Archived operational intelligence briefing
DTG: 240430Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240400Z NOV 25 – 240800Z NOV 25 (CRITICAL C2 WINDOW) OPERATIONAL AREA: POKROVSK AXIS (C2 ATTACK PHASE) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-2 (C2 FRAGMENTATION RISK: EXTREME)
The battlefield remains dominated by the Russian Federation (RF) Electronic Warfare (EW) and Strategic Information Operations (SIOP) attack, designed to achieve Command and Control (C2) paralysis during the execution of UAF Plan 7-B MOD dispersal. RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) are transitioning from reconnaissance (RECCE) preparation to tactical probing, leveraging the perceived vacuum created by spectral pressure.
Clear, stable weather persists, favoring high-altitude RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and ensuring optimal propagation for high-power EW jamming systems (CRITICAL GAP 2). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
RF: EW assets are confirmed active at high power. RF Ministry of Defense (MOD) and affiliated channels are synchronizing operational reporting (93 UAV intercepts) with the ongoing pressure to maximize the cognitive effect. UAF (Plan 7-B MOD): Dispersed forces are currently in the most vulnerable phase, attempting to maintain integrity of the Initial Defense Line (IDL) while under active denial of communications.
Capability: The RF has demonstrated capability to simultaneously execute high-volume EW jamming, high-level strategic disinformation (Geneva/Political Chaos), and aggressive tactical RECCE/PSYOPS synchronization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Intention (Next 4 Hours): Leverage the massed UAV interception claim (93 BPLAs) to internally and externally negate the psychological impact of previous UAF deep strikes (Kstovo) and create the conditions for a ground advance near Rodynske.
Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations: The massive, coordinated dissemination of the claim that 93 UAF UAVs were shot down overnight (TASS, MOD, ASTRA, Pro-RF channels 0408Z-0420Z) indicates a defensive information operation designed to address the effectiveness of UAF deep strike capability (e.g., Kstovo strikes noted in previous reports). This is not just propaganda; it is an active effort to restore RF morale and counter the UAF narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
No new indicators of large-scale RF logistical failures. Tactical logistics for forward RECCE elements remain robust. RF Air Defense (AD) posture is being overtly highlighted through IO (93 intercepts) to deter further UAF deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
RF C2 shows high effectiveness in coordinating across the kinetic, EW, and cognitive domains. The primary mission of RF C2 is to maintain this synchronization until UAF Plan 7-B MOD C2 fragments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
POSTURE: Defensive consolidation remains the imperative. The C2 environment is the primary combat space. Readiness depends on decentralized leadership's ability to operate under Mission Command doctrine while maintaining strict EMCON Level 2 protocols.
SETBACK (Cognitive Domain): The RF's mass media push regarding the successful interception of 93 UAVs (fact unverifiable, but high-volume distribution) works to psychologically neutralize the positive effects of previous UAF deep strikes on global perception and domestic morale.
CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, high-level denial and counter-IO regarding the RF UAV claim (93 BPLAs) to maintain the narrative of UAF initiative in deep operations. CONSTRAINT: Real-time feedback on C2 fragmentation status (CRITICAL GAP 1) remains severely limited by the necessity of EMCON adherence.
The RF SIOP is operating on two synchronized levels (DS Belief: 0.429 - Disinformation):
RF domestic morale is being boosted by official claims of successful defense against UAF strikes. UAF tactical morale, particularly on the Pokrovsk Axis, is susceptible to localized RF PSYOPS broadcasts and the amplified narratives of strategic failure.
The RF's utilization of political conspiracy theories (TASS, 0419Z) demonstrates a concerted effort to shift international media focus from the Pokrovsk offensive to internal Western political friction, degrading the diplomatic support structure.
(HIGH CONFIDENCE)
(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF EW successfully isolates Battalion-level UAF command nodes (Plan 7-B MOD). Decentralized Mission Command fails due to aggressive, tailored RF PSYOPS broadcasts leveraging the strategic uncertainty (Geneva IO). RF Spetsnaz/light motorized forces achieve penetration through the Pokrovsk IDL (likely bypassing Rodynske defenses) due to non-coordinated UAF defensive fire, leading to the immediate collapse of the sector and exposure of operational reserves.
| Timeframe | Event/Decision Point | Triggering Indicator | Status/Update |
|---|---|---|---|
| 240430Z - 240530Z | Confirm C2 Hardening Success. | Less than 10% report rate of total loss of digital comms (Starlink/LPI). | CRITICAL WINDOW: If C2 reports >10% loss, decentralize command immediately (Mission Command Protocol). |
| 240530Z - 240730Z | RF RECCE Contact & IDL Integrity Test. | First tactical contact (small arms/light artillery) between RF RECCE and Plan 7-B MOD elements. | Decision Point: Initiate immediate, aggressive counter-RECCE action and deny RF ground observation points (GOPs). |
| 240700Z - 241000Z | Strategic AD Re-tasking. | Confirmed status/non-threat of the previously predicted massed ballistic strike. | Decision Point: Re-task high-value AD interceptors to protect C2 nodes from high-speed cruise missile strike/CAS. |
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence (Analysis) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL (1) | Plan 7-B MOD C2 Status. Confirmation that commanders are maintaining EMCON Level 2 and successfully using anti-jamming/secure comms. | HUMINT/CEWI: Immediate, high-priority request for brief status check (pre-determined burst communication only) from designated senior unit commanders (Battalion/Brigade). | HIGH |
| CRITICAL (2) | RF EW Emission Centers. Precise geographical location, power output, and frequency hopping patterns of RF jamming sources along the Pokrovsk axis (M-30 corridor). | SIGINT: Dedicated airborne/ground-based Direction Finding (DF) sweeps to map the dynamic EW threat environment and enable targeted UAF counter-EW. | HIGH |
| PRIORITY (3) | UAV Loss Verification. Verification of the claimed mass interception of 93 UAF UAVs to establish a factual basis for STRATCOM response. | TECHINT/IMINT: Post-strike BDA review of known UAF launch sites and potential target zones (if known). | MEDIUM |
The tactical imperative is C2 survival and denial of RF ground exploitation, coupled with immediate neutralization of RF PSYOPS effectiveness.
C2 AND EW DEFENSE (J6 / J3): ENSURE MISSION COMMAND ACTIVATION.
COUNTER-ISR / COUNTER-RECCE (J2 / J3): MAXIMUM INTERDICTION.
STRATEGIC IO / COUNTER-NARRATIVE (STRATCOM): NEUTRALIZE RF MORALE BOOST.
AIR DEFENSE RE-TASKING (AIR FORCE / J-3): PROTECT C2 INFRASTRUCTURE.
//END SITREP//
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