Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240500Z NOV 25 – 240600Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AXIS: POKROVSK AXIS (M-30 GLOC) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-2 (C2 FRAGMENTATION RISK: EXTREME)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational environment remains defined by critical synchronized pressure across the kinetic and cognitive domains. The primary threat is the RF's ability to utilize sophisticated Information Operations (IO) to paralyze Ukrainian Command and Control (C2) at both the National Command Authority (NCA) level ("Geneva Peace Framework") and the operational level ("Dobropillia Cauldron" narrative), thereby facilitating the physical severance of the M-30 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) near Rodynske.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: Focus remains on preventing the physical interdiction of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC at Rodynske. The immediate operational rear (Dobropillia/Shakhovo) remains the critical target for RF psychological operations (PSYOPS).
• Deep Rear: Confirmed RF deep strike capability persists, evidenced by a drone attack on civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv (05:29Z). This maintains strategic pressure and necessitates continued air defense allocation away from the main effort.
• Zaporizhzhia Front: RF kinetic activity continues (combat reports 05:30Z), maintaining the fixing operation designed to prevent the release of UAF southern reserves toward Pokrovsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable weather persists. RF intelligence (TASS) reports generally warmer than expected conditions over the European territory of Russia, confirming favorable conditions for continued ISR and ground maneuver through late November. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are under critical stress. The deployment of Plan 7-B MOD reserves remains the pivotal operational decision, but their security and morale are under direct IO attack. UAF C2 maintains stability in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Kryvyi Rih report 05:32Z), but the system is vulnerable to high-level strategic deception. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains high synchronization between tactical maneuver (Pokrovsk), fixed action (Zaporizhzhia), deep strike (Chernihiv), and both strategic and operational IO/PSYOPS. Intention: To achieve operational collapse on the Pokrovsk axis through systemic C2 fragmentation, rather than solely through massed kinetic force. The key immediate objective is to delay the authorization or successful transit of Plan 7-B MOD reserves.

Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (Cognitive Domain): The RF strategic Information Operation regarding a fake "Geneva Peace Framework" has successfully breached UAF-aligned information channels (05:23Z). This is a severe escalation of the IO vector, targeting the highest levels of Ukrainian NCA decision-making. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strike capability is confirmed to be impacting RF logistics/infrastructure, evidenced by confirmed explosions in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (05:36Z, DS belief 0.017 Energy Infrastructure Attack). This indicates ongoing pressure on the RF energy supply that supports military operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrates robust effectiveness in utilizing tactical military analysts (e.g., Rybar, 05:40Z) to propagate operational narratives and leveraging high-level diplomatic deception through multiple channels. This highlights centralized, dynamic control over IO assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive resilience remains high at the tactical level (successful deep strikes, confirmed local combat engagement). However, readiness is critically compromised by the pervasive, multi-layered IO threat, particularly the high-level peace framework deception which risks decision-making paralysis.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: Confirmed successful UAF deep drone strike on strategic infrastructure (Kstovo/Nizhny Novgorod). This maintains pressure on RF strategic resources and acts as a domestic counter-narrative. SETBACKS: The successful penetration and propagation of the RF-seeded "Geneva Peace Framework" narrative (05:23Z) within friendly media constitutes an immediate strategic failure in information security.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, high-level political intervention is required to neutralize the "Geneva" IO, preventing the strategic distraction it is designed to cause. CONSTRAINT: The necessity of holding forces against the confirmed RF fixing maneuver near Stepnohirsk/Zaporizhzhia front remains the primary constraint on reinforcing the Pokrovsk axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO strategy is a critical threat, operating on three distinct, synchronized levels:

1. Strategic Decapitation: The "Geneva Peace Framework" (confirmed propagating in friendly channels) aims to paralyze NCA crisis response, delaying kinetic operations.
2. Operational Fragmentation: The "Dobropillia Cauldron" narrative (from previous SITREP) targets reserve morale and operational C2 integrity.
3. International Uncertainty: Continued promotion of narratives suggesting Western abandonment (FT/Trump report 05:33Z) aims to erode long-term morale and commitment.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale in the immediate rear is under dual pressure (kinetic strike in Chernihiv + localized PSYOPS). The "Geneva" narrative presents a unique risk of generating false hope or confusion among the population and lower-tier commands, potentially leading to unauthorized cease-fire attempts or questioning of command orders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF channels are actively pushing contingency planning narratives (France military service, US aid cessation), suggesting a long-term strategy to undermine international resolve. These reports, while not immediately kinetic, influence strategic planning. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The RF is currently in the exploitation phase of the IO campaign, seeking to maximize the effect of the "Geneva" narrative before Plan 7-B MOD is fully committed.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours (240600Z - 241200Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. C2 Paralysis Exploitation: RF will heavily amplify the "Geneva Peace Framework" narrative through state and proxy media, awaiting signs of NCA hesitation or delay in authorizing Plan 7-B MOD or counter-GLOC operations.
2. Kinetic Synchronization: RF 40th/155th OMBR elements will intensify localized pressure on Rodynske, utilizing CAS/FPV assets to interdict movement on the M-30 GLOC, capitalizing on the expected C2 confusion.
3. Southern Fixation: Continued high-intensity fire missions on the Zaporizhzhia front (Huliaipole/Stepnohirsk) to prevent operational repositioning.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Failure by the NCA to issue an immediate, public, and credible denial of the "Geneva Peace Framework" results in systemic C2 paralysis. The kinetic interdiction at Rodynske succeeds, leading to the isolation of forward UAF units west of Pokrovsk. Simultaneously, RF mobile groups exploit the paralysis to conduct deep reconnaissance or limited strikes on the unescorted Plan 7-B MOD assembly areas (e.g., Dobropillia), triggering a localized rout.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The current environment demands a C2 defense action plan that treats IO threats as equivalent to kinetic threats.

1. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / NCA): CRUSH GENEVA IO.

   • Action: The highest authority (Presidential/Defense Minister level) must issue an immediate, highly publicized, and forceful denunciation of the "Geneva Peace Framework" claims. State explicitly that this is a proven RF attempt to paralyze the defense against ongoing Russian attacks (referencing the Chernihiv strike 05:29Z).
   • Rationale: Only a top-level denial can effectively counter this strategic deception that has penetrated friendly C2 channels.

2. MANEUVER PROTECTION (J3 / J4): ESCORT PLAN 7-B MOD.

   • Action: Immediate deployment of air defense/EW assets (e.g., MANPADS teams, counter-drone units) along the planned transit route of Plan 7-B MOD reserves passing through the Dobropillia/Shakhovo area.
   • Rationale: Provides physical reassurance and kinetic protection against localized RF reconnaissance/Spetsnaz elements and FPV drones, mitigating the psychological effects of the "cauldron" PSYOPS.

3. AIR DEFENSE PRIORITY (Air Force): REACTIVE TARGETING.

   • Action: Reprioritize all available mobile SHORAD (Short-Range Air Defense) assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger) to defend operational assembly areas (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk/Kryvyi Rih C2 nodes and Dobropillia reserve areas) against confirmed/imminent deep strikes, using the Chernihiv strike (05:29Z) as the current threat signature.
   • Rationale: RF deep strike (drones) is confirmed active (Chernihiv). Protecting C2 and reserve concentration areas is paramount to enable Plan 7-B MOD.

4. C2 CONTINGENCY (J6): ISOLATED RELAY ACTIVATION.

   • Action: Activate pre-vetted, hardened, and isolated radio relay points within the Dobropillia AO, bypassing standard Internet/GSM communication routes, solely for relaying authenticated tactical movement orders for Plan 7-B MOD. These relays must be immediately powered down after message transmission.
   • Rationale: Provides an alternate, secure path for mission command adherence, bypassing potential local EW jamming or cognitive domain compromise stemming from the "cauldron" narrative.

//END SITREP//