Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240400Z NOV 25 – 240800Z NOV 25 (Projection) OPERATIONAL AREA: POKROVSK AXIS (C2 ATTACK PHASE) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-2 (C2 FRAGMENTATION RISK: EXTREME)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The operational environment remains defined by the transition from heavy RF kinetic pressure (KAB/Ballistic) to integrated Electronic Warfare (EW) and Cognitive Attack. UAF forces executing Plan 7-B MOD are currently in the most vulnerable phase: dispersal and establishment of the Initial Defense Line (IDL) while under intense C2 interdiction threat.

Confirmation of local RF air defense alerts being canceled (Artamonov, 240310Z) suggests the predicted NLT 240000Z massed ballistic strike may have been aborted or delayed. This temporary reduction in strategic kinetic threat reinforces the assessment that the immediate battle focuses entirely on neutralizing UAF tactical command capability along the Pokrovsk axis.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: The RF focus is on the corridor defined by the M-30/T-05-15 GLOC near Rodynske. Critical terrain is defined by the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Control over C2 links is functionally equivalent to control over the physical GLOC.
• Zaporizhzhia: Confirmed RF maneuver west of Stepnohirsk continues to fix UAF Southern reserves, preventing flexible deployment.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable weather persists. This favors RF ISR/UAV operations, which are essential for guiding precision fire against UAF units that break EMCON protocols in response to RF EW/PSYOP. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Fully postured for the C2 Attack Phase. Dedicated EW assets (likely Krasukha/Ler-3) are confirmed active in the sector perimeter, prepared to flood tactical VHF/UHF nets. RF maneuver elements (40th/155th OMBR) are initiating forward reconnaissance (RECCE) probes. UAF (Plan 7-B MOD): Dispersed, attempting to maintain EMCON Level 2 while organizing the IDL. The integrity of internal C2 networks (Starlink/LPI links) is the key vulnerability.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF is effectively synchronizing deep Strategic Information Operations (SIOP) with localized Electronic and Physical exploitation. This synchronization is their current primary offensive capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Intention (Next 4-8 Hours): Achieve operational fragmentation of Plan 7-B MOD by leveraging jamming, targeted propaganda, and aggressive ground RECCE.

Recent Tactical Adaptations: The likely abortion or indefinite delay of the massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) indicates two possibilities:

1. Resource constraints/AD focus forced a conservation of strategic missile stocks.
2. RF judged the cognitive pressure (Geneva IO) and EW attack would achieve the C2 decapitation goal without the kinetic risk. The immediate implication is a doubled-down focus on the Pokrovsk tactical battle through EW. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain strained by deep strikes (Kstovo indicator), but the immediate tactical logistics for EW/RECCE forces are secure. The effectiveness of FPV strikes against RF transport (Colonelcassad, 240330Z claims) suggests continued attrition on both sides in the logistical chain. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high synchronization across domains. The primary threat vector remains the RF's ability to isolate UAF tactical C2 through jamming (CRITICAL GAP 2). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive consolidation. Forces must transition from kinetic threat avoidance training to EW/PSYOP resistance doctrine. Unit leaders must be prepared for decentralized operations (Mission Command). READINESS: Readiness is contingent upon the successful implementation of EMCON Level 2. Failure to adhere risks immediate detection and kinetic targeting.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Deep strike capability (Kstovo) forces RF resource diversion. The apparent non-occurrence of the massed ballistic strike (NLT 240000Z) potentially frees high-value UAF AD assets. SETBACK: Plan 7-B MOD is highly vulnerable to RF RECCE probes (40th/155th OMBR) while establishing the IDL.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid deployment and integration of mobile Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) assets to localize and jam high-power RF sources targeting UAF C2. CONSTRAINT: Maintaining CRITICAL GAP 1 (Plan 7-B MOD Integrity) assessment while minimizing radio signatures severely limits real-time blue force tracking (BFT) by UAF higher commands.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF SIOP has intensified its focus on undermining international support (Dempster-Shafer belief 0.05).

• Strategic Vector: TASS and affiliated channels are amplifying western source claims that Europe anticipates a US withdrawal of support (FT report, Trump quotes). This aims to delegitimize the UAF war effort and confirm the "Geneva Peace Framework" narrative (previous SITREP).
• Tactical Vector: Continued claims of heavy UAF losses (Marochko/TASS, 3920 killed last week) and successful destruction of UAF assets (Colonelcassad, Operatsiya Z) serve to inflate RF morale and compound localized demoralization in contested sectors.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stressed by the synchronization of intense tactical pressure and high-level diplomatic uncertainty (Geneva IO). The perceived stability of Western backing is now a critical vulnerability. RF internal IO (supporting SVO participants) is secondary, focused on solidifying domestic support rather than affecting the front line.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO successfully leveraged perceived instability in US commitment and European frustration (TASS, 240327Z/240333Z). This messaging is designed to delay or condition future aid packages crucial for UAF sustainment.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (240400Z - 240800Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. C2 Disconnection and Localization: RF EW assets will execute maximum power jamming focused on UAF tactical communications. SIGINT findings will be immediately exploited by RF artillery fire (via UAV guidance) against any detected C2 signature (frequency drift, high-power transmit).
2. RECCE Exploitation: RF 40th/155th OMBR forward elements will use the expected C2 vacuum to rapidly press RECCE elements toward UAF dispersal points, prioritizing routes bypassing Rodynske.
3. SIOP Amplification: RF state media will synchronize official reporting of "massive UAF losses" (Marochko) with the ongoing tactical EW attack to maximize psychological shock on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully isolates the UAF tactical C2 elements of Plan 7-B MOD. Decentralized UAF sub-unit commanders, lacking reliable confirmation from higher command and exposed to localized PSYOP broadcasts, fail to coordinate the IDL. RF RECCE (Spetsnaz/light motorized) identifies critical gaps in the unformed IDL, triggering a rapid, unhindered exploitation phase toward Pokrovsk. This allows RF to bypass the fixed defenses at Rodynske and achieve operational penetration.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary mission is C2 survival and denial of RF exploitation.

1. C2 AND EW DEFENSE (J6 / J3): IMPLEMENT DECENTRALIZED COMMAND DOCTRINE.

   • Action: All Plan 7-B MOD elements must activate the pre-planned C2 Loss Protocol (Mission Command) immediately upon confirmation of comms degradation (>50% unit report loss). Sub-unit commanders must prioritize IDL establishment based on their current geographic position and pre-designated boundaries, regardless of real-time HQs confirmation.
   • Rationale: The MDCOA relies on C2 decapitation. Decentralization mitigates the risk of coordinated operational failure by granting initiative to front-line leaders.

2. COUNTER-ISR / COUNTER-RECCE (J2 / J3): DENY RF EYES ON TARGET.

   • Action: Designate all RF reconnaissance UAVs (Orlan, ZALA) operating in the M-30/T-05-15 corridor as High Priority Targets (HPT) for MANPADS and heavy machine gun units. Utilize localized EW (anti-drone jammers) to create short-range bubbles of protection around C2 nodes and dispersal points.
   • Rationale: RF RECCE is necessary to monetize the C2 confusion into physical targeting and ground exploitation. Killing the ISR disrupts the targeting chain.

3. AIR DEFENSE RE-TASKING (AIR FORCE / J-3): SWIFT READJUSTMENT OF AD PRIORITIES.

   • Action: Given the likely delay/abortion of the NLT 240000Z massed ballistic strike, immediately re-task two-thirds (2/3) of available high-value interceptors (Patriot/SAMP-T) to prioritize defense of critical C2 nodes and logistics hubs (e.g., Kramatorsk/Druzhkivka region) from high-speed, long-range cruise missile strikes (Kh-101/Kalibr), which are the next logical kinetic phase cover for EW operations.
   • Rationale: The immediate anti-ballistic threat appears lower. Protecting remaining C2 structure from fixed-wing attack is now the priority.

4. STRATEGIC IO (STRATCOM): DEFLECT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE.

   • Action: STRATCOM must issue a coordinated, high-level diplomatic response directly addressing the amplified reports of US/EU support withdrawal. The message must frame these reports as direct RF psychological operations designed to coincide with the Pokrovsk offensive, proving RF dependence on cognitive warfare rather than military superiority.
   • Rationale: Maintain coalition stability and counter the strategic paralysis effect of the "Geneva Framework" narrative.

//END SITREP//