Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240730Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240649Z NOV 25 – 240730Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (MAIN EFFORT) / KHARKIV-ZAPORIZHZHIA (SHAPING EFFORTS) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-3 (OPERATIONAL DECISIVENESS: CRITICAL)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The RF did not execute the anticipated massed ballistic strike NLT 240000Z, instead substituting it with a large-scale saturation UAV attack (162 total UAVs launched), achieving disruption but preventing C2 decapitation. FACT: UAF Air Force confirmed 125/162 enemy UAVs were shot down/suppressed. JUDGMENT: This confirms the RF intention to sustain deep strike pressure while preserving the psychological effect of the kinetic threat. RF ground efforts continue to synchronize deception (Kharkiv) with the main operational objective: physical interdiction of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske. Confirmed tactical success by UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) near Pokrovsk indicates that the forward line is actively contested.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: Fighting remains focused on the M-30 approach into Rodynske. FACT: UAF SSO units are engaged in combat operations near Pokrovsk (07:17Z), validating the J3's deployment of high-value tactical assets to stabilize the forward line. RF claims to have blocked a UAF breakthrough attempt north of Krasnoarmiisk (07:07Z), confirming high intensity of contact.
• Deep Rear: The substitution of the ballistic strike with a massive UAV wave (162 launched) confirms that RF targeting priorities remain C2, logistics, and AD saturation, rather than solely ballistic terror.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. Favorable for continued RF ISR/UAV operations and UAF forward defense utilization of SSO/drone teams. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD demonstrated resilience against the UAV wave, achieving a high attrition rate (77%). However, the enemy's ability to mount such a large-scale saturation attack highlights persistent RF volume capabilities. The NCA remains under high pressure to commit Plan 7-B MOD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF possesses the proven capability to execute massive, multi-axis UAV saturation attacks as a substitute or precursor to ballistic strikes. They can launch 160+ UAVs in one wave. INTENTION: The RF intent remains unchanged: Achieve operational breakthrough at Rodynske by inducing strategic delay (IO) and operational distraction/attrition (UAV/Kharkiv kinetics). Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations: The failure to launch the massed ballistic strike NLT 240000Z is assessed as a deliberate kinetic substitution designed to achieve deep effect without expending high-value missile inventory prematurely, or an unforeseen logistics/readiness delay. The massive UAV wave served the same purpose: C2 disruption and AD resource depletion. RF forces also continue to target UAF C2/UAV launch sites in Zaporozhye region (07:04Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supporting intensive, simultaneous operations: sustaining the Pokrovsk ground push, supporting the Kharkiv fixing operations, and supplying a major (162-asset) UAV strike package. The sustained operational tempo indicates robust, though strained, RF sustainment lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly agile, demonstrating the ability to substitute a planned MDCOA (ballistic strike) with a high-volume MLCOA (UAV strike) to maintain deep pressure. New Insight: Internal friction is emerging; pro-RF military bloggers (Dva Mayora, 07:04Z) are publicly attempting to counter the perceived "peace fatigue" generated by the state-controlled "Geneva" IO, confirming the IO's effectiveness is a double-edged sword. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Tactical response remains effective. UAF AD achieved a commendable intercept/suppression rate against the massive UAV attack. SSO deployment near Pokrovsk is a positive tactical maneuver, indicating active resistance on the main axis. READINESS: Strategic readiness hinges entirely on the immediate, disciplined commitment of Plan 7-B MOD. Tactical losses (Kupyansk C2 node, previous SITREP) combined with sustained pressure necessitate reserve deployment now.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: High rate of interception (125/162) of enemy UAVs, mitigating widespread infrastructure damage. Confirmed SSO engagement near Pokrovsk helps secure the immediate forward defense. SETBACKS: 37 UAVs penetrated UAF AD. The operational cost of defending against saturation drone attacks detracts from the priority mission of securing the Pokrovsk approach for Plan 7-B MOD.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate commitment of Plan 7-B MOD. The risk of delay now outweighs the risk of misallocation. CONSTRAINT: AD resources, though effective, were heavily tasked overnight. Interceptor inventory must be immediately audited and conserved for the potential, delayed ballistic strike threat.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO strategy is highly sophisticated, maintaining both external and internal narratives:

1. External Ambiguity (Geneva): TASS continues to amplify the existence of US-led "peace frameworks" (07:03Z), forcing UAF command to publicly address political negotiations while fighting intensifies.
2. Internal Mobilization (Counter-IO): Pro-war channels are actively fighting the strategic fatigue caused by the official peace narrative (07:04Z), explicitly warning supporters that the war is not over. This exposes a rare friction point between RF political goals (deception) and military blogger narratives (mobilization).
3. Domestic Justification: Reports of FSB counter-sabotage successes (Altai Krai, 06:56Z, 07:15Z) are used to justify continued military action against alleged Ukrainian "terrorism" within Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF national observance efforts (06:58Z-07:00Z) effectively maintain national solidarity and memory in the face of deep strikes. The UAF AD success (125 kills) provides a critical morale boost countering the kinetic fear induced by the UAV saturation attack. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Ukrainian media (RBC-Ukraine) confirming the details of the "28-point plan" and security guarantees (06:52Z) inadvertently reinforces the RF deception, regardless of the report's actual content. Command must be prepared to combat the resulting political vacuum. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The failure of the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike means the RF is adapting its timeline. Plan 7-B MOD remains the critical objective for both sides.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (240730Z - 241330Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Pokrovsk Operational Culmination: RF 40th/155th OMBR elements, supported by continued CAS, will attempt to achieve physical severance of the M-30 GLOC at Rodynske NLT 241200Z. This is the highest priority kinetic action.
2. Secondary UAV Wave: RF will launch a smaller, but targeted, follow-up UAV/loitering munition strike (50-80 assets) aimed specifically at C2 and logistical hubs immediately west of the Pokrovsk axis to disrupt the actual movement and deployment of Plan 7-B MOD.
3. Kharkiv Fixing Continuation: RF composite forces will continue high-risk, low-cost probing attacks in the Kharkiv region to prevent the release of any local reserves southward.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces successfully sever the M-30 GLOC, while the delayed massed ballistic strike (NLT 241500Z, revised) executes, targeting the primary C2 nodes coordinating Plan 7-B MOD movement and the recently confirmed SSO elements near Pokrovsk. Strategic reserve fragmentation combined with C2 decapitation leads to the operational collapse of the Pokrovsk sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The success of the RF plan hinges on delay and diversion. The NCA must ruthlessly prioritize Plan 7-B MOD commitment.

1. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3 / J4): COMMIT PLAN 7-B MOD IMMEDIATELY.

   • Action: Execute the movement of Plan 7-B MOD toward Pokrovsk NLT 240830Z. Utilize continuous ISR (Priority 3 CR) to secure the transit corridor.
   • Rationale: The time bought by the UAF AD success against the UAV wave must be immediately leveraged for reserve movement. Do not wait for Rodynske to collapse.

2. AIR DEFENSE ADJUSTMENT (Air Force / J-FIRE): COUNTER-UAV PRIORITY & BALLISTIC CONSERVATION.

   • Action: AD assets previously held for the NLT 240000Z ballistic strike should be re-tasked to saturate defensive zones along the Plan 7-B MOD movement corridor (low/mid altitude threat) to mitigate MLCOA 5.1 (2) UAV wave. However, high-value Patriot/SAMP-T interceptors must be held in reserve/ABM mode for the potential, delayed ballistic strike (CRITICAL 1).
   • Rationale: Mitigates the proven UAV threat against reserve movement while preserving capacity for the high-consequence ballistic threat.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / G2): EXPLOIT RF INTERNAL FRICTION.

   • Action: Rapidly and subtly amplify the messaging from pro-RF military bloggers (e.g., Dva Mayora) stating that the Geneva negotiations are a distraction and the fighting is intense. Do this through OSINT channels to reach RF audiences.
   • Rationale: Increases political risk and potential demoralization/complacency within the RF domestic support base by widening the crack between state narrative and milblogger narrative.

4. OPERATIONAL DECEPTION (G2/J3): FEIGNED NORTHERN RESERVE PREPARATION.

   • Action: Stage observable, yet non-committal, indicators (e.g., false radio traffic, small-scale vehicle movement) suggesting that a significant portion of Plan 7-B MOD is being staged north (Kharkiv AO).
   • Rationale: Reinforces RF confidence in their successful deception operation, potentially delaying the redirection of RF tactical air or deep strike assets to the actual Pokrovsk movement corridor.

//END SITREP//