Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240519Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240500Z NOV 25 – 240519Z NOV 25 (HIGH INTENSITY IO/EW ENVIRONMENT) OPERATIONAL AXIS: POKROVSK AXIS (M-30/T-05-15 GLOC) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-2 (C2 FRAGMENTATION RISK: EXTREME)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational crisis on the Pokrovsk Axis continues to intensify, driven by a highly coordinated Russian Federation (RF) effort to leverage spectral denial (EW) and localized psychological operations (PSYOPS) to induce C2 fragmentation and tactical collapse. RF Information Operations (IO) have rapidly expanded their geographic focus westward from Krasnoarmiisk to Shakhovo/Dobropillia, directly targeting the morale and disposition of UAF operational reserves designated for Plan 7-B MOD execution. Kinetic activity remains focused on interdiction near Rodynske and fixing reserves on the Zaporizhzhia front.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: The RF primary objective remains the physical severance of the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC near Rodynske. The immediate cognitive battlespace has broadened to the Dobropillia/Shakhovo area (west of the main assault), directly threatening the western flank and reserve concentration areas.
• Zaporizhzhia Front: Confirmed high-explosive ordnance delivery (FABs) near Huliaipole confirms RF intent to fix UAF southern reserves, preventing their use in stabilizing the Pokrovsk Axis.
• Deep Rear: RF deep strike capability remains active, evidenced by confirmed drone strikes in Chernihiv, maintaining strategic pressure on rear area C2/infrastructure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable weather persists, favoring RF ISR capabilities and high-power EW systems. No significant operational changes due to environmental factors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining EW pressure. Forward maneuver elements are synchronized with immediate, localized IO amplification (Shakhovo/Dobropillia narrative). UAF (Plan 7-B MOD): Forces are operating under strict EMCON 2. The defense is critically reliant on the efficacy of decentralized Mission Command and the resilience of rear echelon morale against PSYOPS.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF demonstrates high proficiency in dynamic, localized PSYOPS synchronized with tactical pressure (RVvoenkor 04:53Z). Kinetic capabilities remain robust across the front (Huliaipole FABs) and in the deep rear (Chernihiv drones). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Intention: Exploit the C2 dispersal vulnerability by creating a "cauldron" narrative in the operational rear (Shakhovo/Dobropillia), compelling UAF reserves to either break EMCON or abandon planned defensive positions in panic, thereby guaranteeing the failure of Plan 7-B MOD.

Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (Cognitive Domain): RF PSYOPS strategy has shifted from general claims of UAF retreat (Krasnoarmiisk) to specific claims of localized operational collapse ("Dobropillia cauldron"), indicating RF intelligence believes UAF reserve/support elements are positioned in that general vicinity. This is a direct attempt to force a non-kinetic operational defeat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF air support and deep strike logistics are confirmed functional, evidenced by FAB strikes (Huliaipole) and drone attacks (Chernihiv). The continued discussion of UAF deep strikes on Russian territory (Voronezh) suggests UAF retains pressure on RF logistical hubs. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in rapidly disseminating tactical IO to support the kinetic advance. The swift amplification of the "Dobropillia" claim confirms centralized control over tactical information warfare assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive consolidation remains under maximal stress. High operational tempo is confirmed on the Southern flank (Zaporizhzhia RVA report), confirming forces are engaged in containing RF probes/fixed action. READINESS: Tactical readiness is currently being challenged by the need to distinguish kinetic threats from aggressive, morale-targeting PSYOPS.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESSES: GSU reports high RF casualty estimates (+1190 personnel), suggesting continued effective local resistance. UAF long-range assets continue to strike targets deep inside RF territory (Voronezh UAV attack). SETBACKS: Confirmed civilian casualties (6 wounded) in Zaporizhzhia/Polohivskyi areas reinforce the high cost of holding the Southern flank while under pressure on Pokrovsk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid, decisive counter-IO specific to the Dobropillia/Shakhovo area must be deployed immediately to prevent panic among local support and reserve elements. CONSTRAINT: The necessity of holding forces on the Zaporizhzhia axis (fixed action confirmed by Huliaipole FAB strikes) prevents redeployment of vital reserves to reinforce Pokrovsk.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF SIOP is now focused on escalating the tactical defeat narrative:

1. Tactical Defeatism: Claims of a "Dobropillia cauldron" and the "collapse" of a UAF counteroffensive near Shakhovo (RVvoenkor 04:53Z). This is the most immediate threat in the cognitive domain.
2. Leadership Targeting: Continued discussion of specific RF military commanders (6th CAA commander) by pro-Ukrainian channels suggests reciprocal targeting of high-value RF personnel legitimacy.
3. Morale Boost: Official GSU casualty reports (+1190) are vital for maintaining domestic and front-line morale.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale in rear support areas near Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiisk/Dobropillia) is currently under direct, targeted attack. Failure to swiftly counter the "cauldron" narrative risks internal command friction and potential localized panic/disobedience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No new diplomatic developments in this period. The IO focus remains tactical/operational (defeat narratives) rather than strategic (peace framework deception). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The RF is using IO to pre-condition the environment for kinetic exploitation. The expansion of the PSYOPS target area to Dobropillia suggests RF reconnaissance has confirmed UAF intent to establish reserve staging or logistical nodes there.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (240500Z - 240900Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. PSYOPS Escalation: RF will maximize dissemination of the "Dobropillia cauldron" narrative across all available channels (VHF, social media, radio) to force UAF operational reserves (Plan 7-B MOD) to panic, break EMCON, or prematurely withdraw.
2. M-30 Interdiction: 40th/155th OMBR probing attacks near Rodynske will intensify, synchronized with the PSYOPS, aiming to physically interdict the GLOC and validate the "cauldron" narrative.
3. Southern Pressure Sustainment: RF aviation will sustain FAB/artillery strikes (Huliaipole/Polohivskyi) to prevent any redeployment of UAF Southern command reserves to the critical Pokrovsk sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF IO successfully fragments UAF C2 integrity (CRITICAL GAP 1) in the rear elements near Dobropillia. Logistic support for Plan 7-B MOD collapses due to panic withdrawals or command paralysis. RF mobile groups bypass Rodynske and exploit the GLOC failure, establishing a forward defensive line on the M-30, leading to the isolation and operational encirclement of forward UAF units west of Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary tactical imperative has shifted to aggressively neutralizing the localized PSYOPS targeting the operational rear, which directly supports the success of RF kinetic maneuver.

1. STRATEGIC/TACTICAL COUNTER-IO (STRATCOM / J3): NEUTRALIZE CAULDRON NARRATIVE.

   • Action: Immediately issue a high-level counter-disinformation message explicitly and aggressively denying the "Dobropillia cauldron" and Shakhovo rout claims, branding them as RF attempts to target logistical and support personnel families. This should be disseminated via all civilian and military channels (burst comms, social media).
   • Rationale: The time-critical psychological threat is now centered on Dobropillia, not solely Krasnoarmiisk. This action protects the operational reserve movement (Plan 7-B MOD).

2. RESERVE MOVEMENT SECURITY (J3 / J4): FORCE PROTECTION.

   • Action: Assign a reinforced security element (e.g., mechanized infantry company) to escort the leading elements of the Plan 7-B MOD maneuver force during transit through the Dobropillia/Krasnoarmiisk rear areas.
   • Rationale: Provide visible, kinetic assurance to exposed reserves/logistics elements that the area is secure, mitigating the psychological effect of the "cauldron" IO.

3. DEEP FIRE EXECUTION (J-FIRE): AIR ASSET DISRUPTION.

   • Action: Prioritize available deep strike capability (HIMARS, Scalpel FPVs, etc.) against known or suspected RF aviation staging areas or forward operating bases responsible for the confirmed FAB attacks on Huliaipole.
   • Rationale: Reduce the air threat that is successfully fixing UAF reserves on the Zaporizhzhia front, thereby creating tactical flexibility for Pokrovsk reinforcement.

4. C2 EMERGENCY PROTOCOL (J6): EMCON RELIEF PLAN.

   • Action: Prepare a pre-approved, time-limited EMCON Level 1 (Controlled Broadcast) window (max 5 minutes) for UAF brigade commanders in the Pokrovsk AO, to be utilized only if decentralized Mission Command fails or if a rout is confirmed, allowing central command to issue immediate, high-priority fallback orders. This is a contingency and must only be authorized by high command (OC East).
   • Rationale: Provide a critical safety mechanism against the riskier MDCOA (Operational Collapse due to C2 paralysis).

//END SITREP//