Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241250Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241220Z NOV 25 – 241250Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (CRITICAL CULMINATION) / DNIPROPETROVSK (DEEP STRIKE RESPONSE) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-5 (OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS: IMMINENT)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy (RF) has achieved maximum synchronization between kinetic deep-strike preemption and the Information Operation (IO) designed to induce National Command Authority (NCA) paralysis. RF diplomatic activity with Turkey is actively amplifying the "peace talks" narrative precisely during the T-0515 GLOC crisis. UAF deep strikes continue (Moscow, Pavlohrad), but the RF is adapting by forming regional Air Defense (PVO) reserves. The Plan 7-B MOD launch decision point (241330Z) is now 40 minutes away. Failure to execute force protection on the T-0515 GLOC immediately risks operational collapse.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): Status Unchanged. RF elements are confirmed operating within the urban periphery, directly threatening the T-0515 GLOC.
• Zaporizhzhia Front (Secondary Pressure): RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) claim of "liberation of Novoye Zaporozhye" (12:31Z) indicates confirmed Vostok Grouping momentum and successful maneuver against UAF defensive positions, placing continued pressure on the Huliaipole/Stepnohirsk axis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - RF claim, but aligns with previous reporting of flanking maneuver).
• Deep Rear: Confirmed RF drone attack on Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) resulted in three civilian casualties (12:39Z). Pavlohrad is a key rail and logistical hub, confirming RF intent to disrupt rear area coordination ahead of the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, favoring RF ISR/FPV operations near Pokrovsk and UAF deep UAV strikes (Moscow confirmed 12:34Z).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The recommended action to commit EW/Security assets to the T-0515 corridor by 241230Z was not confirmed. The security window is closing. All operational assets must now prioritize the immediate activation and protective shield of the 7-B MOD movement, regardless of initial interdiction risk.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF Vostok Grouping confirms momentum on the Southern Axis (Novoye Zaporozhye). RF forces maintain the ability to execute simultaneous conventional advances, persistent deep strikes (Pavlohrad), and effective high-level diplomatic deception (Putin-Erdoğan). INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-1 hour):

1. Block/Disrupt T-0515: Intensify all forms of harassing fire (FPV, snipers, light mortars) along the T-0515, seeking to create a decisive kinetic incident targeting high-value vehicles (EW/C2) of the 7-B MOD convoy.
2. Psychological Warfare: Maintain maximum diplomatic pressure via Russian/Turkish media synchronization, leveraging the offer of the Istanbul platform to reinforce the narrative of Kyiv's strategic indecision. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Counter-AD: RF MoD is openly discussing the formation of regional PVO reserve forces (12:24Z).
  • JUDGMENT: This is a proactive strategic adaptation aimed at mitigating the long-term effectiveness of UAF deep UAV strikes (Moscow, Syzran) by shifting homeland AD responsibility to decentralized reserve units, thereby freeing up critical high-value strategic AD assets (S-400, S-300V4) for force protection on the frontline and covering the NLT 240000Z ballistic launch window. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Deep UAF strikes (Pavlohrad, Moscow) continue to impose strain. However, RF Vostok Grouping's sustained offensive momentum suggests sufficient localized logistics support for current operations.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly adaptive and synchronized. The immediate kinetic response to the Pokrovsk pressure (GLOC interdiction) is flawlessly covered by the diplomatic IO campaign.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: The operational posture remains highly vulnerable due to the confirmed proximity of RF forces to the critical GLOC and the ongoing domestic diplomatic uncertainty. READINESS: Tactical units (e.g., 77th OAeMBr) demonstrate effective local counter-assault capability via FPV. However, the loss of an SAU in Dnipropetrovsk to RF FPV (12:40Z) signals the lethality of RF counter-battery efforts in the operational rear.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Confirmed kinetic success against RF forward assault elements (77th OAeMBr video). Continued deep pressure on Moscow's infrastructure. SETBACKS (CRITICAL): Confirmed enemy success in targeting UAF high-value rear assets (SAU destroyed in Dnipropetrovsk) and critical infrastructure (Pavlohrad strike, 3 casualties). The failure to execute the T-0515 route clearance by 241230Z has increased risk to the 7-B MOD movement.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT: The NCA must immediately overcome IO-induced strategic paralysis and commit to the Plan 7-B MOD launch at 241330Z. REQUIREMENT: Unconditional launch of the EW/QRF vanguard now, maximizing electronic suppression to mitigate the kinetic risk.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO strategy has pivoted from broad confusion to specific, high-level diplomatic pressure.

• Diplomatic Pressure: The Putin-Erdoğan phone call (12:23Z-12:29Z), amplified by state media, specifically mentions discussing "American proposals" and the Turkish offer to host talks. This validates the previous "Geneva Framework" IO and seeks to create institutional doubt at the highest levels of Ukrainian command concerning the necessity of continued military action (Plan 7-B MOD).
• Internal Focus: RF sources amplify negative internal events (Odesa TCC violence, domestic corruption) to suggest widespread instability in Ukraine.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The synchronization of confirmed frontline losses (Pokrovsk suburbs) with major diplomatic rumors (Turkey talks) creates maximum friction. Immediate, decisive military action (launching 7-B MOD) coupled with a firm StratCom denial is necessary to stabilize morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The primary diplomatic risk is external partners perceiving a viable negotiation window, potentially delaying or reducing required resupply/fire support necessary for the 7-B MOD maneuver. The NCA must preempt this perception.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 40 Minutes (241250Z - 241330Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Maximum GLOC Friction: RF forces will utilize confirmed positions in Pokrovsk suburbs to establish direct-fire zones, focusing primarily on disabling the first 1-2 tactical vehicles of the Plan 7-B MOD column to create a catastrophic block and C2 failure.
2. IO Sustainment: RF/Turkish media will release further details (likely vague) concerning the peace initiatives NLT 241330Z to coincide exactly with the UAF operational decision point, aiming to compel an abort of the maneuver.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully interdicts the Plan 7-B MOD convoy, eliminating the primary reserve. Simultaneously, the NCA, facing perceived diplomatic progress and imminent ballistic strikes (NLT 240000Z), issues a hold order, resulting in the operational reserve being pinned down and eventually neutralized. This allows RF Vostok Grouping to consolidate gains south of Huliaipole and link up with Pokrovsk thrusts, triggering a multi-axis operational collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - ESCALATED)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical and cognitive situation demands immediate, high-risk execution. The priority is to shield the 7-B MOD movement from both kinetic attack and command paralysis.

1. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): HARDEN THE VANGUARD NOW.

   • Action: Immediately commit the EW/QRF elements, regardless of previous delay, and augment the vanguard with two Mine Clearance Line Charges (MCLC) or similar heavy breaching systems.
   • Action: Designate a Secondary, Redundant GLOC running parallel (if available, e.g., dirt roads/tracks) to T-0515. Plan 7-B MOD must split into two smaller, high-speed columns (A/B) to bypass any confirmed road block (destroyed EW vehicle or heavy interdiction).
   • Rationale: Assume the enemy has successfully mined or blocked the T-0515 GLOC. Redundancy and breaching capability are necessary for movement continuity.

2. STRATCOM / C2 (NCA LNO): COUNTER-IO FIREPOWER.

   • Action: The NCA (President/Top General Staff) must issue a statement NLT 241315Z confirming the military action (Plan 7-B MOD) is underway. This statement must explicitly frame the Turkish/Diplomatic talks as an "Enemy Deception Maneuver" intended to cover ongoing RF war crimes (citing Pavlohrad and Moscow strikes).
   • Rationale: The only counter to catastrophic IO is immediate, transparent, and confidence-inspiring military commitment.

3. FIRE SUPPORT (J-FIRE): ADAPT TO RF COUNTER-BATTERY THREAT.

   • Action: Initiate a Pre-Planned Scatter/Re-Deploy Cycle (SPDR) for all UAF deep fires assets (HIMARS, SAU) operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast NLT 241300Z, following the confirmed RF FPV counter-battery success (12:40Z).
   • Rationale: Protect remaining fire support assets from RF precision FPV attacks, preserving the ability to counter the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike follow-on offensive.

//END SITREP//