Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240830Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240800Z NOV 25 – 240830Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (MAIN EFFORT) / ZAPORIZHZHIA (SHAPING EFFORT) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-3 (OPERATIONAL DECISIVENESS: CRITICAL)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis around Pokrovsk remains critical. RF forces continue kinetic shaping operations across multiple domains, specifically targeting logistics and civilian infrastructure in the deep rear (Chernihiv, Odesa) while intensifying pressure on the secondary Zaporizhzhia axis. The key decision point for Plan 7-B MOD transit security (NLT 240830Z) is currently active.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (Main Effort): RF advance elements continue to converge on Rodynske. UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) report a successful raid in the Pokrovsk direction (08:07Z), confirming continued UAF resistance and delaying action, but the primary threat remains the severance of the M-30 GLOC.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Shaping Effort): RF claims control over the settlement of Zatishye (08:15Z). JUDGMENT: If confirmed, this shifts the immediate threat geometry, supporting the previous assessment that RF intends to fix UAF Southern reserves and prevent their release to Pokrovsk.
• Deep Rear Strikes: Confirmed strikes reported in Chernihiv (07:55Z) and a drone attack on a vessel in Odesa Oblast (08:18Z). This maintains strategic dispersion of UAF AD assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, favorable for RF ISR and precision strike capabilities, especially UAV and drone operations confirmed to be targeting mobility assets west of Dobropillia.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Force confirms continued launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting Kharkiv, Donetsk, and eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (07:59Z, 08:15Z), confirming high RF reliance on tactical aviation to attrit UAF forward units and logistics in the immediate Pokrovsk rear area. UAF units in the Southern Operational Zone report significant RF losses (08:13Z), indicating effective localized counter-offensive operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF continues to demonstrate synchronized multi-domain pressure:

1. Persistent tactical air superiority (KAB saturation).
2. Deep penetration ISR/strike (Dobropillia confirmation).
3. Effective Information Operations (IO) targeting internal Ukrainian stability. INTENTION: The primary RF intent is to force the operational culmination at Rodynske within the next 4 hours (NLT 241200Z). The secondary intent is to rapidly exploit any paralysis resulting from the synchronized IO and kinetic strikes, especially against the Plan 7-B MOD movement.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF claim regarding Zatishye (Zaporizhzhia) constitutes a key tactical change in the shaping effort.

• JUDGMENT: This forces UAF Operational Command South to allocate reconnaissance assets away from Pokrovsk to verify the status of the Stepnohirsk western flank, complicating critical reserve allocation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF military milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are actively running large-scale fundraising drives for the "Autumn-Winter Campaign 2025" (08:01Z). JUDGMENT: This confirms RF commitment to sustained combat operations throughout the winter and indicates a persistent reliance on decentralized (milblogger/volunteer) logistics streams to augment state supplies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF MoD reports suggest effective tactical C2 coordination for interdiction fires, claiming neutralization of UAF rotation attempts near Konstantinovka (08:04Z). This supports the assessment of RF C2 adaptive responsiveness in the Pokrovsk sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF posture is characterized by holding actions in the forward lines (Pokrovsk) while preparing for the deployment of strategic reserves (Plan 7-B MOD). The risk profile for the reserve movement is critically high due to confirmed RF deep ISR capabilities. READINESS: Deployment readiness for Plan 7-B MOD must be maximized for the 240830Z launch window. Failure to launch immediately compromises the operational timeline and risks unacceptable attrition during transit.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: UAF Defense Forces South report high enemy losses, including a tank and over 50 pieces of equipment (08:13Z). SSO raid near Pokrovsk demonstrates local initiative. SETBACKS: Confirmed infrastructure damage and casualties from deep strikes (Chernihiv, Odesa, Bilenke), stretching defensive resources and maintaining RF initiative in the AD domain.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical requirement remains the immediate deployment of dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) and Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) assets to screen the Plan 7-B MOD transit corridor, specifically from Dobropillia eastwards. The persistence of RF KAB and drone strikes constrains the redeployment of low-altitude defense assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are actively attempting to fragment the UAF population and distract UAF Command:

1. Internal Chaos Narrative: Pro-RF channels are aggressively amplifying the Odesa TCC grenade incident (07:52Z, 07:56Z), aiming to portray systemic lawlessness and draft resistance within Ukraine.
2. Domestic Security Narrative: TASS and milbloggers report arrests for military fraud (08:11Z) and thwarting terrorist railway attacks in Russia (Altai, 08:15Z). JUDGMENT: This IO seeks to project RF state competence and internal stability against alleged UAF "terrorism," justifying continued aggression. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. External Threat Framing: Coverage of NATO "Freezing Winds 25" (08:14Z) frames RF actions as a response to perceived Western aggression.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale in RF is being targeted by reports of fraud against service members (08:02Z, 08:11Z). This necessitates careful management by RF authorities to prevent domestic dissent among military families. UAF morale is under pressure from the severity of deep strikes (Chernihiv).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Minimal new diplomatic activity. Coverage of US political figures (Trump) continues to be used by RF milbloggers to reinforce the narrative of RF diplomatic leverage. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The critical window for decisive action (Plan 7-B MOD execution) is now.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (240830Z - 241230Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Reserve Interdiction Focus: RF 14th Spetsnaz and associated UAV assets will increase saturation reconnaissance efforts along known and suspected reserve movement corridors (M-30 bypasses, Dobropillia AO). RF will attempt small-scale drone strikes or artillery missions targeting the first identifiable large vehicular concentration.
2. Rodynske Breach Attempt: RF 40th/155th OMBR will initiate a coordinated, high-risk final push to cut the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske, supported by persistent CAS (KABs) and frontal artillery fires.
3. Zaporizhzhia Fixing Continuation: RF will leverage the Zatishye claim (verified or not) to increase artillery and localized probing attacks near Stepnohirsk to ensure UAF reserves remain fixed in the south.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ISR successfully identifies the main Plan 7-B MOD convoy during transit. RF utilizes prepositioned tactical aviation or long-range fires (HIMARS equivalent / Iskander-K) to inflict fragmentation and high casualty rates on the moving reserve force. Simultaneously, RF ground forces successfully breach the M-30 at Rodynske. The resulting organizational friction in the UAF rear prevents effective counter-attack, leading to the collapse of the forward defensive line west of Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The overarching objective is to ensure the secure and timely commitment of Plan 7-B MOD.

1. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3): EXECUTE PLAN 7-B MOD NLT 240830Z.

   • Action: Operational Command must issue the GO order for the movement of Plan 7-B MOD immediately. The priority must be force protection via dedicated EW assets and SHORAD screens traveling with the convoy, accepting the heightened risk to rear infrastructure.
   • Rationale: Delaying movement due to deep strikes (Chernihiv/Odesa) or secondary threats (Zatishye claim) guarantees the loss of Rodynske and risks operational failure. Speed and protected mobility are paramount.

2. COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE (J2 / J3): ACTIVE DEFENSE OF TRANSIT CORRIDOR.

   • Action: Utilize the UAF SSO/RECCE assets currently operating near Pokrovsk (confirmed by 08:07Z report) to actively hunt and disrupt RF deep reconnaissance teams (14th Spetsnaz) operating in the Dobropillia AO. Designate J-FIRE priority on any confirmed RF ISR C2 signals obtained via ELINT along the transit route.
   • Rationale: Directly attacks the confirmed source of RF deep strike targeting, providing a "clear zone" for Plan 7-B MOD movement.

3. ZAPORIZHZHIA VALIDATION (J2 / J3): VERIFY ZATISHYE STATUS.

   • Action: Allocate high-resolution ISR (UAV or dedicated IMINT) to CRITICAL (1) (Zatishye verification) within the next 60 minutes. If the claim is verified, immediately deploy local reserve holding elements to stabilize the Stepnohirsk western flank.
   • Rationale: Prevents unnecessary diversion of the strategic Pokrovsk reserve (Plan 7-B MOD) based on potentially deceptive enemy IO/claims.

4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM): INTERNAL STABILITY COUNTER-IO.

   • Action: Issue immediate, verified public safety information contrasting the confirmed civilian casualties in Chernihiv and Odesa with the RF IO focus on internal Ukrainian instability (TCC grenade reports). Frame the internal security reports (Altai, SVO fraud) within Russia as evidence of RF systemic failure and desperation.
   • Rationale: Mitigates the psychological effect of RF IO designed to undermine internal cohesion during the kinetic crisis.

//END SITREP//