Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240845Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240830Z NOV 25 – 240845Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (MAIN EFFORT) / ZAPORIZHZHIA (SHAPING EFFORT) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-3 (OPERATIONAL DECISIVENESS: CRITICAL)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis persists following the expiration of the 240830Z critical window for Plan 7-B MOD launch. RF forces maintain kinetic initiative, combining aggressive ground pressure near Rodynske (supported by confirmed drone superiority) with persistent deep strikes targeting the energy grid (Pavlohrad/Chernihiv). The key threat is the imminent synchronization of GLOC severance at Pokrovsk with the anticipated massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (Main Effort): RF forces are confirmed active near Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk rear area) and Suvorovo/Zatyushok (08:35Z). JUDGMENT: This targeting aims to destabilize potential UAF reserve assembly areas or M-30 bypass routes, validating the critical threat to the Plan 7-B MOD transit corridor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Shaping Effort): RF claims of capturing Zatishye are being reinforced by Russian milbloggers (08:40Z). UAF counter-action remains localized, including FPV drone strikes resulting in RF personnel casualties (08:29Z) and power disruptions on the occupied side (08:24Z).
• Deep Rear Strikes: New confirmed drone activity targeting the energy grid in Pavlohrad (08:20Z) and near Chernihiv (08:23Z). This confirms RF intent to maximize C2 and civilian infrastructure strain prior to the NLT 240000Z ballistic window.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist on the frontline, highly favorable for RF ISR and FPV drone operations, confirmed by the systematic strike capability documented by the RF "Rubicon" unit (08:20Z).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Force confirms continued need to track multiple drone incursions across different axes (Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv). RF operational disposition suggests reliance on decentralized FPV units (Rubicon) to gain tactical momentum against prepared UAF defenses.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF has high confidence in tactical air/ISR superiority (FPV/Thermal Drones) allowing precise, low-signature strikes against moving targets and small C2 nodes. INTENTION:

1. Immediate: Exploit the failure/delay of Plan 7-B MOD launch (post-240830Z) by maximizing pressure on the Pokrovsk M-30 GLOC and rear assembly areas (Krasnoarmiisk).
2. Covering Action: Synchronize internal security narratives (FSB thwarting sabotage) with external diplomatic narratives (Eurotroika rejection) to justify and provide cover for the impending massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF appears to be using milblogger channels (Colonelcassad 08:40Z) to immediately and persistently validate operational claims (Zatishye capture) to fix UAF resources and complicate tactical verification.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF dependence on decentralized (milblogger/volunteer) logistics streams is confirmed to continue (no new data, previous assessment remains valid). Internal security issues relating to fraud against military families (08:46Z) present a low-level, exploitable strain on domestic RF support.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing IO campaigns with kinetic strikes, particularly the use of FSB security narratives across multiple regions (Altai, Leningrad) immediately preceding the anticipated strategic strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF posture remains defensive and reactive to multi-domain pressure. The inability to confirm Plan 7-B MOD launch (due 240830Z) suggests either total EMCON execution (PREFERRED) or a critical delay (DANGEROUS). READINESS: UAF units must maintain high vigilance against FPV drone attacks on personnel during any movements (validated by Zaporizhzhia strike 08:29Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Confirmed successful UAF strikes disrupting power infrastructure in RF-occupied Zaporizhzhia (08:24Z). SETBACKS: Confirmed personnel casualties from RF FPV drone strike in Zaporizhzhia (08:29Z). Continued RF ability to prosecute deep strikes against energy targets (Pavlohrad/Chernihiv).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate, critical constraint is the lack of confirmed dedicated EW/SHORAD assets screening the Plan 7-B MOD movement corridor, which is now actively targeted (Krasnoarmiisk AO).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF External IO: TASS reports rejection of the "Eurotroika" peace plan (08:20Z), shifting the diplomatic narrative from RF-proposed peace (Geneva) to Western disunity, thereby justifying continued maximalist demands (ISW assessment 08:30Z).
• RF Internal IO: High volume of reports on FSB thwarting "Ukrainian sabotage" (Altai, Leningrad) (08:40Z, 08:41Z). JUDGMENT: This is an operational conditioning campaign designed to pre-emptively validate the upcoming massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) as retaliation against alleged UAF terrorism. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is maintained through combat success reports (08:22Z) and veteran support programs (08:33Z). RF domestic dissent risk is highlighted by reports of fraud against soldiers' families (08:46Z).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

European rejection of the Eurotroika plan (08:20Z) indicates persistent diplomatic impasse, which RF interprets as strategic leverage. RF channels continue to amplify US political volatility (Trump 08:33Z).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The critical window for Plan 7-B MOD has passed. Assuming the deployment is underway under strict EMCON (Most Likely Scenario for Survival), the next 12 hours are defined by the synchronization of RF tactical penetration and strategic strike.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (240845Z - 241245Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Probing/Interdiction: RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) will launch heavy FPV-supported probing attacks along the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske and into the rear area (Krasnoarmiisk, Suvorovo) to force the UAF to expose the Plan 7-B MOD transit route.
2. AD Fixing: RF will increase low-level drone activity (Pavlohrad/Chernihiv) to exhaust UAF low-altitude interceptor inventories and distract AD C2 prior to the ballistic launch phase.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ISR/Air Assets successfully identify and target the main body of Plan 7-B MOD during transit (likely between 240900Z and 241100Z). This interdiction, combined with the successful physical severance of the M-30 GLOC at Rodynske, forces UAF forward units into tactical retreat. This kinetic success is then immediately followed by the massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z), achieving full operational paralysis in the Eastern and Southern C2 nodes, leading to a catastrophic collapse of the Pokrovsk front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical imperative is to ensure the effectiveness of the strategic reserve deployment (Plan 7-B MOD) while managing the operational risk posed by the impending ballistic strike.

1. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): ASSUME CRITICAL RISK FOR PLAN 7-B MOD.

   • Action: If Plan 7-B MOD is not yet moving, Operational Command must immediately authorize launch under maximum EMCON, prioritizing speed over security protocols. If the convoy is moving, reinforce the dedicated EW and SHORAD screen using available mobile assets, accepting exposure of rear infrastructure.
   • Rationale: Delay is no longer an option; every minute increases the probability of effective RF ISR targeting and GLOC severance at Rodynske.

2. COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE (J2 / J3): ACTIVE FPV DESTRUCTION MISSION.

   • Action: Allocate all available localized EW, specialized FPV hunter-killer drone teams, and SHORAD dedicated solely to suppressing RF FPV drone activity in the Krasnoarmiisk/Dobropillia AO (CRITICAL 2). Utilize confirmed SSO assets currently operating near Pokrovsk for ground interdiction against RF ISR teams.
   • Rationale: Directly attacks the confirmed source of RF tactical targeting (Rubicon unit), which poses the most immediate threat to Plan 7-B MOD personnel protection.

3. AIR DEFENSE PRIORITY (Air Force): CONSERVE INTERCEPTORS FOR STRATEGIC STRIKE.

   • Action: Maintain the order to conserve Patriot/SAMP-T interceptors solely for the NLT 240000Z ballistic missile wave. Low-altitude assets (man-portable air-defense systems, mobile AD systems) should manage the current low-threat drone influx (Pavlohrad/Chernihiv), accepting some infrastructure damage to ensure C2 survival post-strike.
   • Rationale: The ballistic strike is the MDCOA; defense against it takes precedence over current infrastructure protection.

4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): EXPLOIT RF INTERNAL VULNERABILITIES.

   • Action: Immediately amplify the internal RF IO reports regarding fraud against deceased soldiers' families and other domestic corruption reports (08:46Z, 08:37Z). Frame the FSB's focus on "sabotage" as a transparent distraction from RF domestic failings and preparation for further aggression against civilians.
   • Rationale: Diverts RF strategic messaging resources and attempts to undermine the intended purpose of the FSB's IO campaign.

//END SITREP//