Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240649Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240619Z NOV 25 – 240649Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXES: POKROVSK (MAIN EFFORT) / KHARKIV-VOVCHANSK (SHAPING EFFORT) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-3 (C2 FRAGMENTATION/RESERVE DIVERSION: CRITICAL)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The RF strategy to achieve operational breakthrough at Pokrovsk via strategic deception and kinetic shaping operations is intensifying. FACT: RF ground elements are confirmed active across the northern Kharkiv Oblast operational zone (Synelnykove, Kupyansk strike BDA), validating the threat as kinetic, not purely informational. JUDGMENT: This confirms the RF is executing the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) by forcing a real two-front operational dilemma for the commitment of Plan 7-B MOD reserves. The status of the anticipated NLT 240000Z massed ballistic strike remains unconfirmed, creating persistent operational uncertainty.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: Focus remains on preventing the physical interdiction of the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske.
• Kharkiv Oblast: The threat is now generalized across the Kharkiv northern front.
  • FACT: UAF TrO (127th/247th OBTrO) captured RF ground personnel, including a foreign mercenary, near Synelnykove (06:48Z). This confirms RF is utilizing composite/disposable forces to probe and fix UAF defenses.
  • FACT: RF successfully destroyed a major UAF logistics/C2/drone node near Kupyansk (06:45Z). This highlights RF targeting priority in the shaping sector.
• Deep Rear: BDA on the scheduled massed ballistic strike remains a critical intelligence gap.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions favoring continued ISR and RF Close Air Support (CAS). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

JUDGMENT: UAF local reserves (TrO) are successfully engaging RF probing elements in Kharkiv, which is positive. However, this success increases the pressure on the NCA/J3 to formally commit strategic reserves (Plan 7-B MOD) to stabilize the widening northern front, thus diverting them from Pokrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

CAPABILITY: RF has demonstrated the capability to deploy composite (mercenary) forces and utilize precision deep strikes (Kupyansk BDA) to synchronize a multi-axis shaping operation intended to draw UAF reserves. INTENTION: The RF intention is critically clear: Induce C2 paralysis and achieve strategic resource dissipation to facilitate the tactical objective of M-30 GLOC severance. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations: The use of foreign mercenary elements in Kharkiv Oblast (Synelnykove) indicates a willingness by RF command to accept higher casualties on the shaping axis to maintain the pressure. The focus on striking drone C2 nodes near Kupyansk suggests RF is actively targeting UAF tactical technological advantages in the north. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supporting heightened kinetic activity on both Pokrovsk and the broad Kharkiv front. The RF AD posture detected in the previous reporting period suggests robust force protection is in place for these simultaneous operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective. They are successfully leveraging Ukrainian media reports regarding "successful adjustments" in US/Ukraine negotiations (06:33Z, 06:46Z) to re-amplify the "Geneva" ambiguity, confirming their agile control over the cognitive domain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF TrO units in Kharkiv Oblast are operating effectively in counter-penetration roles (Synelnykove success). This reaction validates the presence of real pressure but may mask the strategic severity of the Pokrovsk threat. READINESS: Tactical readiness is adequate where engaged, but the strategic decision cycle remains compromised by competing crises and IO interference.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Capture of RF ground personnel, including a foreign fighter, in Kharkiv Oblast. This provides high-value HUMINT potential regarding RF intentions and unit composition on the shaping axis. SETBACKS: Confirmed loss of a major drone C2 and logistics hub near Kupyansk (06:45Z). This degrades future UAF ISR/Strike capability in the eastern Kharkiv sector.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Plan 7-B MOD must be insulated from the Kharkiv crisis. The J3 must confirm that local/regional reserves are adequately mitigating the northern threat without drawing down the critical Pokrovsk reinforcement. CONSTRAINT: The intelligence gap regarding deep strike BDA (CRITICAL 1) restricts optimized AD and C2 dispersion planning.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO strategy has pivoted to weaponizing UAF-aligned media reports. TASS (06:46Z) cites РБК-Україна reporting successful agreement on most points of the US plan.

• Effect: This transforms neutral/positive reporting into a tool for strategic ambiguity, as the NCA must now combat the perception that a negotiated settlement is imminent, justifying caution or delay in kinetic action (e.g., committing Plan 7-B MOD).
• New IO Vector: RF state security reports on preventing railway sabotage in Altai Krai (06:46Z) serve to internally justify large-scale retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against UAF C2/Infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed engagement of UAF TrO units in Kharkiv (Synelnykove) may boost local morale by showcasing successful defense, but the underlying strategic confusion regarding the "Geneva Plan" continues to erode trust in national leadership's resolve. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The departure of US diplomats (Rubio) from Geneva (06:38Z) signals the conclusion of the immediate, high-visibility talks. This pause allows the RF to fully exploit the ambiguity created by the conflicting reports regarding the "success" of the framework. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The RF will continue to synchronize kinetic operations at Pokrovsk with maximum distraction/shaping efforts in Kharkiv. The strategic window for Plan 7-B MOD commitment is narrowing rapidly.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (240649Z - 241249Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Pokrovsk GLOC Interdiction: RF 40th/155th OMBR elements, benefiting from the operational distraction, will intensify efforts to physically hold the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske, attempting to cut off forward UAF units before reserve arrival.
2. Kharkiv Probing Intensification: RF will utilize low-quality, high-risk forces (such as mercenaries/composite units) to sustain multiple kinetic engagements across the northern front (Vovchansk/Kupyansk approaches), fixing UAF local reserves.
3. Delayed/Revised Deep Strike: Given the lack of BDA confirmation, the massed ballistic strike package (NLT 240000Z) is likely being held or revised. MLCOA is a strike NLT 241500Z, synchronized to target C2 nodes coordinating the movement of Plan 7-B MOD.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces successfully sever the M-30 GLOC at Rodynske while the UAF NCA, facing validated kinetic pressure in Kharkiv and strategic confusion from Geneva IO, authorizes a partial diversion of Plan 7-B MOD reserves north. The resulting fragmentation of the strategic reserve leads to the operational collapse of the Pokrovsk sector, followed by the successful execution of the delayed massed ballistic strike, decapitating J-FIRE and C2 coordination for the southern theater.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Command Authority must execute extreme C2 discipline. The Kharkiv threat is a secondary effort designed to make the main effort (Pokrovsk) succeed.

1. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / NCA): ISOLATE KINETIC DECISION-MAKING.

   • Action: Issue a brief, sharp NCA statement acknowledging the Geneva talks concluded. Directly frame the simultaneous intensification of fighting in Pokrovsk and Kharkiv as proof that diplomatic maneuvering is an RF cover for immediate kinetic objectives. De-link diplomatic success/failure from the operational necessity of Plan 7-B MOD deployment.
   • Rationale: Inoculates C2 against the strategic paralysis generated by TASS amplification of positive diplomatic news.

2. MANEUVER EXECUTION (J3 / J4): COMMIT PLAN 7-B MOD (RED CELL PRIORITY).

   • Action: Execute the movement of Plan 7-B MOD toward Pokrovsk NLT 240900Z, utilizing designated bypass routes around the Rodynske junction. J3 must formally designate the Kharkiv/Vovchansk axis as a FIXING operation, to be managed exclusively by current Regional Command reserves (TrO/local maneuver units) until 241500Z.
   • Rationale: Speed is critical. The confirmed kinetic threat in Kharkiv is calculated to induce delay. Do not fall for the deception.

3. INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINE (G2/G3): C2 ASSURANCE AND PROTOCOL.

   • Action: Assume CRITICAL (1) failure (i.e., C2 nodes were struck and damaged) until proven otherwise. Immediately activate secondary/tertiary C2 nodes for all Pokrovsk maneuver and J-FIRE coordination. Re-task AD units to highest alert status for ballistic defense (MLCOA 3).
   • Rationale: Mitigates the risk of C2 fragmentation caused by the high-priority intelligence gap regarding the deep strike.

4. OPERATIONAL DECEPTION (G2/STRATCOM): EXPLOIT CAPTURE FOR DISINFORMATION.

   • Action: Immediately process the captured RF mercenary (06:48Z). Utilize controlled leaks (via non-official channels) suggesting the purpose of the captured element was deep reconnaissance for a feigned offensive near Vovchansk, thereby reinforcing the RF's belief that UAF command is correctly classifying the Kharkiv threat as a deception.
   • Rationale: Buys additional time for Plan 7-B MOD movement by confusing RF intelligence regarding UAF assessment of the Kharkiv threat.

//END SITREP//