Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 240400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 240300Z NOV 25 – 240400Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL AREA: POKROVSK AXIS (CRITICAL / TRANSITION PHASE) OVERALL THREATCON: CAT-2 (OPERATIONAL FAILURE IMMINENT)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The UAF reserve maneuver (Plan 7-B MOD) has successfully transitioned out of the defined RF Peak Kinetic Threat Window (ending 240400Z) characterized by maximum KAB density. The RF threat vector is now confirmed to be shifting immediately to Electronic Warfare (EW) and Cognitive Targeting aimed at fragmenting isolated UAF units.

New reporting confirms deep strike activity inside the Russian Federation (RF) territory (Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod region). This event serves as a strategic counter-signal and likely diversionary operation, but its impact on the immediate Pokrovsk crisis is indirect. The integrity of Plan 7-B MOD remains the critical operational variable.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: Dimitrov vicinity (T-05-15 route) remains the immediate RF focus. The operational risk has transitioned from physical destruction (KAB) to C2 isolation and psychological collapse (PSYOP/EW).
• M-30 GLOC: Functionally severed. UAF reserve elements must now establish secure bypass/defense lines NLT 240600Z.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable weather persists, favoring RF ISR and long-range ground observation, essential for guiding post-KAB precision fire and directing EW assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF elements (40th/155th OMBR) are now postured to transition into the C2 Attack Phase. RF tactical aviation sorties are expected to decrease, replaced by increased dedicated EW (jammers) and localized PSYOP broadcasts in the M-30 corridor. UAF (Plan 7-B MOD): Currently focused on dispersal, hardening of tactical C2, and implementing EMCON protocols as they establish hasty defensive positions.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF is demonstrating exceptional synchronization between kinetic, EW, and cognitive domains. The capability to project deep strike cover via AD (confirmed previous report) and manage deep strikes on their own territory (Kstovo response) suggests resource flexibility, though strained. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Intention (Next 4 Hours):

1. C2 Disruption: Execute the predicted C2 attack (jamming/propaganda) focused on the tactical VHF/UHF radio nets used by Plan 7-B MOD.
2. Exploitation: RF 40th/155th OMBR reconnaissance elements will press forward, leveraging the expected C2 confusion to probe for soft points along the newly formed UAF defensive perimeter.
3. IO Amplification: RF sources will continue to amplify tactical IO (Kupyansk capture claims) and strategic IO (Geneva Peace Framework) to further distract UAF High Command.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift from peak KAB to EW/PSYOP is not an adaptation but the expected next phase of the integrated RF offensive. RF sources (Strelkov, Rudenko) are heavily pushing propaganda regarding the alleged capture of Kupyansk, attempting to establish an opportunistic operational success narrative to compound pressure on the Pokrovsk sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Confirmed reports of explosions in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod region (240255Z), deep inside Russia. This location is significant due to potential fuel depots or industrial targets. If this was a successful UAF strike, it indicates UAF deep strike sustainment and RF internal force protection vulnerability, requiring RF diversion of AD and logistics resources away from the immediate front.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in sequencing multi-domain attacks. The immediate threat is the RF's ability to isolate UAF tactical C2, not a failure in RF C2 itself. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Transitioning from high-risk maneuver to defensive establishment. The C2 integrity of Plan 7-B MOD elements is paramount. READINESS: High psychological resilience is required to counteract localized surrender PSYOP. Readiness must pivot from AD defense to secure communications doctrine enforcement.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Confirmed deep strike activity (Kstovo indicator) demonstrates continued reach and strategic leverage, forcing RF commitment to internal defense. SETBACK: Plan 7-B MOD is now entering the highest risk phase for C2 fragmentation and unit isolation (240400Z onwards).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (NEW PRIORITY): Robust, dedicated anti-jamming measures (E.g., Starlink/LPI/LPD systems) and strict EMCON enforcement. CONSTRAINT: Real-time damage assessment (BDA) and location tracking of Plan 7-B MOD elements (CRITICAL GAP 1) are hindered by the need for EMCON.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

CORE THREAT: RF continues the synchronized strategic/tactical deception.

1. Strategic Deception: Sustained messaging regarding the "Geneva Peace Framework" and imminent US-brokered capitulation (Rudenko, Tsarev messaging) aimed at paralyzing NCA and coalition support.
2. Tactical IO: Claims of successful offensive action (Kupyansk capture, despite D-S analysis showing moderate belief, not confirmation) are used to inflate RF morale and demoralize UAF forces on unrelated axes (Pokrovsk).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal RF sentiment channels (Strelkov network) reflect deep cynicism regarding RF military leadership, domestic corruption (Astrakhan deputy, Sberbank layoffs), and economic hardship. This internal friction remains a long-term strategic vulnerability for the RF.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Focus remains on countering the RF-amplified "Peace Plan" narrative. The priority is ensuring international support remains tied to kinetic realities, not diplomatic fiction.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (240400Z - 240800Z)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. EW Attack Max Effort: RF dedicated EW assets will initiate maximum jamming attempts targeting UAF tactical voice and data links along the Pokrovsk axis (M-30/T-05-15 corridor).
2. PSYOP Intensification: Localized propaganda broadcasts (surrender demands, false command messages) will be broadcast over UAF targeted frequencies, synchronized with the jamming efforts.
3. Fire Guidance: RF ground elements will utilize UAVs and forward observers to guide localized precision fire (artillery/mortars) against any concentrated UAF signature that breaks EMCON or is detected during the transition phase.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF jamming successfully isolates the C2 of Plan 7-B MOD components. Without reliable communications, sub-unit commanders, under localized PSYOP pressure and ground fire from RF reconnaissance elements, fail to establish a coherent line, leading to operational fragmentation and a localized rout. RF 40th/155th OMBR is then able to bypass Rodynske defenses and achieve unhindered exploitation toward Mirnohrad/Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL STATUS)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The transition from kinetic interdiction to cognitive warfare requires an immediate pivot in force protection doctrine. The priority is preserving C2 and countering RF EW synchronization.

1. C2 AND EW DEFENSE (J6 / J3): STRICT EMCON AND HARDENED COMMS.

   • Action: Immediately enforce EMCON Level 2 (Strict Silent Running) for all maneuvering elements until IDL confirmation (NLT 240600Z). Primary communication must be through frequency-hopping, secure digital systems (e.g., Starlink) or non-RF burst communications. Use of conventional VHF/UHF tactical nets is to be considered compromised until further notice.
   • Rationale: The RF MLCOA is C2 isolation. Breaking EMCON or using predictable nets guarantees RF fire/jamming response and subsequent unit fragmentation.

2. COUNTER-PSYOP (J3 / UNIT COMMANDERS): PRE-EMPTIVE NARRATIVE CONTROL.

   • Action: Disseminate a highly condensed, explicit order to all sub-unit leaders: "Ignore all unverified radio transmissions, leaflets, and media reports claiming operational collapse or peace." The only valid command must come through encrypted, pre-designated digital channels.
   • Rationale: Directly combat the localized PSYOP threat designed to trigger surrender or panic in isolated units.

3. AIR DEFENSE (AIR FORCE / J-3): RE-TASK AD FOR LOW-ALTITUDE SCREENING.

   • Action: With the peak KAB window concluded, redeploy mobile SHORAD units to protect EW/SIGINT assets and C2 nodes establishing the IDL. Prioritize low-altitude screening against RF reconnaissance UAVs (Orlan, ZALA) that will guide RF ground exploitation.
   • Rationale: The RF shift relies on ISR to target units during C2 confusion. Killing the ISR platforms disrupts the RF ground exploitation plan.

4. STRATEGIC IO (STRATCOM): LEVERAGE KSTOVO FOR COUNTER-NARRATIVE.

   • Action: If CRITICAL GAP 3 confirms the Kstovo strike targeted a high-value military or industrial asset, STRATCOM must immediately integrate this reality into messaging, juxtaposing the successful deep strike capability with the RF’s false diplomatic narratives.
   • Rationale: Demonstrate UAF capability to hit back deep, undermining the RF narrative of control and military dominance, particularly in the context of the "Geneva Framework."

//END SITREP//