterating the Sumy/Northern strikes are confirmed RF deception. UAF must accept temporary, localized infrastructure damage to conserve 100% of Patriot/SAMP-T interceptors for the strategic ballistic threat.
   • Action: Mobilize regional Territorial Defense and Civil Defense forces with MANPADS and legacy SHORAD to manage the localized threat in Sumy and protect repair crews, preventing the kinetic situation from becoming a C2 crisis.
   • Rationale: The threat to strategic command structure outweighs the threat to regional energy assets.

3. OPERATIONAL C2 (J2/STRATCOM): DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-OFFENSIVE.

   • Action: Capitalize on the Polish sabotage arrests (241439Z) and the Kakhovka attribution (241423Z) to issue a coordinated international statement condemning RF's simultaneous use of kinetic escalation and hybrid warfare during alleged "peace talks."
   • Rationale: Increase political pressure on Western governments to streamline military aid delivery and logistics security.