Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 241130Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 241049Z NOV 25 – 241130Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (CULMINATION PHASE) / HULIAIPOLE (CRITICAL STABILIZATION) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-4 (OPERATIONAL DECISIVENESS: IMMEDIATE)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy (RF) has achieved kinetic confirmation of operational objectives on both primary axes. The immediate threat to the T-0515 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) near Pokrovsk has escalated from theoretical interdiction to active engagement in the urban periphery. Simultaneously, the RF Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed the loss of Zatyshshya, placing Huliaipole in immediate jeopardy. The enemy has finalized the cognitive domain attack by officially denying receipt of any peace plan, confirming that the diplomatic narrative was purely a mechanism to induce UAF C2 paralysis preceding the kinetic strike window (NLT 240000Z).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF TASS/MoD (10:57Z) released video evidence of combat operations for the "liberation" of Shakhtarsky and Hornyak micro-districts.
  • JUDGMENT: This confirms RF maneuver units (likely Tsentr Grouping) have penetrated the outer urban defenses of Pokrovsk (historically referred to by RF as Krasnoarmiisk). This places RF elements within direct-fire range of the T-0515 GLOC, drastically increasing the vulnerability of the planned Plan 7-B MOD transit route. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (BREAKTHROUGH CONFIRMED): Official RF MoD confirmation (11:07Z) of the liberation of Zatishye (Zatyshshya) by Vostok Group of Forces. RF sources claim DRGs are already operating in Huliaipole (10:50Z), likely an exaggeration, but confirming forward pressure.
  • JUDGMENT: The UAF must be presumed to have executed a tactical withdrawal to the immediate northern or northwestern defensive lines of Huliaipole. The window for stabilization fires is closing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kupyansk Axis (SHAPING): RF 1st Tank Army UAVs successfully destroyed a UAF C2, ammunition depot, and PVD (11:09Z). This indicates sustained, effective RF deep fires, aiming to fix UAF northern reserves.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, favoring RF ISR and precision strike capabilities across all domains.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The critical control measure, Plan 7-B MOD launch, is now threatened by confirmed active engagement on its transit GLOC. Immediate tactical measures are required to clear the T-0515 path. UAF reserves in the South are now fully committed to the Huliaipole defense perimeter.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: Demonstrated ability to transition seamlessly from successful diplomatic manipulation to immediate kinetic execution. High proficiency in UAV/deep targeting on critical UAF rear assets (Kupyansk 11:09Z, Huliaipole 11:00Z). INTENTION (IMMEDIATE, 0-4 hours):

1. GLOC Severance (Pokrovsk): Utilize light infantry and precision strikes (FPV/artillery) confirmed in Shakhtarsky/Hornyak to generate continuous interdiction and chaos on the T-0515, forcing Plan 7-B MOD deployment delay or failure.
2. Exploitation (Huliaipole): Maintain pressure on Huliaipole defenses, leveraging the suppression of UAF counter-battery assets (11:00Z BDA) to prepare for a major mechanized push.
3. IO Consolidation: Officially reject diplomatic options (Peskov 11:11Z) while amplifying defeatist narratives (Korzhenko quote 11:12Z) to reinforce the strategic narrative that resistance is futile just before the NLT 240000Z strike.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The operational shift is the acceleration of the Pokrovsk urban phase. RF is not pausing to consolidate around Rodynske but pushing directly into the suburbs, forcing UAF to fight immediate decisive action. This compresses the timeline for Plan 7-B MOD launch.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain effective, supporting high-tempo operations and precision deep strikes across multiple axes (Vostok and Tsentr groupings).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 is highly integrated, with Presidential/MoD spokespersons executing synchronized messaging to maximize the psychological impact of kinetic gains.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Extreme duress. The security of the primary reserve deployment route (T-0515) is compromised. Forward units in Pokrovsk are engaged in urban defense, which will rapidly consume limited resources and attention. Tactical command must avoid paralysis caused by the overwhelming enemy synchronization. READINESS: Frontline units continue to suffer degradation from the concerted enemy IO campaign, although SBU action (10:51Z) and Presidential addresses (10:55Z) are attempting to establish a counter-narrative focusing on justice and international support.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Continued UAF StratCom efforts to maintain international focus on accountability (SBU war crimes, Crimea Platform address). SETBACKS (CRITICAL):

1. Confirmed Kinetic Degradation: Confirmed loss of Zatyshshya (11:07Z) and confirmed active enemy presence in Pokrovsk suburbs (10:57Z).
2. C2/Logistics Vulnerability: RF deep strikes successfully targeting UAF logistics and C2 in the Kupyansk area (11:09Z), demonstrating persistent ability to degrade operational rear assets.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint remains time (T-minus 2 hours until planned Plan 7-B MOD launch decision point). The primary requirement is sufficient EW and close protection assets to ensure the T-0515 corridor is traversable, as the enemy is now physically present.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has confirmed its core strategy:

1. Diplomatic Denial: Moscow (Peskov/TASS 11:02Z, 11:11Z) explicitly rejects the "Geneva Peace Framework." This confirms the diplomatic narrative was a deception maneuver to induce UAF hesitancy.
2. Operational Momentum: RF MoD uses video evidence (10:57Z Pokrovsk) and official statements (11:07Z Zatyshshya) to project irresistible forward momentum.
3. Morale Degradation: The highly effective tactic of broadcasting UAF commander quotes regarding the negative impact of peace talks on morale (11:12Z) continues to dominate the tactical IO space.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF morale is the primary target. The narrative of strategic denial (RF refuses peace) must be swiftly countered by a narrative of operational commitment (Plan 7-B MOD launch) to restore trust and focus.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Zelenskyy’s address to the Crimea Platform (10:55Z) reaffirms international commitment to the Crimean cause and continuity of support. However, the diplomatic IO confusion (conflicting Trump quotes 10:53Z, 10:57Z) has served the RF goal of distraction.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (241130Z - 241530Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Interdiction Saturation: RF will intensify fire on the T-0515 corridor using precision artillery, FPV, and potentially fast-attack vehicles from the Pokrovsk suburbs (Shakhtarsky/Hornyak) to fix Plan 7-B MOD.
2. Huliaipole Preparation: Continuous KAB and heavy artillery barrage targeting identified UAF C2/Artillery positions around Huliaipole (following the 11:00Z BDA success), aiming to dismantle the forward defense structure before a mechanized advance NLT 241800Z.
3. Cognitive Escalation: Final massive IO push reinforcing the necessity of surrender prior to the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The successful RF physical interdiction of the T-0515 corridor (CRITICAL 1 unmet) forces the operational command to delay Plan 7-B MOD launch past the safe transit window. This synchronization allows the RF Vostok Grouping to simultaneously break the Huliaipole defense line and pivot north, while RF deep fires successfully paralyze the J-FIRE coordination center in the Dnipropetrovsk sector prior to the NLT 240000Z strike, leading to the uncoordinated retreat of UAF forces from Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS - ADJUSTED)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate priority has shifted from preparing for reserve movement to physically guaranteeing the reserve movement under enemy fire. The cognitive fight must be won simultaneously to prevent paralysis.

1. STRATCOM / C2 (J7 / NCA LNO): DECEPTION IMMUNITY.

   • Action: Immediately transition the Head of State communication strategy from ambiguity to absolute certainty. Message must explicitly state: "The enemy has confirmed their deception by rejecting peace talks. We counter their lies with action. Plan 7-B MOD is moving now. The time for deliberation is over."
   • Rationale: The enemy has provided the necessary evidence (11:11Z denial) to inoculate frontline forces against the defeatist narrative. Utilize this window NLT 241145Z.

2. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): HIGH-RISK LAUNCH.

   • Action: Plan 7-B MOD Execution: PROCEED WITH ESCALATED FORCE PROTECTION. Do not wait for clearance status HIGH. Utilize heavy AD/EW assets (e.g., Gepard, high-power jammers) as the lead element of the column to suppress all drone and light fire threats along the T-0515 route.
   • Action: Allocate close air support (if available) or heavy suppressive fire (e.g., cluster munitions) to target the confirmed RF penetration areas (Shakhtarsky/Hornyak, Pokrovsk) to distract and suppress interdiction efforts during the 241330Z launch phase.

3. FIRE SUPPORT (J-FIRE): DEEP INTERDICTION TO SAVE HULIAIPOLE.

   • Action: Increase the volume and extend the depth of precision strikes S/SE of Zatyshshya. Target RF mobilization points and potential staging areas for follow-on mechanized forces.
   • Rationale: A temporary (6-hour) delay in the RF advance on Huliaipole is essential to prevent the operational requirement from pulling Plan 7-B MOD reserves south, thereby sacrificing Pokrovsk.

//END SITREP//