Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240730Z NOV 25 – 240800Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (MAIN EFFORT) / ZAPORIZHZHIA (SHAPING EFFORT) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-3 (OPERATIONAL DECISIVENESS: CRITICAL)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The kinetic operational tempo remains high, validating the RF intent to maintain simultaneous pressure across multiple domains while preparing for the operational culmination at Rodynske. FACT: RF 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Vostok Group) successfully targeted and destroyed a UAF towed artillery piece west of Dobropillia via UAV (07:20Z). JUDGMENT: This targeting is critically significant as Dobropillia lies directly on the anticipated transit route for Plan 7-B MOD reserves, indicating RF ISR/deep strike is actively focused on interdicting the reserve movement, not just the forward line. Deep strikes continue, confirming attacks on Odesa port infrastructure and civilian areas in Chernihiv (07:26Z, 07:40Z). The immediate decision point for Plan 7-B MOD commitment is now compounded by validated RF precision targeting capability along the reserve corridor.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (Main Effort): The immediate threat remains the physical severance of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske (NLT 241200Z).
• Dobropillia Vulnerability (CRITICAL NEW TERRAIN): RF successful targeting west of Dobropillia elevates this area to a critical vulnerability. The area is confirmed to be within effective range of RF reconnaissance and drone strike assets, placing Plan 7-B MOD movement at high risk during staging and transit.
• Zaporizhzhia/Kharkiv: RF activity remains consistent (drone/artillery focus, Dva Mayora, 07:40Z), maintaining fixing pressure and preventing reserve release.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist across the main axes. Freezing temperatures (-12C reported in Carpathians) are irrelevant to the immediate Pokrovsk fight but confirm persistent conditions favorable for RF ISR/drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD resources were heavily tasked protecting C2/logistics nodes overnight. The focus must now shift to protecting high-value maneuver assets (Plan 7-B MOD) during movement, specifically against the confirmed deep penetration of RF Spetsnaz/UAV units targeting the Dobropillia area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF Vostok Group demonstrates effective synchronization of deep reconnaissance (UAV) and kinetic execution (drone strike) at operational depth (West of Dobropillia). This capability allows them to target UAF reserve staging and movement corridors effectively. INTENTION: RF intent is refined: Achieve operational culmination at Rodynske while simultaneously inflicting attrition and creating organizational friction within the Plan 7-B MOD transit. The deep strikes on Odesa and Chernihiv maintain strategic pressure and AD depletion. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations: The strike west of Dobropillia is a tactical adaptation targeting the UAF counter-response before it reaches the forward line. This confirms RF intelligence prioritization on Plan 7-B MOD movement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Sustained simultaneous operations (Pokrovsk ground push, deep UAV strikes, Zaporizhzhia fixing) confirm robust RF logistics. The large UAV strike packages indicate sustained production/acquisition capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly adaptive, successfully substituting the ballistic strike threat with a massive UAV wave and demonstrating agile ISR/strike coordination against UAF reserves (Dobropillia). Pro-RF channels continue aggressive IO campaigns, demonstrating synchronization with political messaging (Geneva narrative) and security events (Altai Krai). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF retains local initiative on some secondary fronts (46th Airmobile Brigade success). However, the overall operational posture is defensive and critically dependent on the rapid, secure deployment of Plan 7-B MOD. READINESS: Readiness is degrading due to confirmed RF targeting of the staging area (Dobropillia). Failure to secure the transit corridor will result in piecemeal commitment and unacceptable attrition of the strategic reserve.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Continued effectiveness of UAF AD (reported 77% intercept rate in previous SITREP). 46th Airmobile Brigade reports success (07:26Z). SETBACKS: Confirmed loss of a towed artillery piece west of Dobropillia. Confirmed civilian casualties/infrastructure damage in Chernihiv and Odesa.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, dedicated counter-UAV/electronic warfare (EW) assets must be deployed to secure the Plan 7-B MOD movement corridor west of Pokrovsk (Dobropillia AO). CONSTRAINT: High-value AD assets must still be held for the MDCOA ballistic threat (NLT 241500Z revised), complicating allocation to low-altitude counter-UAV defense along the ground GLOC.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

1. Geneva IO Amplification: TASS and prominent milbloggers (Operatsiya Z, 07:29Z) are consistently reinforcing the narrative that the US (Trump plan) is pressuring Ukraine to accept peace terms. This aims to undermine the NCA’s authority and create political uncertainty during the kinetic crisis.
2. Internal Legitimacy: RF security services reports (Altai Krai, 07:21Z, 07:29Z) are used to justify continued military operations by framing the conflict as self-defense against Ukrainian terrorism within Russia's deep rear.
3. DPRK Narrative: Unconfirmed reports of North Korean deployment near Huliaipole (07:28Z, 07:34Z) are circulating. JUDGMENT: This is high-level disinformation, likely seeded by RF to inflate their perceived manpower capacity and distract from Pokrovsk, requiring immediate denial/counter-IO.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

RF internal media heavily relies on WWII historical analogies (Frontline Editorial Office posts, 07:44Z) to frame the current conflict as a necessary, existential struggle, aiming to reinforce long-term domestic morale. UAF public sentiment remains focused on defensive successes (AD, 46th Brigade) but is immediately impacted by new deep strikes (Chernihiv casualties). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF state media (TASS, 07:46Z) continues to report critically on the perceived lack of detail in US diplomatic efforts, subtly reinforcing the narrative that RF kinetic action is driving the diplomatic agenda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The RF intent to interdict Plan 7-B MOD movement before it reaches Rodynske is now confirmed. The next 4 hours are decisive for reserve movement security.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (240800Z - 241200Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. GLOC Interdiction/ISR Focus: RF ISR (likely 14th Spetsnaz/Vostok assets) will prioritize persistent targeting of any identifiable large-scale vehicle or C2 movement in the AO west of Pokrovsk/Rodynske, particularly along alternative or bypass routes near Dobropillia.
2. Pokrovsk Advance Consolidation: RF 40th/155th OMBR elements will intensify high-risk, close-contact assaults (NLT 241100Z) on the forward UAF defense to create the necessary breach for operational culmination at Rodynske NLT 241200Z.
3. Localized Drone Strikes: A wave of 20-30 loitering munitions will target logistics and repair points in the immediate Pokrovsk sector to preemptively attrite assets required for Plan 7-B MOD support.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ISR identifies the main body of Plan 7-B MOD moving toward the front. RF High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS equivalent) or tactical aviation (CAS) is successfully directed to interdict the convoy along the Dobropillia corridor, resulting in significant fragmentation and dispersal of the reserve force. This success allows the 40th OMBR to sever the M-30 and solidify the operational breakthrough, potentially leading to a localized UAF rout.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate threat is the interdiction of Plan 7-B MOD. The defense of the reserve convoy is now as critical as the defense of the forward line.

1. MANEUVER & FORCE PROTECTION (J3 / J4): SECURE PLAN 7-B MOD TRANSIT.

   • Action: Execute the movement of Plan 7-B MOD toward Pokrovsk NLT 240830Z. Priority 1: Dedicated deployment of mobile EW assets (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to travel with and screen the main body of the reserve convoy along the entire transit corridor (specifically west of Dobropillia).
   • Rationale: Directly mitigates the confirmed RF 14th Spetsnaz/UAV targeting capability (CRITICAL 1). EW screens reduce the risk of lethal ISR targeting the slow-moving reserve columns.

2. AIR DEFENSE ADJUSTMENT (Air Force / J-FIRE): SHORT-RANGE AIR COVER (SHORAD) FOR RESERVES.

   • Action: Immediately re-task a dedicated battalion of SHORAD (e.g., Gepard or Strela-10/Osa) to provide close-in, low-altitude defense for the Plan 7-B MOD movement, accepting minimal AD coverage for infrastructure west of Dnipro for the next 6 hours. High-value ABM assets (Patriot/SAMP-T) remain reserved for the delayed ballistic strike (CRITICAL 2).
   • Rationale: Protects the high-value maneuver force from MLCOA 5.1 (2) (secondary UAV wave) and the confirmed threat demonstrated near Dobropillia.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / G2): IMMEDIATE COUNTER-IO.

   • Action: Issue an unequivocal, rapid denial of the DPRK deployment rumors (Priority 3 CR). Link the "Geneva Peace Plan" narrative and the DPRK rumors to RF psychological operations designed to distract from the Pokrovsk offensive.
   • Rationale: Prevents strategic uncertainty and maintains focus on the kinetic reality of the Pokrovsk operational crisis.

4. OPERATIONAL DECEPTION (G2/J3): ISOLATE RF SPETSNAZ C2.

   • Action: Utilize SIGINT/ELINT intelligence from the Dobropillia strike analysis (CRITICAL 1) to identify and target, via counter-fire or cyber effects, the confirmed or suspected C2 nodes for the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade's drone operations. This action should be synchronized with the launch of Plan 7-B MOD.
   • Rationale: Degrades the RF ability to adjust targeting based on real-time ISR during the critical reserve movement window.

//END SITREP//