Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241420Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241349Z NOV 25 – 241419Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (KINETIC CULMINATION) / SUMY (NEW INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETING) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL RISK: SEVERE)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational focus remains on force preservation during the transit of Plan 7-B MOD into the Donetsk axis kinetic environment. New intelligence confirms a simultaneous, synchronized escalation by the Russian Federation (RF) targeting critical infrastructure in the deep rear, exemplified by a successful drone strike on civilian infrastructure in Sumy Oblast, causing immediate power outages (241419Z). This geographical expansion of kinetic activity suggests RF is trying to overload UAF Air Defense (AD) prior to the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike. The diplomatic threat has been neutralized, confirming full command autonomy for kinetic response.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk/Pokrovsk Axis: Continues under extreme kinetic suppression (KAB confirmed in previous period). The status of the Plan 7-B MOD reserve movement remains the critical operational variable (CRITICAL GAP 1). RF PSYOPS (leaflet drops near Dimitrov/Pokrovsk, 241404Z) support the expectation of imminent ground assault in this sector.
• Sumy Axis (New Development): Confirmed enemy strikes via KAB and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) targeting civilian infrastructure, leading to power grid instability.
  • JUDGMENT: This is assessed as a deliberate, synchronized action to distract UAF C2 and AD resources, forcing a fragmentation of response that benefits the RF main operational effort (Pokrovsk culmination / Ballistic Strike preparation). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Conditions favorable for continued RF UAV, FPV, and KAB operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Force is tracking low-altitude UAVs moving across Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (241352Z, 241359Z), indicating continued RF reconnaissance/strike preparatory activity ahead of the ballistic launch. The status of Plan 7-B MOD remains unconfirmed.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: Demonstrated capacity to conduct synchronized kinetic strikes across disparate axes (Donetsk KAB saturation and Sumy infrastructure drone attacks) while maintaining intense information warfare. RF military industry claims (Chemezov/TASS, 241400Z) reinforce the material attrition narrative. INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-6 hours):

1. Overload AD: Utilize disposable drone assets (Shahed/Geran) and KABs against infrastructure targets (Sumy) and logistics nodes (Pokrovsk GLOCs) to drain or confuse UAF AD resources ahead of the strategic ballistic strike NLT 240000Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Psychological Decay (Tactical): Use PSYOPS (leaflet drops) and targeted propaganda to induce local surrender or lower tactical morale in the Donetsk crisis area.
3. Hulyaipole Shaping: Utilize aggressive UAV reconnaissance and suppression (Vostok Group, 127th Div, 241356Z) to prepare ground assault groups on the Zaporizhzhia front, reinforcing the fixation effort previously observed at Zatishye.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Geographic Expansion of Infrastructure Targeting: Targeting Sumy indicates a return to multi-regional pressure on critical infrastructure, likely aimed at preempting reinforcement movements or logistics planning in the North.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are highly optimized for mass production and delivery of conventional munitions, as publicly reiterated by Chemezov (241400Z). Humanitarian aid convoys are noted supporting RF medical units (241402Z), indicating standard front-line sustainment continuity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the simultaneous kinetic action (Sumy/Pokrovsk) synchronized with IO (PSYOPS leaflets, anti-Ukrainian diplomatic spin). Kremlin maintains diplomatic ambiguity regarding the Geneva talks (Peskov, 241401Z) to preserve freedom of action. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: High AD readiness confirmed by Air Force monitoring and reporting of UAV/KAB threats. Forward units are utilizing effective small-scale tactics (e.g., FPV counter-attacks reported by Presidential Brigade, 241202Z). READINESS: UAF C2 has demonstrated strong resilience to the RF Information Operation, confirming the rejection and amendment of the proposed "28-point peace plan" (Bevz, 241408Z). This solidifies command clarity.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS (Strategic/IO): Ukraine successfully negotiated critical modifications to the proposed peace plan, reducing RF influence and stabilizing diplomatic expectations. This directly counteracts the RF goal of strategic paralysis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) SETBACK (Tactical/Kinetic): Confirmed successful strike on civilian infrastructure in Sumy, leading to service disruption. This increases the operational burden on regional response teams and AD units.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

REQUIREMENT: Urgent need to confirm the location and current attrition rate of Plan 7-B MOD. CONSTRAINT: The new threat in Sumy and continued high-volume KAB strikes restrict the ability to move high-value mobile AD assets (e.g., Gepard) to fully cover the reserve movement without exposing the C2 centers to the imminent ballistic threat.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Counter-Narrative: Following the collapse of the 28-point peace plan narrative, RF channels have pivoted aggressively to undermine Ukrainian negotiators, alleging corruption (Tucker Carlson/Yermak narrative, 241346Z) and portraying the West as anti-Russian and criminal ("World Mafia" claim by Zakharova, 241405Z).
• UAF Stabilization: UAF StratCom effectively used official statements to confirm the elimination of the flawed 28-point plan, replacing it with a modified 19-point framework (241418Z). This move successfully detoxifies the domestic information space and clarifies the path for continued kinetic operations.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale should stabilize following the clear diplomatic rejection of the RF-favored peace terms. However, the successful strike and power outages in Sumy risk generating localized panic if not immediately mitigated by effective disaster response.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmation by the UAF of the structural modifications to the peace proposal (now 19 points) ensures international allies know Ukraine has successfully defended its red lines (previously announced by Stefanuk). This confirms strong internal coordination and provides political momentum for continued military resistance.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Continued AD Harassment and Fixation: RF will sustain drone and KAB attacks on secondary infrastructure targets (Sumy, Kharkiv, potentially rail junctions in Poltava/Kirovohrad) to force the premature deployment or fragmentation of UAF AD resources needed for the NLT 240000Z ballistic defense.
2. Attrition on Reserves: RF ISR elements (UAV/FPV) will attempt to locate and vector KAB/artillery fire onto the Plan 7-B MOD movement corridor before it can establish defensive positions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forward observation successfully identifies the trajectory of Plan 7-B MOD. Simultaneous heavy KAB fire and concentrated ATGM/FPV attacks destroy the main body of the 7-B MOD convoy during transit (NLT 241800Z), turning the strategic reserve into a catastrophic loss. This kinetic success, combined with the successful NLT 240000Z ballistic strike on C2 hubs (which failed to conserve interceptors due to distraction by Sumy/Northern strikes), leads to the uncontrolled retreat of forward Pokrovsk elements.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - FORCE PROTECTION)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The key tasks are immediate force preservation of the strategic reserve and rigid adherence to the strategic AD conservation plan.

1. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): HIGH-SPEED DISPERSAL.

   • Action: If Plan 7-B MOD status is confirmed active (CRITICAL-1), order the convoy commander to immediately switch to tertiary movement corridors and maintain high speed. Minimize communication emissions to avoid RF triangulation for KAB strikes.
   • Action: If tactical drones (FPV) are available for the 7-B MOD column, instruct them to move 1-3 km ahead of the main body specifically to target suspected RF forward observation (Spetsnaz, FPV control stations) rather than engaging general combatants.
   • Rationale: Low-emissions, high-speed dispersal on unconventional routes is the only viable protection against current RF air superiority.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J-FIRE / AIR FORCE): COUNTER-DISTRACTION PROTOCOL.

   • Action: Issue a new flash order detailing the Sumy/Northern strikes as calculated RF deception. Reiterate that high-value AD interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) must be conserved solely for the strategic ballistic threat NLT 240000Z, even at the cost of temporary localized infrastructure damage.
   • Action: Deploy regional Territorial Defense force elements to provide SHORAD coverage for the affected infrastructure in Sumy (if possible, using MANPADS or legacy systems) to manage local political consequences without expending strategic interceptors.
   • Rationale: The threat to strategic C2 (ballistic strike) outweighs the threat to regional civilian infrastructure (drone strike).

3. OPERATIONAL C2 (J2/J3): STABILITY IN THE SOUTH.

   • Action: Hold the line on not diverting 7-B MOD to the Zaporizhzhia axis. Continue to assign Southern Command (SC) reserves or specialized counter-drone units (as seen near Hulyaipole) to fix and contain the threat posed by the 114th GMRR and 127th Division.
   • Rationale: Maintaining focus on the Pokrovsk COG is essential to prevent operational collapse.

//END SITREP//