Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240930Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240845Z NOV 25 – 240930Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (MAIN EFFORT, CRITICAL) / ZAPORIZHZHIA (SHAPING) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-3 (OPERATIONAL DECISIVENESS: CRITICAL)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis has intensified on the Pokrovsk axis, moving from GLOC threat (Rodynske) to a direct threat against the immediate rear area (Krasnoarmiisk) and the strategic reserve (Plan 7-B MOD). Russian Federation (RF) information operations (IO) have achieved partial success in causing cognitive friction at the Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA) level regarding US-backed peace proposals. The synchronized threat of tactical encirclement and strategic ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) is currently peaking.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF forces (MoD, Tsentr Group) are actively promoting propaganda claiming the "encirclement" and "clearing out all exits" from Krasnoarmiisk (09:05Z, 09:08Z).
  • JUDGMENT: While claims of full encirclement are highly likely false (IO effort), this confirms RF maneuver elements are operating deep into the rear area, placing Plan 7-B MOD transit and logistics hubs under direct observation and interdiction threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Aviation Activity: UAF GS confirms RF aviation strikes across the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, including Slovyansk, Kostyantynivka, Hulyaypole, and Vozdvyzhivka (09:16Z). This action broadens the kinetic front, forcing UAF to disperse Air Defense (AD) attention from the Pokrovsk sector.
• Shaping Axes: UAF GS confirms clashes near Stepnohirsk (Orikhiv direction) and Zatyshshya (Huliaipole direction) (09:17Z), verifying RF success in fixing UAF reserves in the South.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Clear, cold conditions remain favorable for RF ISR and precision strike capabilities. Moscow weather reporting (08:57Z) is irrelevant to UAF operations but serves RF domestic news consumption.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF GS reports indicate defensive stability across most axes (Lyman, Kupyansk) but sustained heavy pressure on the Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk directions (09:17Z). The RF deployment of offensive IO against Krasnoarmiisk suggests they are currently massing forces to exploit the perceived vulnerability created by the delayed Plan 7-B MOD.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF C2 retains the capacity to execute highly synchronized multi-domain operations (IO, tactical penetration, strategic strike preparation). INTENTION:

1. Immediate (2-6 hours): Maximize psychological pressure on UAF forces in the Pokrovsk-Krasnoarmiisk area via coordinated propaganda (encirclement claims, surrender videos 09:13Z) to precipitate tactical collapse or the premature commitment of Plan 7-B MOD reserves.
2. Operational (6-12 hours): Ensure M-30 GLOC remains severed or interdicted, setting the conditions for the strategic objective: the massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) targeting decapitation.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF shift of the narrative focus from Rodynske (GLOC physical severance) to Krasnoarmiisk (Logistics hub psychological severance) (09:08Z) is a significant adaptation, confirming the targeting of UAF reserve deployment effectiveness.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF claims 93 UAF UAVs intercepted overnight (09:01Z). JUDGMENT: This high claimed interception rate, even if inflated, suggests RF AD is operating at high alert, likely protecting strategic assets or launch sites in preparation for the strategic strike window (NLT 240000Z). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in generating crisis and uncertainty. Evidence of RF internal domestic issues (corruption/extortion against soldiers' families, 09:01Z) persists but does not currently affect front-line C2 efficiency.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive resilience is maintained across the North and South, but the concentration of RF effort and IO at Pokrovsk threatens the defensive structure. READINESS: CRITICAL WARNING: NCA exposure to information pressure (Zelenskyy’s statement 08:55Z) suggests that RF IO has created a political environment hostile to high-risk kinetic decisions (i.e., immediate, high-EMCON movement of Plan 7-B MOD). This delay compounds operational risk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: UAF Unmanned Systems Forces continue to develop and promote technological readiness, boosting institutional morale (09:07Z). UAF counter-drone strikes reported in Belgorod Oblast (09:14Z). SETBACKS: The continued successful penetration of RF forces into the Krasnoarmiisk AO (as indicated by sustained IO focus) remains the primary tactical setback.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical constraint is time and the psychological resilience of command against coordinated diplomatic and kinetic pressure. Immediate, focused EW/C-UAS resources are required for the Krasnoarmiisk-Pokrovsk area.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF External IO (US Pressure): RF channels are amplifying threats that the US may halt military supplies if a peace agreement is not signed soon (08:51Z). This is a direct measure to exploit US political volatility (Trump 08:50Z) and increase the perceived cost of continued Ukrainian military action (Plan 7-B MOD). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Tactical IO (Surrender): Use of captured Ukrainian soldiers to urge surrender and confirm the "encirclement" of Pokrovsk (09:13Z). This is targeted PSYOPS aimed at undermining unit cohesion in the contested sector.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• President Zelenskyy acknowledges the "critical moment" and "political pressure" (08:55Z), inadvertently validating the effectiveness of the RF IO strategy.
• Reports of severe demographic contraction (30.5M remaining population, 08:52Z) contribute to long-term national anxiety but do not directly impact immediate tactical morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Marco Rubio (US) suggesting potential extension of the US-Ukraine framework agreement deadline (09:05Z) may temporarily reduce the perceived urgency of US diplomatic pressure, offering a small breathing space against the IO narrative.
• ISW assessment that RF officials reject any peace plan (09:12Z) provides crucial material for UAF counter-IO, confirming the RF's aggressive intentions regardless of negotiations.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The current intelligence confirms RF is executing the MLCOA from the previous report: GLOC interdiction is transitioning into full operational pressure on the rear area, coupled with information paralysis efforts.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (240930Z - 241330Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. IO Escalation: RF media (MoD, Colonelcassad) will intensify claims regarding the "fall" or "imminent surrender" of UAF units near Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk, seeking to force an operational reaction from UAF command (e.g., launching Plan 7-B MOD without full preparation or delaying it further).
2. Physical ISR/Attack: RF light forces (Spetsnaz/FPV teams) will attempt to physically interdict minor logistics routes and disrupt communications between Krasnoarmiisk and Pokrovsk, providing material evidence to support the IO encirclement narrative.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The successful synchronization of kinetic and cognitive effects: RF ground forces achieve physical deep penetration (west/south of Pokrovsk) and successfully acquire targets of opportunity (High-Value Targets/Plan 7-B MOD logistics trains). Simultaneously, the NCA, paralyzed by internal political and external diplomatic pressure (Washington Post threats), delays the full, decisive commitment of the Plan 7-B MOD reserve. This delay results in catastrophic loss of the reserve force and operational collapse on the Pokrovsk axis, immediately preceding the massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to break the synchronization of RF pressure by accelerating the kinetic response (Plan 7-B MOD movement) while simultaneously mitigating the cognitive attack (NCA paralysis).

1. STRATEGIC C2 (J3 / NCA LNO): IMMEDIATELY ISOLATE NCA DECISION-MAKING FROM IO NOISE.

   • Action: Operational Command must provide a unified, consolidated threat assessment (using this SITREP) to the NCA, explicitly defining the RF IO (Washington Post/Peace Plan) as a covering measure for the imminent ballistic strike and the Krasnoarmiisk penetration. Request immediate, unconditional authorization for Plan 7-B MOD launch under existing protocols.
   • Rationale: The political/diplomatic pressure is working to delay the reserve. C2 must prioritize operational survival over political optics.

2. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): CLEARANCE OF KRASNOARMIISK CORRIDOR.

   • Action: Commit dedicated aviation or heavy C-UAS/EW assets now to conduct aggressive surveillance and kinetic clearance of the area W/SW of Krasnoarmiisk (CRITICAL 1). This must precede the main body of Plan 7-B MOD by at least 60 minutes.
   • Rationale: Eliminates RF tactical ISR elements and ground probes supporting the "encirclement" narrative, ensuring the reserve can move past the most critical vulnerability point.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): DIRECT COUNTER-IO.

   • Action: Utilize the ISW finding (09:12Z) to immediately launch a high-volume counter-narrative: "RF rejection of all peace plans confirms US/Western pressure is RF deception designed to cover massed civilian strikes." Simultaneously amplify UAF readiness (UAS Force video, 09:07Z).
   • Rationale: Directly attacks the RF cognitive warfare objective, restoring public and command confidence in continued resistance ahead of the ballistic strike window.

//END SITREP//